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ABSTRACT
Critical infrastructure systems play a vital role in the supply of lifeline services to busi-
nesses and the wider public. It is of paramount importance for national security, public
health, and economic prosperity that these critical structures function properly. Unfor-
tunately, with respect to drinking water infrastructures in the US, much of the pipeline
assets are nearing the end of their useful life and utilities are challenged with maintaining
these systems with limited budgets and information.
Risk analysis is a useful decision making tool which can allow managers to better identify
weaknesses, and aid better investment decisions regarding maintenance, inspection, and
repair. The current practice for risk analysis and management of critical water systems
falls short of the approaches preferred by risk researchers. The aim of this thesis is
to advance to practice and theory. This involves the evaluation of existing methods as
well as the incorporation of modern analytical tools to fundamentally advance the state
of practice. This thesis first critically analyzes a popular risk analysis standard (J100-
10) to establish the knowledge gap between practice and theory in the water domain.
Two quantitative methodologies are then explored: machine learning and mathematical
optimization. The research here demonstrates how they can be integrated into a broader
risk framework and used to improve assessments for water systems.
The work presented in this dissertation represents a significant contribution to the field
of infrastructure risk and reliability analysis. While the domain application is specific






In many parts of the United States, drinking water infrastructure is nearing the end of its use-
ful life and upgrades are needed to ensure the consistent delivery of complaint water with federal
quality standards to end users [10]. It is estimated that over one trillion US dollars of capital invest-
ments are required for necessary upgrades to the nation’s water infrastructure [19]. Furthermore,
there are additional social and economic burdens when failures to the distribution system occur.
These costs are often associated with public health risks [130], stoppage of service, and public
disruption as a result of emergency repairs [205].
Despite drinking water systems being recognized as one of the most critical infrastructures [70],
current practice for quantitative risk management of these systems falls short of the approaches
preferred by risk researchers. Some examples include: 1) inappropriate metrics used to quantify
risk may be simple to implement but can lead to misallocation of resources [60] and 2) the scope
of most frameworks do not adequately address emerging threats to water systems [200]. The
aim of the proposed research is to improve infrastructure risk analysis practice and theory. This
involves the evaluation of existing methods as well as the incorporation of modern analytical tools
to fundamentally advance the state of practice.
The research presented in this thesis aims to achieve the following goals:
1. Evaluate the J100-10 risk analysis standard against the state of the art.
2. Advance the literature on pipe break machine learning techniques to better forecast future
failures.
3. Apply modern optimization tools to plan for inspection routes when having to account for
limitations of inspection tools.
Together these goals combine to form a holistic body of work that represents a significant
contribution to the risk and resilience literature for infrastructure systems. Section 1.3 discusses
why these specific subjects are selected for this thesis.
1.1 Drinking Water Distribution System Overview
This section first provides some background on the schematic of drinking water distribution sys-
tems. In the US, water supply systems are usually owned and operated by local municipalities,
but occasionally belong to private organizations. Figure 1.1 illustrates the basic process in how
drinking water is extracted from its natural source, delivered to the end user, and transported back
to the natural source.
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Figure 1.1: Schematic of Drinking Water System Cycle.
Large aqueducts or transmission mains deliver the water from a reservoir, lake, or underground
aquifer to the treatment facility. There the water is processed and treated to meet chemical quality
standards [10] such that it is fit for human consumption. Then the water is transported through
transmissions mains either directly to both the end user as well as storage facilities scattered
throughout the service area. In a supply network there needs to be sufficient positive pressure
to ensure that water reaches all consumers. Pressure and flow is regulated by pumps and valves
as well as natural elevation itself, where pressure is generated by having water flow from high to
low points. Water towers provide storage capacity at raised elevations. When water is released,
gravity provides additional pressurization for the delivery of water to consumers. Once homes and
business have finished consumption, the wastewater system extracts and delivers the water back to
a treatment site [192]. There the water is once again treated to meet quality standards such that it
can be returned to the raw source (e.g. river, lake, ocean).
1.2 Research Motivation
This thesis focuses on advancing the risk analysis methodology of water distribution systems.
Today, most Americans and American businesses get their water from one of approximately 51000
community water systems, which make up over 1 million miles of distribution pipe [39]. Many of
these systems are small, serving populations of 500 or fewer people. Approximately 10000 large
water systems located in densely populated areas serve around 82% of the total population. These
vast and intricate systems that deliver the lifeline good of potable water are often taken for granted.
However, increasing rates of failure due to aging combined with limited funding for asset renewal
[38] has highlighted the importance for sound management of these buried infrastructures.
To provide a first inclination on the urgency of the matter, a report by the American Water
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Works Association surveyed various types of buried pipeline assets and their corresponding design
life [37]. Cast-iron distribution pipes laid in the late 1880s have an average lifespan of 120 years,
while those laid in the 1920s which were constructed using different manufacturing techniques
have a lifespan of 100 years. The pipes laid during the post-World War II economic boom were
expected to have a useful life span of about 75 years. These values indicate that much of the
underground pipeline network for potable water systems in the US will be due for replacement in
the next 2 decades [54].
As a result, being able to accurately identify the assets that are most prone to failure, and
making the right mitigation decisions on these risks, is of utmost importance for utility managers.
However, a study by the EPA [38] points out that a simple prioritization based on material age
would lead to a sub optimal investment strategy. The rate of deterioration of a water system is not
a simple function of age but rather the cumulative effect of the internal and external forces acting
on it. These include external and internal corrosion, hydraulic conditions inside the pipe, the soil
properties surrounding the pipe, as well as the piping material itself. Therefore, in order for an
effective use of limited capital resources, better frameworks for assessing system risk and decision
making is needed.
The current state of practice for risk assessment of water infrastructure, and other infrastructure
systems in general, lacks the sophistication found in literature [60]. In this thesis, I first critically
evaluate the J100-10 [23] risk analysis standard which is widely used in the water industry. By
highlighting its limitations and weaknesses, we can identify the current gap between practice and
theory. While there are numerous critiques published in the literature regarding the J100-10 and
other similar risk analysis frameworks, much of the assessments have solely focused on the indi-
viduals approaches rather than comparing multiple methods against one another [183]. The first
part of the thesis aims to advance our understanding of some popular methods in the context of
risk prioritization.
Secondly, modern mathematical techniques can lend themselves useful for addressing prac-
tical challenges in condition assessment and asset management. The rest of this thesis explores
how statistical modeling and optimization tools can be applied to advance current practice of risk
assessment. Therefore this work not only fills a research gap, but also makes advances towards in-
troducing vital tools for practitioners which guide resource allocations to optimize risk reductions.
1.3 Project Objectives
The goal of this thesis is to enhance our understanding of risk assessment approaches in their utility
for infrastructure asset management, as well as advancing the state of practice by examining the use
of analytical tools to provide useful decision support. Table 1.1 below summarizes the intellectual
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contribution and methodology focus for each of the remaining chapters of this dissertation.
Table 1.1: Intellectual Contribution and Methods Focus of Dissertation Chapters.
Chapter Intellectual Contribution Methodology Focus
2
Gap analysis between risk
analysis literature and practice.
Foundations of the risk analysis field.
3, 4




Extending the existing techniques
for pipe break prediction.
Statistical modelling, supervised learning,
unsupervised learning.
To help frame the research better, we first begin with an analysis on the current state of risk as-
sessment protocols in the water industry. The goal of the thesis is to advance practice and theory for
the risk and resilience assessments of water systems, a natural starting point is to first understand
what is being done in currently practice and to establish a knowledge gap. Two methodological
techniques are the focus for the remainder of the thesis: statistical learning, and mathematical op-
timization, each of them pertaining to specific processes in the risk assessment framework. The
topic of pipe break prediction is selected because it is a critical component for any risk analysis for
water systems due to pipeline failure. In order for utilities to better allocate their resources, they
need to target the assets which are in poorest condition. The contributions here are to 1) address
practical challenges when implementing these models, and 2) demonstrate an advancement in the
modeling methodology which can improve performance. The problem of inspection planning is
also selected because it is another key component of a risk assessment process. Robotic condition
assessments are expensive, and utilities want to get the maximum return on investments for each
inspection. This thesis aims to explore how the techniques of mathematical optimization can be
used to help identify good routes for the use of robotic inspection tools.
1.3.1 Project 1: Review and Evaluation of the J100-10 Risk and Resilience
Management Standard
The objective of the first project is to identify the gap between risk analysis practice and theory in
the water infrastructure sector. To address the ever growing need of having a uniform and holistic
risk assessment framework within the water industry, in 2010 the American Water Works Associa-
tion published the “J100-10 Risk and Resilience Management of Water and Wastewater Systems”
(referred to simply as J100-10) standard to be used by practitioners across the US [23]. This stan-
dard was modeled closely after the 2006 cross-sector infrastructure risk assessment framework
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“Risk Analysis and Management for Critical Asset Protection” (or RAMCAPTM ) published by
the Department of Homeland Security, but adapts the methods to be specific to the water sector.
In Chapter 2 of this thesis, I evaluate the methods listed in J100-10 against the current state of
the art in the risk analysis literature. The analysis covers both conceptual and practical limitations
that can lead to inadequate risk characterizations and misguide decision makers.
Figure 1.2: Front Cover of the J100-10 Risk Management Standard [23].
To my knowledge, no previous work has holistically reviewed an entire risk analysis standard
against the foundations of the risk analysis field in this manner. The contribution here is to identify
areas where risk analysis practice in the water infrastructure industry can be improved. By present-
ing this review of the J100-10 and highlighting of its main shortcomings we aim to establish the
gap between practice and theory, and ultimately guide future improvements made to the standard.
6
1.3.2 Project 2: Routing Optimization of Robotic Pipeline Inspections
To aid the development of an effective asset management plan, inspection operations are often em-
ployed to gather information on the current condition of the system. Some commercially available
products are shown in Figure 1.3.
Figure 1.3: Commercial Robotic Pipeline Inspection Technologies developed by Pure Technolo-
gies U.S. [140]. Left: SmartballTM , Right: PipeDiverTM
SmartballTM uses an acoustic technology to target leak detection, while PipeDiverTM uses
electromagnetic technology to scan for pipe wall defects [140]. These are two examples of the
variety of inspection technologies utility managers could leverage, and having an effective plan for
their deployment can increase the return on investments. However prioritizing inspections based
solely on the risk of inspected assets, a widely popular approach in both the academic literature and
practice, can lead to suboptimal results because the operational limits of the inspection technology
must be accounted for [65]. These considerations can affect the quality of the collected data, and
ultimately the return on investment for inspection expenditures.
The goal of this project is to present a mathematical optimization formulation for the plan-
ning of pipe inspection routes, and demonstrate how it can be solved in networks of various sizes
and complexities. The work here is divided across two chapters. Chapter 3 introduces a general
optimization framework for the problem, and explores the application of heuristic methods for
identifying routes in both synthetic and real networks. Chapter 4 revisits the same problem and
presents a full integer programming model, a variety of exact solution algorithms are demonstrated
on a real network and their scalabilities are examined. The contribution of this project is to present
both a heuristic and exact framework for the mathematical optimization of inspection routes while
considering platform limitations. To my knowledge, no previous academic literature tackles the
problem in this manner.
By presenting and comparing both exact and approximate solution methods, we aim to provide
insight for decision makers on how mathematical optimization can provide useful decision support
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for inspection planning.
1.3.3 Project 3: Pipe Break Machine Learning for Maintenance Prioritiza-
tion
The failure of drinking water systems occurs under three broad categorizations: source water con-
tamination, treatment deficiencies, and distribution network failure [158]. The focus of this project
is the predictive modeling of distribution network failures, specifically water main breaks.
While there are many previous works on pipe break models [117, 169, 201], many of them
are inapplicable simply because utilities do not have records of information regarding the pipelines
themselves. The work is also divided into two chapters. Chapter 5 tackles the data scarcity problem
many water utilities have [101, 43] by examining whether pipe break models built using only public
data can accurately forecast future failures. The contribution here is to determine if statistical
learning techniques can provide useful decision support for utility managers in identifying system
vulnerabilities without any available system data. Chapter 6 expands the modeling literature by
combining supervised and unsupervised modelling techniques, it explores if information about
spatial clusters of pipe breaks can improve predictive accuracy. To my knowledge, no previous
academic work on pipe break modeling has evaluated the combination of clustering and machine
learning techniques for predictive accuracy.
Ultimately, the goal is to extend the literature on statistical modeling of pipeline failures, and
demonstrate that better prioritization for renewal and replacement spending can be achieved.
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CHAPTER 2
Review and Evaluation of the J100-10 Risk and
Resilience Management Standard for Water and
Wastewater Systems
Risk analysis standards are often employed to protect critical infrastructures which are vital to a na-
tions security, economy, and safety of its citizens. We present an analysis framework for evaluating
such standards and apply it to the J100-10 risk analysis standard for water and wastewater systems.
In doing so, we identify gaps between practices recommended in the standard and the state of the
art. While individual processes found within infrastructure risk analysis standards have been eval-
uated in the past, we present a foundational review and focus specifically on water systems. By
highlighting both the conceptual shortcomings and practical limitations, we aim to prioritize the
shortcomings needed to be addressed. Key findings from this study include: 1) risk definitions fail
to address notions of uncertainty, 2) the sole use “worst reasonable case” assumptions can lead to
mischaracterizations of risk, 3) analysis of risk and resilience at the threat-asset resolutions ignores
dependencies within the system, and 4) stakeholders values need to be assessed when balancing
the tradeoffs between risk reduction and resilience enhancement.
Keywords: Drinking Water Distribution System, Asset Management, Risk Analysis and Man-
agement
Note: The research presented in this chapter has been accepted for publication at the Journal
of Risk Analysis, acceptance date on Oct 14, 2019. Co-authors: Valerie Nicole Washington, Seth




Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the federal government recognized the need to de-
fine and prioritize the requirements for protecting the nation’s infrastructure [23]. As a result, the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 [59] prescribed a cross-sector risk assessment plan to identify
vulnerabilities for all critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR) and define a framework to
prioritize defense resource allocation. As defined in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan
(NIPP) of 2009 [70], CIKRs include energy, water (drinking and waste), transportation, communi-
cations, and government facilities.
The potential importance of a uniform risk analysis procedure was recognized when the White
House recruited the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) to develop a procedure
applicable across different types of infrastructure [23]. The goal was that common terminology,
metrics, and methodology would facilitate comparisons within and across CIKR sectors, and sup-
port decision making for risk reduction investments. In 2006, ASME released the specifications
for Risk Analysis and Management for Critical Asset Protection (RAMCAPTM ), which serves as
the basis for J100-10 [23]. RAMCAPTM defines a seven-step process (discussed in Section 2.1.2)
to assess risk and resilience for a given asset and to prioritize countermeasures.
RAMCAPTM outlines three major objectives [21]: 1) to define a common framework for own-
ers and operators of critical infrastructure to assess consequences and vulnerabilities relating to
terrorist attacks on their assets and systems, 2) to provide guidance on methods that can be used
to assess and evaluate risk through this framework, and 3) to provide an efficient and consistent
mechanism to report risk information to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
The American Water Works Association (AWWA) adopted the RAMCAPTM seven-step frame-
work to create a water and wastewater sector specific risk analysis standard, and in 2010 published
the J100-10 standard for Risk and Resilience Management of Water and Wastewater Systems [23].
While RAMCAPTM and J100-10 were initially developed with the intent of analyzing risks as-
sociated with terrorist attacks [21], subsequent updates expanded the analysis breadth to include
a variety of threats (e.g. natural hazards, dependency, and proximity threats). Beyond allowing
utility operators to systematically assess risk, J100-10 provides methods to evaluate options for
improving weaknesses in water and wastewater systems [23]. The aim is to prioritize the actions
that better mitigate risks and can lead to more resilient critical infrastructure.
We use the term risk analysis in this chapter as it is defined in the Society of Risk Analysis
(SRA) glossary [186]. Risk analysis is “a systematic process to comprehend the nature of risk
and to express risk with the available knowledge”. A fundamental principles document from SRA
highlights some key criteria for a high quality risk analysis [187]: it needs to be reliable, valid,
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and the decision maker needs to have confidence in the results. Reliable means that there is re-
producibility in the process (encompassing analyst, methods, procedures etc.), and valid meaning
there is success at characterizing the relevant risks. A key is that the degree of knowledge (or lack
thereof) of the analyst is properly communicated to the decision maker. The ultimate goal is to
inform and support decision making for risk management.
In this chapter, we provide an analysis framework for assessing risk analysis standards and
present a holistic review of J100-10 to highlight its conceptual shortcomings and practical limi-
tations. Our goal in this chapter is to begin a conversation about how to strengthen the J100-10
moving forward.
2.1.2 J100-10 Definitions
Two key components of a risk management standard are the definitions and the underlying con-
ceptualizations of risk. Before proceeding further with our assessment, we include key definitions
from J100-10 [23], which were adopted from RAMCAPTM . The following definitions are taken
verbatim from the standard, and a discussion on their sufficiency is presented in later sections. For
ease of reading, we have eliminated block quotations.
Risk is “the potential for loss or harm due to the likelihood of an unwanted event and its
adverse consequences” (page 18, J100-10 manual [23]). J100-10 uses the RAMCAPTM approach
to quantify risk using Equation (2.1) below [23]:
Risk = Threat Likelihood× Consequence× Vulnerability (2.1)
Threat likelihood is “the probability that an undesired event will occur” (page 49, J100-10
manual [23]). With natural hazards, J100-10 states that this should be “the historical frequency of
similar events, unless there is a belief that the future will differ from the past. With malevolent
threats, the likelihood is a function of available intelligence, the objectives and capabilities of the
adversary, and the attractiveness as a target” (page 49, J100-10 manual [23]).
Consequence is defined as “the immediate, short- and long-term effects of a malevolent attack
or natural incident” (page 43, J100-10 manual [23]), which J100-10 specifies should be estimated
exclusively on a “worst reasonable case basis” (page 8, J100-10 manual [23]). These effects in-
clude fatalities, injuries, and losses suffered by the owner of the asset and by the community served
by that asset.
Vulnerability is “an inherent state of the system (e.g. physical, technical, organizational, cul-
tural) that can be exploited by an adversary or impacted by a natural hazard to cause harm or
damage” (page 49, J100-10 manual [23]). J100-10 specifies that vulnerability should be expressed
as the likelihood of an event resulting in the estimated consequences, given that the event occurs.
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There are various definitions of risk presented in the academic literature [186], a discussion on
the sufficiency of the J100-10 definition in Equation (2.1) is presented in section 2.4.1.
Resilience is “the ability of an asset or system to withstand an attack or natural hazard without
interruption of performing the asset or systems function or, if the function is interrupted, to restore
the function rapidly” (page 19, J100-10 manual [23]). Resilience can be considered at the threat-
asset level or at the system level. Asset-level resilience is defined on a scale such that lower values
indicate greater resilience. It can be calculated using the following three metrics:
1. Operational Resilience Metric (ORM) measures the service denial due to a threat-asset pair,
weighted by vulnerability and threat likelihood. It is calculated following equation (2.2)
[23]:
ORM = Duration× Severity× Vulnerability× Threat Likelihood (2.2)
Duration is the time, in days, of service denial and severity is the amount of service denied
(in gallons of water per day).
2. Owners Economic Resilience Metric (OERM) converts ORM into a dollar value and char-
acterizes the financial loss to the utility owner, and is calculated following equation (2.3)
[23]:
OERM = ORM× Preincident Unit Price (2.3)
3. Community Economic Resilience Metric is the lost economic activity, in dollars, to the com-
munity served by the utility. Estimating these impacts requires a regional simulator and/or
economic model to fully capture the direct and indirect effects.
An evaluation on the conceptualization of the J100-10 resilience definition (equation (2.2) and
equation (2.3)) is presented in section 2.4.3.
2.1.3 J100-10 Risk Analysis Process
J100-10 outlines a seven-step risk analysis process, as shown in Figure 2.1 below.
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Figure 2.1: The adopted RAMCAPTM process in the J100-10. Taken from the J100-10 Risk
Management Standard [23].
Below we provide a brief description of each of the seven steps of the assessment methodology.
1. Asset Characterization: Identify the critical assets, which if compromised, would inhibit the
organization from carrying out its mission or operational goals. Asset ranking can be used
to prioritize components for analysis if the number is too large to include them all.
2. Threat Characterization: Identify and describe reference threats scenarios to estimate vul-
nerability and consequence. Reference categories include malevolent threats, natural haz-
ards, and proximity and dependency threats. Additional threats can be added as long as they
are used in the analysis of all assets under consideration.
3. Consequence Analysis: Identify and estimate the “worst reasonable consequence” generated
by each threat-asset combination. Consequence metric categories include fatality count,
serious injury count, financial loss to the owners, and economic losses to the community.
4. Vulnerability Analysis: Estimate the conditional likelihood that, given an adverse event oc-
curs on the asset, the estimated consequences will occur. Some methods for estimating
this value suggested by J100-10 include direct expert elicitation, path analysis, vulnerability
logic diagrams, event trees, or a hybrid of these methods.
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5. Threat Assessment: Estimate the probability that each of the identified threats will occur
in a given time frame (typically one year). J100-10 provides guidance on how to estimate
these values for different types of threats, e.g., an event tree based approach for malevolent
threats, or using federal agency-specific resources for various natural hazards (e.g., the Fed-
eral Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) flood insurance rate maps, or the National
Hurricane Center risk analysis program, HURISK).
6. Risk and Resilience Assessment: Use Equation (2.1) to calculate the risk metric, equa-
tion (2.2) and (2.3) to calculate the resilience metrics for each threat-asset pair. J100-10
outlines a utility resilience index (URI), which assesses the operational and financial capa-
bilities of the utility to cope with various incidents that have the potential to disrupt service.
7. Risk and Resilience Management: Implement actions to achieve a level of acceptable risk
and resilience at an acceptable cost. Benefit-cost analysis is useful for suggesting potential
actions, e.g. new security countermeasures or consequence mitigation features. Benefits are
calculated as the expected risk reduction or resilience increase and costs are defined in dollar
units.
2.2 Literature Review
2.2.1 Standardized Risk Analysis Methods in the Water Sector
By one estimate, there are more than 250 critical infrastructure risk analysis methods [134]. Many
of these methods have been used in other risk analysis standards to study water infrastructure prior
to the development of RAMCAPTM or J100-10. Three of these prior standards in particular have
been widely documented and used [23]. They are 1) the Risk Assessment Methodology - Water
(RAM-WTM ) [100] developed by Sandia National Laboratories, 2) the Scientech and PA Consult-
ing Group Vulnerability Self-Assessment Tool (VSATTM ) [99], and 3) the National Rural Water
Association Security and Environmental Management System (SEMSTM ) [22]. RAM-WTM was
specifically developed to evaluate the risk of adversarial threats. It is a water sector-specific ver-
sion of the RAMCAPTM standard (see Section 2.1.3 for general seven-step approach) that focuses
on risk quantification, while J100-10 analyzes both risk and resilience. VSATTM was originally
intended for use by wastewater utilities, but was later adapted to include drinking water utilities. It
uses a risk matrix, estimated as a combination of qualitative criticality and vulnerability ratings, to
determine which assets need security improvements [13]. SEMSTM was developed for small sys-
tems in rural areas. It uses a simple “yes” or “no” questionnaire to help owners of utilities identify
vulnerabilities and improvement actions. While it does not describe any explicit quantification of
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risk, SEMSTM provides information about the operating conditions and asset status of the utility.
Following the release of RAMCAPTM , the VSATTM and RAM-WTM standards have been
modified to be consistent with the RAMCAPTM seven-step framework. SEMSTM has been adapted
to include questions that cover basic information required by RAMCAPTM [23], such as certain
security measures. Despite the wide variety of available assessment frameworks, we chose to eval-
uate J100-10 because it was the first standard to include both a wide range of risk sources and all
types of water infrastructure in its analysis.
2.2.2 J100-10 and RAMCAPTM Critiques
In this section, we review some of the previous critiques and contextualize them within our broader
review of J100-10. The presented critiques of J100-10 have broader implications for the parent
RAMCAPTM standard. Because RAMCAPTM serves as the foundation of J100-10, we include
critiques of this standard as well.
While the J100-10 and RAMCAPTM standards do not mandate that utilities report risk as-
sessment results or implement countermeasures, some utilities have documented the use of the
approach to guide decision making to improve facility security. A cross-infrastructure sector im-
plementation is found in Krimgold (2012) [122], where the RAMCAPTM methodology is imple-
mented to analyze power, water, transport, and communications systems in an unnamed metropoli-
tan region. This is done to better identify specific threats and their respective consequences across
sectors. The study concludes that the RAMCAPTM asset-level assessment provides useful guid-
ance on defining risk through operational units, which assists in the prioritization of short- and
long-term risk management goals.
Herrare et al. (2017) [93] examine an implementation of RAMCAPTM to Colorado’s trans-
portation sector, which helped identify system vulnerabilities and assisted in supporting federal
emergency response funding requests. The Department of Transportation favored the benefit-cost
analysis within the risk and resilience management step used to evaluate multiple mitigation op-
tions since it provided a data-driven approach to support decision making.
An implementation specific to the water sector is found in Kerr et al. (2015) [109], which pro-
vides a case study from a utility in Peel, CA. In this study, the utility uses the J100-10 assessment
method to develop a long-term strategy to manage and reduce risk through capital investment and
operational planning. The authors find that using the J100-10 analysis framework gives the utility
a more complete and unbiased understanding of the assets that are at highest risk, which allows
for a clearer process for capital investment decision making. In addition, the risk and resilience
management guidelines provide a framework for the continual review and revision of the analysis
as mitigation plans are implemented.
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A number of academic studies have critiqued the risk assessment methodology outlined in
the RAMCAPTM standard. High-level critiques include Cox (2008) [60], which emphasizes the
shortcomings of the threat-vulnerability-consequence triplet definition of risk as well as the ordi-
nal scales used in the RAMCAPTM risk calculation. Some of the main limitations discussed by
Cox (2008) [60] are that RAMCAPTM fails to address possible correlations between the threat,
vulnerability, and consequence components. Additionally, it does not account for non-additivity of
risk when aggregating from the analysis level of threat-asset pairs to system-level risk estimates,
the use of ordinal scoring values to calculate risk can lead to sub-optimal allocation of resources
for implementing countermeasures, and notions of uncertainty related to the estimates of threats
and consequences are not addressed in the analysis.
Burkhart (2015) [55] identifies consistency and scope problems in the J100-10 standard; for ex-
ample, the utility is given the choice to analyze the resilience at either the asset or system level, but
no guidance is provided on how to choose between the two resolutions. Furthermore, no concrete
process is outlined for defining a single level of acceptable risk, especially if multiple decision
makers are involved. As a more general critique of assessments using risk-based scoring methods
for resource allocation, Cox (2009) [62] specifies that such an approach often fails to account for
interdependencies and risk externalities (risk for parts of a system changes as countermeasures are
added) among the considered threats.
Critiques of specific steps within the J100-10 process have been discussed in the academic
literature. Cox (2008) [61] highlights the limitations of using risk matrices to drive prioritization
decisions. Such use of risk matrix methods from RAMCAPTM can be found in the asset character-
ization step, which is used to screen assets for analysis to reduce the scope of the risk assessment.
The study argues that risk matrices often have poor risk resolution and errors in risk estimation,
which can lead to suboptimal prioritization decisions.
Consequence estimation, as defined in the J100-10 and RAMCAPTM standards, are based
solely on a “worst reasonable case” [23] premise, the common thinking being that this results in a
conservative (inflated) estimate of risk intended to add a factor of safety. A case study in off-sea
oil drilling presented by Huage et al. (2014) [91] highlight the limitations of this approach. The
authors explain that uncertainties related to characterizing extreme outcomes and their likelihoods
can limit the usefulness of an assessment.
The threat analysis step in the RAMCAPTM methodology defines 41 reference threats, which
include terrorist threats, natural hazards, and dependency hazards. The J100-10 standard uses
the same 41 reference threats and provides details for analyzing risk from these threats. How-
ever, White et al. (2016) [200] recognize the failure of this process to account for key emerging
threats (climate change, aging infrastructure, and cyber attacks) and propose 13 additional refer-
ence threats to address these emerging issues. As a follow up study, White et al. (2016) [199] use
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a simulated RAMCAPTM model to analyze the performance under the proposed set of 54 threats.
The risk and resilience analysis step defines risk as the product of the consequence, vulnera-
bility, and threat likelihood, which make up the triplet definition of risk. The shortcomings of this
approach is well established in the risk science literature, where the main concern is that potentials
for extreme outcomes are not properly reflected. Alternative and more general perspectives have
been developed where risk captures the triplet events, consequences, and uncertainties, see SRA
(2015) [186] and Aven 2012 [28], 2017 [32]. These perspectives build on Kaplan and Garrick
(1981) [106] who refer to risk qualitatively as “uncertainty plus damage”.
As shown above, there have been multiple case studies reported on the implementation of
the J100-10 standard in the water and wastewater sector and of RAMCAPTM in other infrastruc-
ture systems. There are also a number of studies by risk analysts highlighting the limitations
of RAMCAPTM and the methodologies it recommends for analyzing risk and resilience. These
critiques have focused on specific issues within certain steps of the analysis. In the subsequent
sections we will present a more comprehensive critique of the J100-10 assessment process as a
whole.
2.3 Analysis Framework
Here we define our framework for evaluating the J100-10 standard. The approach can be imple-
mented for a variety of risk analysis standards outside the water infrastructure domain. Based on
the criteria for a risk analysis outlined in Section 2.1.1, we identify two questions of emphasis: 1)
are risk and other key concepts (e.g. probability and resilience) being characterized adequately?,
and 2) are the recommended procedures in line with the state-of-the-art in risk science?
As a result, in this research we conceptually compare J100-10 against the state of the art in risk
science. We choose this approach because it focuses on the foundational issues of the risk analysis
field and measures the process against these established principles. An alternative approach is
to implement both J100-10 and a second risk analysis method and compare their outputs. This
can be tricky because various assessments are beset by tradeoffs of completeness, consistency, and
timeliness [199]. The development of a process to directly compare multiple frameworks is beyond
the scope of our analysis and is left for future research.
Our analytical framework can be divided into two categories: conceptual and practical lim-
itations. The former addresses the theoretical shortcomings. The latter addresses specific steps
which could lead to poor risk characterizations. We primarily focus on the risk analysis portion
of J100-10, but also discuss its guidelines for assessing resilience. We present our findings of the
conceptual and practical limitations in Sections 2.4 and 2.5, respectively.
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2.4 Conceptual Limitations
In the following section, we identify conceptual gaps related to definitions of key terms, how they
are calculated and interpreted in the standard, and how they relate to the state of the art in the field
of risk analysis.
2.4.1 Definitions of Risk
The operating risk definition in the J100-10 standard falls short because concepts of uncertainties
are not included. J100-10 uses the expected consequences definition of risk, which is calculated as
the product of the probability of a threat event, the conditional probability that the event will lead
to the worst-case consequences, and the consequences themselves. As discussed in Section 2.2.2,
this understanding of risk has severe limitations and its use can seriously mislead decision makers.
An analysis of the literature shows that there are multiple definitions of risk: some are broader,
while others lead more naturally to quantifiable equations. By distinguishing between the concept
of risk and how it is measured, a consensus can be reached on characteristics of risk, as shown
by the Society for Risk Analysis Glossary (2015) [186]. Aven (2012) [28] discusses the issue and
argues that a notion of uncertainty is required to capture the concept of risk. Analysts classify
uncertainty in two ways [167]: 1) aleatory uncertainty, which reflects variation in populations
and 2) epistemic uncertainty, which reflects lack of knowledge. The latter type of uncertainty
is key to understanding and characterizing risk, while the former is used to build probabilistic
models, when justified, and support the epistemic uncertainty characterizations. Understanding
where sources of uncertainty lie can help utilities better interpret assessment results and guide
management decisions to reduce uncertainty for future analyses. J100-10 does not attempt to
address uncertainty in the analysis process, evidenced by the fact the word “uncertainty” does
not appear anywhere in the standard. While there is debate regarding how uncertainties should
be characterized and propagated in assessments, e.g., some arguing probabilities fully capture
uncertainty [202] and others advocating for other methods [167, 94, 80], it is evident that the
current J100-10 framework falls short because uncertainty is not addressed at all.
Including the concept of uncertainty in the definition of risk can improve the assessment frame-
work of J100-10. The most common method is probabilistic risk assessments (PRA) [17], which
uses probabilities as the sole measure of uncertainty. Flage et al. (2014) [80] and Shortridge et al.
(2017) [183] outline a variety of other analysis methods, from simpler models that use qualitative
assessments of uncertainty, to more sophisticated technical models (e.g. use of possibility bounds
and evidence theory).
Another approach is to assess the underlying strength of knowledge when using probabilistic
judgments, for example, in relation to expert opinions. Experts include utility operators and share-
18
holders, and they can be used to assess threat likelihoods and consequence measures when data
is unavailable [23]. Typically, a stronger background knowledge is correlated with lower degrees
of uncertainty. In performing this assessment, the uncertainty description becomes a function of
their strength of background knowledge [20]. Askeland et al. (2017) [20] present a framework
to evaluate strength of knowledge, categorizing it as “weak”, “moderate”, or “strong” based on
five criteria: 1) experts understanding of the phenomena, 2) reliability and availability of data, 3)
agreement among experts, 4) identification, documentation, and soundness of assumptions, and
5) evaluation of knowledge gaps and changes in knowledge over time. Aven et al. (2013) [25]
present an alternative method for assessing strength of knowledge through assumption deviation
risk scores. Assumption deviation risk is defined as “risk related to a deviation between what
has been assumed and what actually occurs” [17]. To assess the risk, consideration is given to
deviation probabilities, consequences of deviation, and related strength of knowledge judgments.
Subsequent updates to the J100-10 standard can employ one or more of these methods or develop
methods more suitable for application in the water industry.
2.4.2 Concepts of Probability
Probabilities are an integral part of the risk assessment process in J100-10. The standard defines
probability on page 43 as follows:
“A measure of the likelihood, degree of belief, frequency, or chance that a particular event
will occur in a period of time (usually one year) or number of iterations or trials. This is usually
expressed quantitatively as a value between 0 and 1, a range of values between 0 and 1, a distri-
bution (density function), or the mean of such a distribution. Probability can also be expressed in
qualitative terms, e.g. low, medium, or high, if there is a common understanding of the meaning of
the qualitative terms” [23].
The definition presented is unclear in two ways. First, there are multiple ways outlined to
represent probabilities. For clear interpretation of results to drive decision making, it is vital to
have a consistent probability representation. Second, how these probabilities should be interpreted
is left ambiguous. Aven and Reniers (2013) [35] highlight the practical importance for decision
makers to understand what the risk analysis is communicating. For this reason, a concise definition
of probability and its interpretation is required. Many previous studies have discussed this issue at
length, see for example: White et al. (2016) [200, 199], Aven and Reiners (2013) [35]. The body
of work categorizes probability into two major schools of thought: frequentist and Bayesian.
The “frequentist” interpretation defines the probability of an event as the fraction of “successes”
over a hypothetical infinite series of independent and identical trials. An asymptotic relationship
is assumed where, as the number of trials increases, the fraction of successes will converge to the
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“true” value (according to the law of large numbers), which is interpreted as the probability of the
event. The true probability is in most cases, unknown and needs to be estimated. On the other hand,
the “Bayesian” view defines probability as a measure of the assessor’s degree of belief about the
event. This numerical encoding of one’s belief is always conditional on the assessor’s knowledge
base. Often, an example of drawing balls from an urn is used to provide an interpretation of the
probabilities [35].
The J100-10 standard needs to be clear on which form of probability is used in each of the risk
analysis steps because the two approaches can lead to different interpretations of the analysis, and
ultimately lead to different actions in practice [35]. When a frequentist view is used, it is important
that the historical records are representative of future scenarios. The uncertainties of the frequentist
estimates also need to be addressed. Similarly, when a Bayesian probability is adopted, evaluating
the analyst’s strength of knowledge on the matter is critical to understanding the usefulness of
the assessment. Furthermore, communicating this knowledge level is essential for the accurate
interpretation of a Bayesian probability. This results in the need to see beyond just the numerical
value. An assessment process is required to evaluate the strength of knowledge as well, where a
high strength of subject knowledge gives the analysis more authority and vice versa [32, 29].
The J100-10 standard gives some flexibility for the analysts to decide which type of probability
they wish to use (see page 29 of the J100-10 standard for eliciting probabilities for proximity and
dependency hazards). Making the different types of probability clear and how they are to be
interpreted can help the analyst choose the more suitable method depending on data availability
and their strength of knowledge on the system.
While the J100-10 standard deals with threats from many different sources, a particular empha-
sis is misplaced on terrorism risk, as evidenced by 31 of the 41 reference hazards being malevolent
threats. J100-10 acknowledges that a true terrorism threat likelihood estimation is beyond the
scope of most water sector risk analysis [23], but suggests that estimating a proxy for this value
can provide useful information for decision making. Equation (2.1) indicates that determining the
annual likelihood of attack and the conditional likelihood of certain outcomes given an attack are
key components of quantifying terrorism risk.
However, there is debate in the risk analysis literature regarding whether assigning static prob-
abilities is even feasible. One side (see [62, 34, 36, 52]) argues that the intelligent nature of
the adversary makes assigning meaningful and useful probabilities problematic if not impossi-
ble. Bayesian probabilities of attack can be elicited through experts, but are misleading because
the defender and attacker act on different knowledge bases. Others argue that employing a game
theoretic approach [177, 176, 165], which requires some simplifying assumptions on the adver-
sary, provides a foundation from which probabilities can be assigned. Unfortunately these basic
assumptions are rarely met in practice and renders the method deeply flawed. For example, there
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is not common knowledge between all actors, nor do the attackers always behave rationally.
J100-10 takes a more simplistic approach for estimating static probabilities, adopting a method
developed by Risk Management Solutions, LLC. The process is outlined in a RAND Corporation
report [71] and detailed in Appendix F of J100-10 [23]. The method characterizes attack prob-
ability as the product of six values: 1) the likelihood an attack will occur, 2) the likelihood the
attack will occur in a given metro area, 3) the likelihood water infrastructure will be targeted for
attack, 4) the likelihood a subclass of facilities will be selected out of all water infrastructure (e.g.
reservoirs, treatment plants, etc.), 5) the likelihood of a certain facility being targeted, and finally
6) the likelihood of the specific threat-asset pair being chosen.
Determining the likelihoods at each step uses a mixture of both frequentist and Bayesian per-
spectives. The approach J100-10 adopts is a Bayesian driven analysis when eliciting probabilities
of attack for a metro region (step 2) and for a specific threat-asset pair (step 6). It is important
that an appropriate elicitation from subject experts include consideration of adversary intent, ca-
pabilities, and options. In contrast, a frequentist approach is used when estimating the likelihood
of which facility type (e.g. reservoir or pump station) and which specific site will be selected
for attack. Because of the deep uncertainty surrounding intelligent adversaries, we argue that the
J100-10 approach in trying to capture likelihoods of terrorism attack in a single value is inadequate
and misleading as the process assumptions, the adequacy of historical data, and the strength of the
assessor’s knowledge all need to be communicated.
2.4.3 Evaluation of Resilience
While we focus our analysis on the risk analysis portion of J100-10, resilience is also an integral
part of the decision making process in J100-10. Here we highlight some limitations regarding how
resilience is evaluated.
There are various definitions of resilience across different disciplines. SRA defines resilience
as the “ability of a system to sustain or restore its basic functionality following a risk source or an
event” [186]. This is in line with the popular engineering (in particular infrastructure) view that
conceptualizes resilience as the ability to “bounce back” following shocks [63]. Other character-
izations of resilience, particularly in the social sciences, focus more on the capacity for adaptive
learning and change following events [63].
A literature review by Hosseini et al. [95] highlights two key attributes for characterizing
engineering resilience: 1) the system’s preparedness to absorb disruptions to performance, and 2)
the ability for performance recovery. To this end, the definition provided by J100-10 (see section
2.1.2) is in line with the engineering state of the art. However, the approaches J100-10 provides
for characterizing resilience are too narrow. The Operational Resilience Metric (ORM) metric
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in Equation (2.2) quantifies the expected amount of service denial because of a lost asset, and
the Owner’s Economic Resilience Metric (OERM) in Equation (2.3) measures the dollar value of
this loss to the utility. These metrics are not adequate reflections of system resilience but rather
measures of consequence, and using them as characterizations of resilience can seriously misguide
the decision maker.
Since J100-10 is specific to water infrastructure, the key function for utilities to sustain or
recover is the ability to meet demand for clean water and to prevent wastewater overflow. The
temporal and dynamic aspects of service recovery is crucial for determining resilience [6, 89]
but is completely omitted in J100-10. J100-10 instructs that individual component resilience be
quantified using Equations (2.2) and (2.3); however, this notion has been thoroughly discredited
in the literature. Park et al. (2013) [164] argue that the nonlinear and self-organizing features
in complex systems makes resilience impossible to measure when solely focusing on individual
assets. Rather an emphasis should be placed on the performance of the entire system as a whole.
Some alternative assessments of resilience which J100-10 can apply are presented here. Two
survey-based methods for measuring system-wide resilience are provided in Shirali et al. (2013)
[182] and Cutter et al. (2008) [64]. In both case studies, the authors worked with domain experts to
characterize indicators of resilience (e.g. redundancy, robustness) and developed specific criteria
to identify whether an organization met these indicators. Examples of quantitative methods for
evaluating resilience involve stochastic simulation and optimization. In simulation driven methods
[3, 188], infrastructure models are subjected to hypothetical hazards and key performance indica-
tors (e.g. percentage of on-time deliveries for supply chains) are tracked. Optimization modelling
[5, 78], in contrast, aims to estimate least cost recovery or best-case performance for a system after
damage.
The above examples analyze resilience in relation to well-defined objectives and disruptions.
Haimes (2009) [89] argues that resilience should be further expanded as the performance of a
system can be different for different types of shocks (e.g. natural hazards vs intentional attacks).
To address this issue, Aven (2017) [31] argues that risk and resilience assessments can be coupled
together for a more complete analysis.
Finally, the notion of community resilience in J100-10 only references the economic impacts of
hazards, ignoring the multi-faceted aspects of community resilience and the need for all attributes
to be adequately captured in an analysis, as highlighted in Koloui et al. (2017) [120]. These
multi-faceted aspects include physical, environmental, financial, and social impacts.
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2.5 Practical Limitations
Here, we discuss some of the practical limitations of the J100-10 assessment framework. One
such limitation is that the employed methods can lead to inaccurate representations of risk. Other
limitations involve cases of ambiguity as a result of how key metrics are estimated and interpreted.
2.5.1 Use of Work Case Scenarios
As discussed in Section 2.2.2, relying exclusively on worst-case assumptions in performing risk
analysis can result in misleading conclusions. Even if there is certainty on the most extreme conse-
quence, the sole analysis on worst-case outcomes will always lead to mischaracterizations of risk
because all other possible outcomes are excluded from the analysis. Consider for example, the
threat-asset pair summarized in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Summary of Example Threat-Asset Pair 1 with Divergent Outcomes. Risk calculated
using Equation (2.1). ∗Worst case only risk.
Scenario Threat Consequence Vulnerability Risk
1-1 0.1 10000 0.001 1∗
1-2 0.1 500 0.049 2.45
1-3 0.1 100 0.950 9.5
Expected Value 1 + 2.45 + 9.5 = 12.95
For the same threat event, which has probability 0.1 of occurrence, there are three possible
outcome scenarios with varying likelihoods. This is shown by the different consequence values
and their associated vulnerabilities. A worst-case-only analysis would conclude that the associated
risk is 1 (based on scenario 1-1). However, if the other two outcome scenarios are taken into
account, the expected value is 12.95. In comparison, consider the threat-asset pair shown in Table
2.1. For the same threat with likelihood 0.1, there are two possible consequence scenarios. A
worst-case-only analysis would determine that the associated risk for this example is 0.4 (under
scenario 2-1). However, the expected value of risk, which considers both outcomes weighted by
their respective likelihoods, is 50.3.
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Table 2.2: Summary of Example Threat-Asset Pair 2 with Divergent Outcomes. Risk calculated
using Equation (2.1). ∗Worst case only risk.
Scenario Threat Consequence Vulnerability Risk
2-1 0.1 2000 0.002 0.4∗
2-2 0.1 500 0.998 49.9
Expected Value 0.4 + 49.9 = 50.3
These examples serve as simple illustrations as to why a full representation of all consequence
scenarios is needed for an accurate representation of risk. Both example threat-asset pairs have
high worst-case consequences with low associated vulnerabilities, which lead to very similar risk
scoring (1 and 0.4 respectively). Taking a worst-case-only approach would lead risk analysts to
conclude that both threat-asset pairs are subject to the same level of risk as measured by equa-
tion (2.1). Worst-case scenarios alone, however, do not accurately represent the risk of the threat-
asset pairs. In both examples, the worst-case scenarios are also the least likely to occur. After
considering the other possible scenarios, the resulting risk calculations again using equation (2.1)
(12.95 and 50.3 respectively) show that the second example is clearly the riskier threat-asset pair,
with close to four times the risk value. The assumption here is that the expected value is an ad-
equate risk measure, which is a very questionable assumption. This clear distinction in the risk
description is overlooked when a worst-case-only basis is used.
A worst-case-only approach is quite popular in other domains beyond critical infrastructure
analysis (e.g. financial [215] and environmental risk assessments [97, 107]). The limitations of
using conservative “worst case” methods have been thoroughly discussed and criticized in the lit-
erature [166] and the reader is referred Aven (2016) [30] for an expanded discussion. Considering
the full range of possible outcomes and their consequences in the analysis will lead to more in-
formative descriptions of risk. In addition to the probabilistic characterizations, judgments of the
strength of knowledge supporting these should be included as highlighted in Section 2.4.2.
An alternate characterization of risk is to present information on the underlying consequence
distributions, for example, showing the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles as well as the expected
and worst-case scenarios. A common and more complete probabilistic representation in the risk
analysis literature is the use of F-N types of curves, discussed in Aven (2013) [26], which plot
all possible consequence values against their respective inverse cumulative probabilities, i.e. the
probabilities for events leading to at least N units of loss (e.g., fatalities).
24
2.5.2 Defining and Estimating Consequences
It is important to display a full range of consequence scenarios for risk estimations. The J100-10
framework defines four baseline metrics for measuring consequence. These are 1) number of fatal-
ities, 2) number of serious injuries, 3) financial loss to utility owners, and 4) economic losses to the
community. The standard suggests that other facets of consequence, such as degradation in public
confidence and environmental impacts, can also be included if the analyst deems necessary. De-
tailed calculations using simulation and economic models or direct estimation by qualified experts
are acceptable methods of determining consequences according to J100-10.
The risk valuation in Equation (2.1) requires a single value for the consequence metric. How-
ever it is unclear how, or even if, an analyst should aggregate across metrics. For example, no
guidance is offered for combining the metric estimates of 10 deaths, 5 injuries, $5 million in
financial losses to the utility, and $15 million in economic losses to the serviced community. Ag-
gregating across different metrics is poor practice because no utility will view each category the
same. A decision maker is likely to have different acceptable outcomes across the varying metrics.
For example, health and safety violations are not acceptable and must be avoided at all cost, but
once these are met the financial risks are material in the decision making framework. This process
becomes more difficult when qualitative assessments of consequences are also considered.
There are a number of ways to encode consequences into a single metric. One method is to
monetize fatalities and injuries to provide a common unit of measure to sum consequences from
each category. A similar approach is to normalize each metric into an ordinal scale (e.g. 1-10) and
sum the normalizations. J100-10 provides a 0-10 consequence scale for each category [23] which
the analyst can opt to use. This approach makes an implicit assumption about the inherent value
of different consequence outcomes, and disagreements about these valuations may arise when
multiple decision makers are involved. For example, according to the J100-10, one fatality is equal
to $1 million in economic losses to either the utility or the community. These assumptions need to
be made explicit to the decision maker and J100-10 does not provide any direction on doing so.
Additional outcome aggregating methods are also presented in the risk analysis literature. The
field of decision analysis supports the use of multi-attribute utility theory (MAUT) to encode a
variety of decision maker preferences into a numerical value, and has been demonstrated in many
engineering risk assessments [151, 150, 51]. Ayyub (2014) [40] introduces other methods for
assessing consequences and severities, including cause-consequence (CS) diagrams and total eco-
nomic valuation (TEV). CS diagrams use a tree representation of multiple consequence categories
(e.g. fatalities, economic costs) and assess their respective severities using logic diagrams. These
severities are combined additively in an ordinal scale. TEV uses willingness to pay or accept
methods to estimate the market value, measured in dollars, of lost goods and services.
While there is a host of processes for combining consequence metrics into a single value, it
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is unclear what this single value represents. In making this calculation, the system operator must
make assumptions regarding the value of consequences to other stakeholders, and in doing so, the
utility imposes its own value structure on these stakeholders. According to Arrow’s impossibility
theorem [18], it is generally impossible for any analyst to accurately encompass each stakeholder’s
diverse preferences under a set of numerical weights. Survey methods are available as a foundation
to begin the analysis of contrasting value judgements, but they require time and resources that the
utility may not be willing to commit.
Therefore, in some situations utilities may find it beneficial to keep the consequence categories
disaggregated. While this can lead to a less quantifiable measure of risk (i.e. Equation (2.1) can
no longer be applied), more information can be communicated in the assessment results. Lund-
berg and Willis (2019) [142] present one approach for carrying out risk assessments while dealing
with non-aggregate outcomes. The authors use a survey-based method to identify a ranking of
consequences attributes. This information allows the analyst to prioritize one category over an-
other. Kabir et al. (2018) [102] presents a quantitative Bayesian network model for modeling
consequences due to infrastructure failures. The model disaggregates outcomes based on health
and safety, environmental, societal, and economic impacts. Expert judgement is used to define the
dependencies between various outcome measures.
2.5.3 Analysis Resolution of Threat-Asset Pairs
An accurate estimation of the consequences of a hazard on complex systems requires the analysis
of multiple components together and the consideration of their interdependencies. Consequently,
analyzing risk and resilience only at the threat-asset pair resolution overlooks the dependency
between components [6].
This integrated relationship between assets can be illustrated through a simple example. A
reliability block diagram (RBD) is a visual method that describes how individual components
contribute to the overall functioning of a complex system [26]. Here, the functioning or success
of the system is defined as the extent to which it can carry out its mission. In the case of water
systems, this involves the adequate delivery of clean drinking water to end users. Each block in
a diagram represents a system function, which can correspond to individual components of the
system, e.g., treatment plant or storage tank, that can fail with a given probability upon an incident
hazard. Blocks can be connected in parallel or series; parallel paths introduce redundancy into
the system, where all blocks within a parallel block must fail before the network fails. On the
other hand, any failure to a single block in a group of blocks connected in series will cause system
failure.
Figure 2.2 illustrates a simple system with three components, represented by blocks A, B, and
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C. Component A is connected in series to a parallel set of components B and C. This means failures
to A alone, or B and C together, or to all three components can lead to system failure. Risk analysis
of this system at the threat-asset level involves evaluating the consequences of failure when only
A, B, or C fails individually. The redundancy relationship between B and C is not captured in the
analysis at this resolution. A consequence estimate on the failure of asset B assuming asset C is
functional may only include costs of damage repair; however, if asset C also fails, the consequence
involves repairs to both components as well as economic losses due to service interruption.
Figure 2.2: Reiliability Block Diagram of Example System.
The simplifying example above serves to illustrate that an accurate assessment of threat conse-
quences requires information from multiple components of the system, and examining risk at the
asset levels overlooks this relationship by requiring the analyst to make implicit assumptions about
the condition of other components. The assessment can be improved where joint impacts, particu-
larly cases where consequences of failures to a group of assets will exceed the sum of consequences
from individual failures itself, are captured.
Aside from reliability block diagrams, graph theory (or network theory) is another method re-
searchers have used to study the system-wide impacts related to individual component failure (see
[209, 210, 9, 127]). In these network models, infrastructure components are represented through
a series of arcs and nodes [73]. Each node represents a demand point, storage site, treatment
site, or generation facility. Arcs represent distribution assets (e.g. wire cables for power systems,
pipelines for water and gas networks). These studies have aimed to examine which network met-
rics (betweenness, centrality, etc.) are most useful in providing an accurate characterization of
network resilience. Papers by Alderson et al. [6, 4] emphasize the use of physical infrastructure
models rather than simple topological representations to provide the most accurate reflections of
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network performance. LaRocca et al. (2015) [128] compared a range of topological metrics and
physical models to measure power system performance, and found that combining graph theory
with physical flow models provided the most accurate insights.
2.5.4 Threats Defined
Another issue of implementation is the limited scope of the 41 reference threats listed in Figure
2.3.
Figure 2.3: RAMCAPTM Reference Hazards used in the J100-10. Figure taken from the J100-10
Risk Management Standard [23].
The RAMCAPTM framework, which the J100-10 standard is based on, was originally devel-
oped to deal with terrorism threats, and 31 out of the 41 reference threats deal with malevolent
threats. As a result, the analysis scope can be biased towards this single threat category. This can
lead to a suboptimal allocation of resources to countermeasures that are dedicated to increasing
the physical security of the system at the expense of hardening the system against (arguably) more
frequent natural hazards. For example, a countermeasure, such as adding more security personnel,
can decrease the risk for many of the 31 reference terrorist threats. Because of the large overlap in
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the types of threats and how to defend against them, implementing mitigation options for one of
these threats also serves to mitigate several other threats. As a result, the estimated net benefit of
counter-terrorism defenses will be over inflated.
On the other hand, countermeasures for natural hazards tend to be more specific to the threat,
e.g., installing flood-walls around coastal treatment plants to reduce flood damage. The limited
overlap in affected threats from these countermeasures can lead to lower net benefits after summing
over all threat-asset pairs. This shows that the J100-10 reference threat set typically biases the user
to allocate resources to defend against terrorist threats over other hazard categories. For some
general guidance on how to use cost-benefit type analysis, see Aven (2017) [24] and Ale et al.
(2018) [7].
As noted in Section 2.2.2, two studies presented by White et al. [200, 199] argue that the oper-
ating 41 reference threats do not adequately address the emerging threats of climate change, aging
infrastructure, and cybersecurity. While J100-10 allows analysts to include additional threats, it
lacks guidance in how to define events that encompass these emerging threats and how to calculate
the respective threat likelihoods. Furthermore, the subjectivity involved in adding more events can
lead to inconsistencies when different analysts are performing the risk assessments.
2.5.5 Risk versus Resilience Tradeoff
In Steps 6 and 7 of the J100-10 methodology, risk and resilience are calculated, countermeasures
are defined, and resources are allocated based on cost-benefit analysis. However there is ambigu-
ity in choosing how to allocate these resources based on the different metrics. Step 7 (risk and
resilience management) specifies that utilities need to define what acceptable levels of risk and
resilience are, and implement countermeasures to meet these pre-defined thresholds.
As defined by J100-10, resilience and risk are two different outcomes. When dealing with
various outcomes, an analyst must work with the stakeholders to elicit the value of resilience
enhancement versus risk reduction. Decision makers need to understand the tradeoffs between
the risk and resilience objectives in order for the assessment to be actionable. Unfortunately, the
importance of eliciting these value judgements is omitted from J100-10.
There is, however, a strong argument in the risk research community that the separation be-
tween risk and resilience is artificial and that the risk concept should cover resilience [33]. This is
because any actions performed to affect one will also affect the other: reductions in risk will also
increase resilience, and vice versa. Aven (2017) [31] argues that assessments are more effective
when the two outcomes are considered together, rather than treated as separated objectives.
As it currently stands, J100-10 is too vague in its definition of the relationship between risk
and resilience. Improvements to the standard can either solely focus on risk, and target reductions
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in risk, or integrate risk and resilience together for a more holistic assessment.
2.6 Discussion
In this study, we performed a comprehensive review of the risk and resilience assessment frame-
work J100-10, a certified standard adopted by the water and wastewater industry. The framework
adopts the seven-step methodology outlined in RAMCAPTM , which applies to multiple sectors of
critical infrastructure and key resources. Our analysis examined both conceptual limitations within
the standard and practical issues with carrying out the risk and resilience assessment processes.
The main conceptual shortcomings are 1) the exclusion of notions of uncertainty when defining
risk, 2) a clear definition for probability and how to interpret the values is not presented, and 3)
resilience measures are too narrow. In particular, the differences between frequentist and Bayesian
probability needs to be highlighted, and the conceptualization used needs to be communicated in
the final analysis results. Our key findings on the practical limitations relate to the mischaracter-
ization of risk, the biased emphasis placed on malevolent threats, and the general ambiguity in
defining and comparing key metrics.
When calculating risk, using only a worst-case assumption of the associated consequences
without considering the full range of possible outcome scenarios will result in a poor risk charac-
terization. Furthermore, risk and resilience analysis at the resolution of individual threat-asset pairs
ignores key dependencies between assets in connected systems. This resolution can lead to risk
judgments that are too low in cases where combined consequences of hazards on multiple assets at
a time will be far greater than the sum of the individual parts.
On the same note of accurately representing consequences, the standard uses four key metrics:
fatalities, injuries, and economic losses to both the utility and community. Additional qualitative
evaluations of consequence can also be included. The J100-10 standard does not provide adequate
guidance on how to bring these four metrics, measured in different units, and other qualitative
aspects of consequence, together into a single consequence value. This ambiguity can lead to
inconsistencies in the risk analysis process.
The J100-10 defines 41 reference threats as part of the assessment, 31 of which are related to
malevolent threats. The disproportionate representation of risk related to one category of threat
can lead to biased conclusions about inflated benefits gained from counter-terrorism defenses. It is
important for resulting updates of the J100-10 and RAMCAPTM standard to account for any over-
lap when weighing the tradeoff between countermeasures designed to address malevolent threats
versus natural hazards versus proximity and dependency hazards.
Lastly, the J100-10 standard needs to provide guidance on how to best assess stakeholder values
relating to the two goals of risk reduction and resilience enhancement. This is critical for using
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the J100-10 in an effective decision making context. The vagueness of the current standard can
also introduce arbitrariness and inconsistencies, with potential for poor investments of available
resources.
The shortcomings summarized above can assist with prioritization in redrafts of the standard by
highlighting areas that need to be addressed. By closing the gap between the standard’s methods
and those that are the state of the art in the risk analysis literature, more informed risk-driven
decisions can be made to better protect the nation’s critical lifeline infrastructure.
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CHAPTER 3
Optimal Pipe Inspection Paths Considering
Inspection Tool Limitations
The inspection of deteriorating water distribution pipes is an important process for utilities. It
helps them gain a better understanding of the condition of their buried conveyance systems and
aids better decision making for risk-based asset management. In-pipe continuous inspection tools
provide high resolution and accurate data, but they have seen relatively limited use due to cost and
operational constraints. To facilitate-cost efficient deployment of these technologies and maximal
information gain, a process that finds high risk pipes to inspect while accounting for the limitations
of the tools at hand is needed. This chapter shows how to incorporate these considerations within
an optimization formulation, and examines the use of Evolutionary Programming, Simulated An-
nealing, and Greedy Search heuristics to identify inspection paths. Case studies performed on both
synthetic and real world networks demonstrate that Evolutionary Programs are the most effective.
While only three factors are used to characterize tool limitations, the method presented in this
chapter can be extended to include technology-specific complexities in real world applications.
Keywords: Drinking Water Distribution System, Condition Assessment, Asset Management
Note: The research presented in this chapter has been published in the Journal of Reliability
Engineering and System Safety. Citation: Thomas Y.J. Chen, Seth D. Guikema, Craig M. Daly.
Optimal Pipe Inspection Paths Considering Inspection Tool Limitations. Reliability Engineering
and System Safety, 181:156-166, 2019.
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Preamble
The research in this chapter presents work that was done between 2016 - 2018. The contribution
of this chapter is significant because it establishes the problem of inspection routing with consider-
ation to tool limitations. The goal of the chapter is to highlight why platform considerations need
to be taken into account when planning for inspections, and demonstrates how to solve it using
heuristic solutions. From our review, prior to the publication of this chapter, no work in the aca-
demic literature addresses this issue. Chapter 4 was done sequentially (between 2018 - 2019) and
explores the same problem with more mathematical sophistication, but this chapter first establishes
the initial formulation of the routing problem.
3.1 Introduction
Drinking water distribution systems are one of the most critical infrastructures [70], however many
utilities are challenged with managing these aging networks with insufficient budgets and limited
availability of information [19]. Experts estimate that on average, utilities in the US lose over
14% of their treated drinking water daily due to leaky distribution pipes, and about $500 billion is
required to address the replacement needs of these decaying assets over the next 40 years [39]. A
proactive management framework is needed to reduce the spending on emergency repairs [161].
Furthermore, pipe breaks are also associated with public health risks [46, 184, 110], and can impact
public confidence in the utility.
While the number of breaks and their associated costs can vary, pipe failures and leaks are a
substantial problem in many countries. Kettler and Coulter [110] surveys failures rates on pipes
of different age and size in 4 cities across the US and Canada, they found that failures can range
from 1.05 to 0.05 breaks per km per year based on how pipes are categorized. These failures
are expensive, a study from the Water Research Foundation reports that direct costs from pipeline
breakages can range from $5,000 to $250,000 [204].
To aid the development of an effective asset management plan, inspection operations are often
employed to gather information on the current condition of the system. As outlined in Roman
and Pellegrino [173], besides obtaining information on pipe health and condition, other benefits of
using inspection robotics include: 1) removing humans from potentially hazardous work situations,
2) allowing for inspection of inaccessible areas and, depending on the tool, 3) providing on-line
inspection without stoppage of pipe operation.
In order for utilities to better address their most pressing liabilities, the planning of these in-
spections is critical. The highest risk pipes need to be prioritized so more information can be
obtained to guide decision making on how to mitigate the risks of failure (e.g. replacement, repair,
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leave alone).
Tur and Garthwaite [194] summarizes some current inspection technologies and Daly et al.
[65] provides an overview of data collection techniques associated with these tools. This includes
but are not limited to: targeted testing and continuous testing. Targeted testing extracts data at
discrete points within the network, however obtaining an accurate condition characterization for
an entire pipeline is difficult due to the variability of structural damage along a length of pipe
[65]. In contrast, continuous testing obtains information along the entire length of the pipeline.
Due to the continuous and high resolution data available with this method, it is typically preferred
for inspecting critical mains (typically with diameters larger than 12 in.). Despite the breadth of
conditional assessment tools available for deployment, Tur and Garthwaite [194] reports that due
to economic, regulatory, operational, and physical constraints, typical inspection capabilities for
these assets are limited. It is industry standard that a utility invests in inspections of approximately
2% of system length annually.
While the focus of this research is the development of an optimization framework for contin-
uous inspection routes, the same technique can also be applied to identify contiguous regions of
pipe for discrete inspections.
Prioritizing inspections based solely on a risk-based ranking of assets can lead to suboptimal
results because operational limitations of the tools must be accounted for when planning for de-
ployment. These constraints can affect both the accuracy and quality of the data obtained as well
as the cost associated with inspection [47]. Often these constraints are related to the physical char-
acteristics of the pipe segment. For example, sensors must be calibrated for specific materials of
pipe (e.g. cast iron, concrete), this is a particular concern for free floating devices which collect
inspection data while moving along the flow of water. These devices cannot be reconfigured and
recalibrated on the fly, so multiple runs along the identified path are needed to obtain complete
data in paths with multiple pipe materials. This can greatly increase the cost of inspection as the
number of material changes go up [159].
In 2010 the National Academy of Corrosion Engineers (NACE) published a standard practice
guideline for in-line pipe inspections which highlights many operational issues when planning for
inspection deployments [159]. Some of them include 1) limiting sharp turns (90-degree bends)
and/or valves which can increase the likelihood of tool damage, and 2) ensuring the flow rate and
water pressure inside the pipe meet the specifications of the robotic sensor.
Another important consideration is pipe diameter. Electromagnetic devices which measure
wall thickness require the sensor be placed a certain distance from the wall. A path that includes
high variability in pipe diameter will require multiple recalibrations of the sensor offset, which will
result in signal disruptions along the inspection and disjointed data collection.
The contribution of this study is to demonstrate how to incorporate the limitations of assessment
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technologies within an optimization framework when planning for inspections. This is overlooked
in popular practice where only the criticality of the pipeline assets is considered. To the authors
knowledge, no past research has tackled inspection path planning in this fashion. This chapter aims
to fill this gap by presenting a general optimization formulation, and comparing the performance
of three solution algorithms applied to synthetic and real-world distribution networks. The integer
programming formulation presented is simplified, the derivation of the full formulation (and the
corresponding algorithms to solve it) is beyond the scope of this study and is left for future work.
The solution algorithms compared in this chapter are: Greedy Search Heuristic, Simulated An-
nealing, and Evolutionary Programming. We chose these methods because they provide a straight-
forward implementation in a network-based problem, as well as presenting a range of derivative-
free approaches (the underlying optimization problem is integer) with varying degrees of com-
putational complexity. Other optimization methods that have been studied to model the optimal
design and control of water systems, such as ant colony optimization [213, 138] and particle swarm
[156, 75], could potentially also be applied in a similar manner but are not included in this study.
The rest of this chapter will be organized as follows: a review on inspection technologies and
planning is in Section 3.2, the simplified optimization formulation is presented in Section 3.3,
its implementation using various networks and the aforementioned solution methods is covered
in Section 3.4, performance results are reported in Section 3.5, followed by a discussion of their
implications in Section 3.6.
3.2 Literature review and background
There are two fundamental types of continuous inspection platforms, tethered and untethered
[159]. Tethered platforms include robotic crawlers which can be operated from above ground
and free floating tools that move independently with the flow of liquid. Tethers provide a physical
link between the operator and the tool, and serves to provide power supply and communications to
the robotic units. Data is collected continuously during an inspection and typically stored on com-
puters and not within the tools themselves. In comparison, untethered tools are autonomous units
that contain their own power supply and data storage. These tools are inserted into a pipe and move
with the flow of liquid to a point of extraction where data is then downloaded for analysis. While
movement of these tools cannot be controlled, they are often tracked from above ground using
sensors attached to the pipeline at defined intervals along the inspection path, typically at valves
or other locations readily accessible from the surface. If an untethered tool becomes damaged or
stuck during an inspection the recovery efforts are more complex and potentially costlier.
Both tethered and untethered tools can be outfitted with a variety of sensors. The two main
types of sensors utilized for pressure pipe inspection are electromagnetic and acoustic, though
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sonar and laser sensors are common too. Typically, acoustic sensors are used for leak detection
while electromagnetic sensors are used to identify defects that risk perforating the pipe wall. Sonar
is used to identify large defects in the pipeline as well as areas where debris and sediment build-up
are present. Lasers have been used to measure ovality in pipelines which could be an indication of
a structural condition.
A widely adopted method in practice for inspection planning is using a risk based ranking to
prioritize assets, where the riskiest pipes are inspected first [145, 111]. This also serves to ensure
that costly data collection techniques are targeted to the most at-risk assets. In this context, risk is
typically defined as the expected consequences of an adverse event (specifically pipe failures). This
is a popular definition used in many engineering applications [27] where risk scores are calculated
as the product between the consequences, typically measured on a unit less scale (e.g. 0 - 1), and
likelihood of a hazard. As part of the risk calculation, many studies have attempted the statistical
modeling of pipe break probabilities, which range from simple parametric models [179, 15, 207],
to more sophisticated non-parametric approaches [81, 56]. Recent advances have also focused on
the consequence aspect of risk. A Water Research Foundation report [205] summarizes a compre-
hensive survey of pipe break records focused on understanding key drivers of failure consequences
to both the operators and the customer.
Effective asset management not only includes the accurate modeling of risk, but also the devel-
opment of an efficient operation plan. Researchers have worked to implement algorithms for ob-
taining the best scheduling of repair and maintenance tasks. Cost minimization was often the pre-
vailing objective, from which a variety of methods have been developed (see [87, 12, 50, 49, 114]).
For example, Dandy and Engelhardt (2001) [67] uses the Evolutionary Programming algorithm
to determine a cost minimizing 5 year rehabilitation and replacement schedule for an Australian
municipality. This was extended in Dandy and Engelhardt (2006) [66] which formulated the same
problem in a multi-objective framework to capture a variety of shareholder interests.
Reducing the time taken for individual inspections is also a key consideration for cost effi-
ciency, Lu et al. [141] and Kawaguchi et al. [108] solves for specific inspection routes by likening
the task to a travelling salesman problem, which lends itself to a host of solution methods docu-
mented in Laporte [126]. However the practical application of these results are limited because, as
pointed out in Tur and Garthwaite [194], it is not economically feasible for an entire system to be
inspected by urban utilities over a limited time horizon.
Many previous studies have also presented optimization models for risk based inspection and
maintenance (see [111, 190, 185]). In these models the risk considered pertains only to the dis-
tribution assets. This is an important omission (see Section 3.1) that affects both data quality
and associated deployment costs. From the authors review, no mathematical programs have been
developed for finding optimal inspection routes which facilitates maximal information gain by
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considering both 1) the sparing use of the tools and 2) the operational limits of the technology.
3.3 Optimization formulation
Let N be the number of discrete pipe segments in a given distribution network. Let X define
a vector of length N to index each individual segment and to represent the inspection decision,
where each element is a binary variable corresponding whether a pipe is chosen for inspection or
not. Algebraically this can be shown as X ∈ RN , Xi = 1 if segment i is inspected, Xi = 0 otherwise,
for all i in 1 to N. Similarly vectors R and L, both of length N, can also be defined to represent the
risk score and length of each individual pipe segment where R, L ∈ RN .
In order for an inspection path to be feasible, it must satisfy some physical constraints. This
includes: 1) it has to be fully contiguous where all the selected segments connect, 2) the path must
be a simple path where no pipe junction is traversed more than once, this implies no looping occurs
or branching in the path can occur. Let I define an indicator function which is used to check for
the feasibility of any candidate solution X, where I(X) = 1 if conditions above are satisfied and 0
otherwise.
This research will consider only pipe feature changes of material and diameter as tool-limiting
factors, however technology specific complexity (e.g. penalizing sharp turns for tethered tools) can
be added to the formulation in more advanced settings. Feature-change counter functions Cm(X)
and Cd(X) are defined to return the number of material and diameter changes respectively along
any feasible inspection path X. Furthermore, each change of pipe material and diameter will have
a constant penalty Pm and Pd associated with it.
These penalties are not parameters of an optimization algorithm, rather a reflection of the lim-
itations of inspection tool as they traverse non-ideal conditions inside a pipe. In practice, the value
of these coefficients should be defined by engineers with experiences using inspections platforms
to accurately reflect the penalties associated with encountering pipe property changes along an
inspection route.
Bringing the above information all together, the optimization model is as follows:
maxZ = R ·XT − PmCm(X)− PdCd(X) (3.1a)
Subject to:
L ·XT ≤ D (3.1b)
I(X) = 1 (3.1c)
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Where equation (3.1a) characterizes the objective function of searching for a path to include
high-risk pipe segments, while also being penalized for high variability in physical features along
the path. Equation (3.1b) specifies the distance constraint of the selected assets, which must be less
than some quantity D, this reflects the limited inspection capabilities for a utility. Equation (3.1c)
enforces that only physically feasible paths be considered as part of the candidate solutions. For
this work we only consider the selection of one optimal path under the budget constraint. Due to
the large set up costs for running an inspection (e.g. road closures, digging down to the pipe, crew
dispatch), utilities in practice typically plan for a single inspection route at a time. The exploration
of optimizing inspections where multiple paths can be considered is left for future research.
3.4 Case study networks, risk modeling, and solution algorithms
This section describes the methodology used for this study, including how synthetic networks
were developed, how a real network was applied, and how a simple risk model was implemented
to characterize asset condition. In most engineering applications, risk analysis considers both the
probability and consequence of failure [26]. Since it is beyond the focus of the study to apply a
sophisticated modeling of risk, an age-based pipe break likelihood model from Pelletier et al. [168]
is adopted instead, though more advanced risk models could be used instead. Finally, the solution
methods used to solve the formulation presented in Section 3.3 is outlined.
3.4.1 Networks
A popular network theoretic representation of a water distribution system is through a system of
connected/disconnected arcs and nodes [73, 209]. Each node representing a water source, a con-
necting valve, a storage or treatment facility, or end user; while arcs represent pipeline segments.
Directed edges are used to represent flow direction within pipes. We use this arc/node representa-
tion of a water network in our optimization formulation and solution methods. While it is possible
to explore other abstractions of the physical network, it is beyond the scope of the research and can
be examined in future work.
Since this research deals with incorporating tool limits for inspection route optimization prob-
lems, we include both synthetic and real networks in our benchmark trials. Two synthetic net-
works are used in this study, one with a highly regularized structure and another with a more
realistic/sparse structure. As a test bed, a square Grid network (10 edges per side) was developed
in the R statistical software [44], where every node is connected to all of its adjacent nodes (see
Figure 3.1).
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Figure 3.1: Layout of Grid Network
The other, more realistic, synthetic network used was an open sourced virtual pipe network
named Micropolis, presented in Brumbelow et al. [53]. Developed in EPANET and ArcGIS
(ESRI, 2011), the virtual city represents a water system of a small rural town of approximately
5000 residents (see Figure 3.2).
Figure 3.2: Layout of Micropolis Network
Due to the synthetic nature of the Grid network which lacks any pipe attribute information,
physical features had to be assigned to each arc, as well as a randomized probability of failure
to characterize risk. Each pipe segment (arc) was randomly assigned one of 3 classes of material
and diameter. The actual type of material or diameter is irrelevant as the objective function in
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equation (3.1a) will only consider the change in features along an identified path. 5 random grid
networks are generated to test the optimization algorithms.
The other synthetic system we explore, Micropolis [53], contains a more realistic structure for
a water network. It contains pipes segments from 5 different classes of diameter and 3 different
classes of material. Micropolis has been used as a test bed in previous research [214, 136] studying
water distribution systems, demonstrating that it is an effective tool to simulate realistic networks
when data is unavailable. The Micropolis dataset was visualized using the mapping software Ar-
cGIS (ESRI, 2011), shown in Figure 3.2.
Finally, to determine the efficacy of the solution algorithms in realistic settings, we move away
from synthetic systems and use a subsection of the water distribution system (WDS) from Ann
Arbor, Michigan. The network is also mapped in ArcGIS and displayed in Figure 3.3. The dis-
tribution systems contain pipe segments of 12 different diameter sizes and 10 different material
designs.
Figure 3.3: Layout of the City of Ann Arbor Water Distribution System
Table 3.1 summarizes some characteristics of each of the examined systems.
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Table 3.1: Summary of case study networks
Characteristic Square Grid Micropolis Ann Arbor WDS
Pipe Network Length (mi) NA 32 242
Number of Segments 220 567 13058
Age Information No Yes Yes
Year of Installation of First Pipe NA 1910 1880
Diameter Information Synthetic Yes Yes
Material Information Synthetic Yes Yes
3.4.2 Probability of failure risk model
In order to characterize the physical condition of the pipe segments in the networks, an age-based
pipe break likelihood model is implemented where data related to pipe age is available (the Mi-
cropolis and Ann Arbor systems). It is beyond the scope of this research to explore a sophisti-
cated modeling of risk, our goal here is to have a method to assign rewards for inspecting each
pipeline asset. A failure probability model is convenient for this framework since higher likeli-
hoods represent riskier assets and the probability values can be used as the reward coefficients in
equation (3.1a). To similarly bound risk values between 0 and 1 for the Grid network, a uniform
distribution is used to assign pipe break likelihood risk scores to each arc.
The probability model we use is taken from a case study reported by Pelletier et al. [168]. A
Weibull distribution is fit against historical failure data from a municipality in Gatineau, Canada.
A Weibull distribution is characterized by two parameters κ and ρ, it is associated with the time
to first failure from initial installation [174]. The authors found a better statistical fit of the failure
data is achieved by discretizing the pipe system in two based on installation year, before and after
1960, and fitting two separate distributions. Historical failure data is required to fit this distribution,
but since failure data is not available for both Micropolis and Ann Arbor, we will use the reported
parameters from Pelletier et al. [168] to derive a risk model for our benchmark trials.
A hazard function which corresponds to the annual probability of failure can be derived from
a Weibull distribution, and is presented in equation (3.2) below.
λ(t) = κρ(κt)ρ−1 (3.2)
It is assumed that each pipe has not experienced a break up to the year 2017 (t is the pipe age
at 2017), thus λ(t) is the probability of failure at the year 2017. Table 3.2 presents the κ and ρ
parameter set used to model the Micropolis and Ann Arbor systems.
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Table 3.2: Hazard function parameters of Pipe Break Likelihood Risk Model, used for Ann Arbor
and Micropolis System. Model parameters taken from Pelletier et al. [168]
Parameter Pipes Installed Before 1960 Pipes Installed at 1960 or After
κ 0.022 0.029
ρ 2.725 2.172
Figure 3.4 shows the distributions of failure likelihoods among the pipe segments in the Mi-
cropolis and Ann Arbor Systems using the aforementioned risk model. By observation, the failure
probabilities obtained from equation (3.2) all fall below 0.5 in both networks. There are three large
peaks in the failure density distribution for the Micropolis system since there are only three unique
installation dates, and age was the only determining factor in probability estimation.
Figure 3.4: Likelihood of Failure Distribution for Micropolis and Ann Arbor Networks, evaluated
using Risk Equation (3.2).
In contrast, there is a wider spread in distribution for the Ann Arbor system due to the larger
pipe age heterogeneity in the dataset. In contrast, the probability of failure was uniformly assigned
in each of the randomly generated grid networks and should have even greater variance.
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3.4.3 Optimization algorithms
The optimization algorithms used (Evolutionary Program, Simulated Annealing, Greedy Search)
for this research were implemented using the statistical language R. The following subsection will
outline each of the respective methods, but some optimization model parameters and formulation
coefficients must be first defined.
Since each individual failure likelihood/inspection reward value is bounded between 0 and 1, a
0.33 penalty coefficient (corresponding to Pm and Pd in equation (3.1a)) was chosen to sufficiently
impact the value of the inspection path. As discussed in section 3.1, in practice the value of these
cost coefficients should be defined by experts to best reflect the penalties associated with encoun-
tering non-ideal conditions along an inspection route. However, since this work is exploratory in
nature, we select 0.33 since it sufficiently impacts the value of each pipeline asset.
The selected cost coefficients Pm and Pd assume that a change in pipe material and diameter has
an equal penalty. However, in practical applications where certain features are more crucial to the
effective operation of the inspection tool (e.g. limiting sharp turns is more critical than homogenous
pipe features for tethered tools), differing penalizing factors can be included. Furthermore, a 2%
of total system length constraint (value D in constraint (3.1b)) is defined to reflect the limited
inspection capabilities of utilities. This is a typical value seen in industry practice, both for capital
planning and budgeting purposes. This length limit can be adjusted to reflect different levels of
budgeting and regulatory limits on a case-by-case basis.
3.4.3.1 Greedy search
This approach involves an iterative process of selecting the locally optimal solution and taking
steps in that direction within the feasible region [74]. The implementation of the algorithm starts
by randomly selecting an arc to initialize a candidate path, followed by an exhaustive search to
enumerate all feasible paths that can be taken from current path that adds on N more segments.
After all feasible paths are generated, the objective function (3.1a) is used to evaluate them and
the highest scoring one is selected. From the selected path only the single arc that directly extends
out of the current candidate path’s end is added, now the path is one arc longer. This process is
repeated until the distance limit is met. To avoid the algorithm reaching locally optimal paths, a
4-step (N = 4) Greedy Search was used in this study. Figure 3.5 shows a flow chart summarizing
each step of the algorithm.
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Figure 3.5: Schematic for Greedy Search
The greedy search method works well because there is a natural implementation in a link/node
graph setting, in particular the exhaustive N path enumeration can be performed using standard
network traversal algorithms [2]. The efficacy of the greedy search can vary depending on the
randomly selected arc in the first step. To boost the search capacity, a M-random start version of
the heuristic is also implemented. The algorithm is simply run M number of times, each with a
random starting point, and the best performing solution is chosen at the end. M is set to 50 in the
corresponding case studies.
3.4.3.2 Simulated annealing
Introduced in Kirkpatric et al. [115], the Simulated Annealing algorithm involves the iterative
comparison of neighboring solutions until a set of terminating conditions are met. It can be sum-
marized as an iterative 3-step process: 1) generating a neighboring path to the current solution, 2)
comparing path scores between the 2 neighbors, and 3) selecting from the pair a candidate path for
the next iteration.
The algorithm starts by taking an initial solution, which is a randomly selected feasible path,
and compares it against a neighboring path using the objective function (3.1a). A neighboring
solution is generated by replacing a selected arc from either end of the current path with an unse-
lected one while maintaining feasibility. If the neighboring path scores higher than the original, it
is selected for the next iteration. However, if the neighbor scores lower, it is selected with prob-
ability P instead, otherwise the original path is kept. Allowing for the initial rejection of a better
performing neighbor potentially avoids having the algorithm get stuck local optimas.
Following the formulation of the Simulated Annealing algorithm from [115], the selection




Where Zneighbor and Zcurrent are the respective objective function values of the two paths under
consideration, and T is an iteration-step dependent multiplier. T is set to 1 initially and is reduced
by a factor of 0.9 with each iteration. In this equation, when the difference in performance is small,
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the likelihood of accepting the worse solution is higher, this likelihood drops as the difference
increases or as more iterations have been completed.
A flowchart of the algorithm steps is shown in Figure 3.6. Through a number of test trials,
we found that over each network the path typically converges within 2000 iterations. Hence, the
simulated annealing algorithm is run for 2000 steps in each of the following trials, this is defined
as the stopping criterion for the method.
Figure 3.6: Schematic for Simulated Annealing
Like the greedy search, the simulated annealing algorithm also works well for path finding
problems because of its natural implementation in a graph setting. The algorithm involves the
iterative movement between neighboring solutions, and in a link/node representation of a path
this is simply the swapping of one node and edge off the end of a path for another node/edge
combination.
Similar to the Greedy Search, the performance of the Simulated Annealing can also vary de-
pending on the location of the initializing path. Thus a M-random start version of the heuristic is
also applied where we run M trials of the method and choose the best solution after all runs of the
algorithm are completed. M is set to 50 in the corresponding case studies.
3.4.3.3 Evolutionary program
Evolutionary Programs [206] are a subclass of evolutionary methods that have been often used in
water resource planning [67, 83]. Unlike the Greedy Search and Simulated Annealing, which only
selects one solution to move between iterations, the Evolutionary Program will consider a set of
candidate solutions to increase search capacity.
The Evolutionary Program is initialized by first generating a group of N feasible paths, followed
by an iterative 4-step process: 1) computation of the performance measure of each solution using
objective function (3.1a) and the subsequent ranking of solutions, 2) ranking-based selection (with
replacement) of N candidate paths, 3) randomization of the selected paths and computation of their
performance, 4) choose the N best performing paths from the combined selected and altered paths
and define it as the new solution set. A new set of solutions are generated at each iteration of this
four step process until a stopping criterion is met.
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In each step, the algorithm attempts to identify the best performing paths and include them
in the next iteration set. These solutions are chosen using linear-based rank selection, where the
probability of selection for each candidate is associated with its relative performance amongst
others. Better solutions have a higher probability of selection. This selection method is chosen
over a roulette based approach, where solutions are selected with probability proportional to its
objective function value, to avoid premature convergence at local optima’s [152]. Once a solution
is identified, the solution is randomly altered to expand the number of candidate paths considered
and avoid getting trapped in local optimums.
In the classic Evolutionary Program approach outlined in Yu and Gen [206], the path random-
ization step is known as the mutation function. Similar to the other 2 methods presented above,
the Evolutionary Program also has a natural implementation for path identification in a link/node
graph setting. In this research, the mutation function is implemented by randomly choosing and
removing up to half of the segments from either end of the selected path, and adding back a differ-
ent series of segments until the length limit is met to generate a different path. The two paths are
neighbors to each other since they share at least half of their comprised pipe segments.
Figure 3.7 shows a flow chart schematic of the algorithm. In the case studies a total of 100 sets
is generated (we also found that the best path typically converges within 100 steps of the method),
and the size of each solution set is 50, the same number as M in the M-start versions of the Greedy
Search and Simulated Annealing. The best performing path from the final set is selected as the
final solution. Since the Evolutionary Program itself is already a group based search, a 50-start
version of the algorithm is not implemented.
Figure 3.7: Schematic for Evolutionary Program
3.5 Algorithm testing and results
As discussed in the previous section, there are a total of 7 networks under consideration in this
study: 5 randomized grid networks, the Micropolis system, and the Ann Arbor system. For each of
the 7 systems, the optimization algorithms were applied in 50 trials and the objective function value
of the resulting inspection path was recorded. The rest of this section will present a summary of
the solution results and a discussion of their significance, example routes identified by the various
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solution methods are shown in the appendix.
Since the length of individual pipe segments can vary greatly relative to the length limit of the
inspection path (2% of the total system) and across different systems, the value of the objective
function (3.1a) can be greatly impacted due to the number of segments comprising a path. It
is possible to implement network preprocessing methods beforehand to standardize the segment
lengths, but this is beyond the scope of the study. To maintain generalizability, our analysis will
focus on the relative performance of each algorithm within a given network rather than across
networks.
Table 3.3 shows the mean and standard deviation of the path scores for each of the generated
Grid networks, which has randomized risk scores and physical properties. Across all five networks
there is a distinct hierarchy. On average: the 50 start Simulated Annealing performs the best,
followed by the 50 start Greedy Search, then the Evolutionary Program, then finally the single
runs of the Simulated Annealing and Greedy Search. A similar ordering is also observed for
the standard deviation associated with the path values, the 50 start Simulated Annealing has the
lowest standard deviation which suggests the algorithm is much more consistent in identifying
good solutions.
Table 3.3: Objective function mean and standard deviation of identified solutions from 5 randomly








Sample mean over 50 trials (sample standard deviation)
Network 1 3.75 (0.61) 5.17 (0.28) 4.94 (0.40) 5.45 (0.09) 5.10 (0.22)
Network 2 3.28 (0.60) 4.61 (0.16) 3.98 (0.41) 4.52 (0.01) 4.38 (0.21)
Network 3 3.25 (0.73) 4.37 (0.13) 4.45 (0.37) 4.71 (0.01) 4.65 (0.17)
Network 4 3.32 (0.63) 4.71 (0.23) 4.20 (0.38) 4.73 (0.01) 4.46 (0.22)
Network 5 3.24 (0.62) 4.65 (0.22) 4.27 (0.36) 4.70 (0.10) 4.47 (0.19)
The distinction between the heightened effectiveness of ensemble-based searches over single
searches is clear. Barring computational limitations, running the same heuristic multiple times
and picking the best solution can only improve the performance over a single run unless the global
optimal is found on the first trial. The average improvement in mean scores between Greedy Search
to the 50 run version across the 5 networks is 39.6%, while the improvement for the Simulated
Annealing is much smaller at 10.5%. These results suggest that when using less computationally
expensive algorithms, the expected improvement in running the algorithm a large number of times
is greater than when using more exhaustive approaches.
Even though the Evolutionary Program is the most computationally expensive algorithm used
in the benchmark trials, it falls short of the 50 start Simulated Annealing. Possible reasons for
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this could be related to the size of the solution set within the Evolutionary Program, increasing
the number of paths compared could expand the search capability of the method. Furthermore, in
highly connected networks such as the Grid, a Simulated Annealing approach may be better suited
to explore the feasible region since it has the freedom to move around the entire network, and is
less likely to be hindered by topological bottlenecks.
Table 3.4 shows the mean and standard deviation of the solution values for optimization trials in
the Micropolis and Ann Arbor networks. For the micropolis system, the ordering of performance
for the algorithms is as follows: the Evolutionary Program performs best (highest average score)
and is most consistent (lowest standard deviation), followed by the 50 start Simulated Annealing,
then the 50 start Greedy Search, and finally the single run versions of the Simulated Annealing and
Greedy Search.









Sample mean over 50 trials (sample standard deviation)
Micropolis 0.85 (0.79) 3.12 (0.81) 1.78 (0.94) 3.58 (0.49) 4.36 (0.34)
Ann Arbor 7.85 (10.55) 33.49 (3.21) 6.74 (6.65) 26.45 (3.18) 44.08 (2.25)
This relationship is also seen in Figure 3.8, where the probability density distribution of the
solution values are plotted, the distribution associated with the paths found using the Evolutionary
Program has the sharpest peak. It is seen that the distributions of both the 50 start algorithms have
overlap with that of the Evolutionary Program and is far better than their single run counterparts.
However, this overlap is small, with most of the distribution of the 50 start methods falling below
the Evolutionary Programs, indicating that while all ensemble based searches are capable of iden-
tifying good inspection paths, the Evolutionary Program is much more consistent and effective.
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Figure 3.8: Density distribution of path value from 50 trials of each optimization algorithms on
Micropolis network.
In contrast to the results seen from the randomized grids, the Evolutionary Program outper-
forms the 50 start Simulated Annealing, where average score of the former is approximately 22%
greater than the latter. This gap in performance is much larger than that observed in the randomized
grids, where the 50 start Simulated Annealing outperforms the Evolutionary Program by less than
5% on average. One possible reason for this discrepancy is due to the way the algorithms search
the network. Simulated Annealing relies on moving between neighbors after each iteration, this
means network topology and the ease of which regions of high value paths can be accessed from
other parts of the system is vital to the algorithms effectiveness. On the other hand, the Evolu-
tionary Program does not rely on moving between neighbors, instead it directly moves groups of
solutions to regions where good solutions are found. While network topology is still an important
property that determines how well the mutation function can explore the surrounding region of a
given path, it is less likely to get stuck at poor solutions due to topological constraints. Thus the
disconnected network structure of Micropolis means the Evolutionary Program is more adequate
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to find good inspection paths
For the Ann Arbor system, the ordering of performance for the algorithms is similar to the
Micropolis case: again referring to Table 3.4, the Evolutionary Program performs best (highest
average score) and is most consistent (lowest standard deviation), followed by the 50 start Greedy
Search, then the 50 start Simulated Annealing, and finally the single run versions of the Simulated
Annealing and Greedy Search. Figure 3.9 shows the probability density plots of the respective
scores over the 50 trials.
Figure 3.9: Density distribution of path value from 50 trials of each optimization algorithms on
Ann Arbor network.
It is evident that gap between the Evolutionary Program performance and that of any other
approach is far greater here than in previous examples. The average path score obtained using the
Evolutionary Program is 33% higher than the 50 start Greedy Search, the second best approach.
Furthermore, there is almost no overlap between the Evolutionary Program distribution and that of
any other approach. This indicates that in real networks that are both larger (26 times larger than
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Micropolis and 60 times larger than the grid in terms the number of pipe segments) and much more
disconnected, using a heuristic that is less reliant on network topology is vital for identifying good
inspection paths.
An interesting observation seen in the Ann Arbor case study is the reversal between the perfor-
mances of the 50 start Greedy Search and 50 start Simulated Annealing. In all the previous cases
the Simulated Annealing, the more computationally intensive algorithm, performed better than the
Greedy Search. The opposite is seen in the Ann Arbor system. A hypothesis for this observation is
due to the disconnected layout of the Ann Arbor system, which contains more “dead ends” com-
pared to Micropolis. As a result, the Simulated Annealing may be more prone to getting trapped,
and leaving these dead ends becomes difficult due to the disconnected layout.
3.5.1 Optimality gap comparison
Due to the homogenous length of the pipe segments in the grid, every solution path will always
contain the same number segments (in our case, 10), this is in contrast to the Micropolis and Ann
Arbor network solutions where the number of segments comprising a path is highly dependent on
their individual lengths. Thus for the grid example, the value of a global optimum (10) can be
obtained by setting the probability of failure of each segment to 1 and augmenting the path such
that there is no pipe feature change along its length.
To further compare the effectiveness of the heuristic algorithms, an optimality gap estimator
was implemented where another 50 random grids was generated. Each grid was induced with a
global optimum by selecting a random path and setting all comprising arcs with risk value 1 and
homogenous physical properties. This guarantees us that there exists a globally optimal path in
the network. For each of the augmented grids, the heuristics were run and the ratio of the scores
between the identified path and the optimal path was recorded in Table 3.5.
Table 3.5: The average ratio, over 50 trials, between the value of a path identified by a heuristic








Ratio 0.597 0.970 0.921 1.00 0.993
It was found that in the presence of a global optima, all approaches except the single run Greedy
Search performed very well by averaging over 92% when comparing objective function values to
the optimal. The 50 start simulated Annealing in particular never failed to find the global optimal,
while the Evolutionary Program was almost near optimal (99.3% average value of the optimal).
However, since all the ensemble based methods performed near-optimally (comparing 97% for the
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50 start Greedy Search to 99% from the Evolutionary Program), it did not provide more meaningful
insight into helping differentiate the different ensemble-based optimization approaches.
3.6 Discussion
It is shown from Section 3.5, that as the size of the system grows and the complexity of the net-
work layout increases, more computationally intensive methods like the Evolutionary Program are
more effective at finding good paths than less refined approaches. While the presented methods
were chosen because they provided a straightforward implementation in a network setting, future
research can aim to adapt other methods for comparison.
To demonstrate the importance of considering tool constraints when planning for inspections,
the Evolutionary Program is applied again to identify an inspection path in both the Micropolis and
Ann Arbor systems, except this time, the algorithm will the applied once with the original objective
function in equation (3.1a), and another with the tool-related penalty terms PmCm(X) and PdCd(X)
removed. The latter case will serve to show the difference when the only consideration is to find a
path with the riskiest pipes and tool limitations are disregarded.
In the Micropolis example, when pipe feature change penalties are included, the obtained so-
lution has objective value 2.89 with no pipe or diameter changes. In contrast, when the feature
change penalties are removed, the resulting path has value 3.88 and 5 total changes in pipe prop-
erty. While the second solution includes riskier pipes for inspection, the 3 changes in material and
2 changes in diameter along that path may lead to greater risk of deployment of the tools.
The difference in the resulting paths is further emphasized in the Ann Arbor example. When the
feature change penalties are included, the obtained solution has value 43.07 with 8 pipe diameter
changes and 8 material changes. On the other hand, without the feature change penalties, the
resulting path has value 48.88 and more than double the number of feature changes (20 diameter
changes and 15 material changes respectively). Again, while the second path includes more high
risk assets, the lack of consideration for the tool limitations can lead to a suboptimal inspection due
to greater risk of operational issues during inspections. For example, if a free floating device which
cannot be recalibrated instantaneously was used, multiple runs of the tool along the identified path
would be required, each time calibrating to a unique combination of pipe material and diameter.
This increases operational costs and risk of damage to the technology, the first path on the other
hand would be preferred since it presents a less risky deployment while also including critical
pipes.
How we characterized the tool limits in this study is through a simple penalty parameter which
only takes into account pipe material and diameter and assumes an equal cost for each respective
change. This may not always be the case, since costs could grow in a non-linear fashion. This can
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be modeled as part of more sophisticated formulations in future research. Further considerations
for tools include limiting the turns in a path as some tools operate better traveling down straight
lines [159]. The direction of flow as well as the flow rate of water in the segments is also an im-
portant factor in evaluating candidate inspection paths not considered in this study. In subsequent
modeling efforts, added complexities that better reflect real world operations can allow decision
makers to gain more useful insight from the model results.
In summary, while only simplifying assumptions are included, it is shown that the Evolutionary
Program applied in more realistic networks can aid the formulation of better inspection processes.
A better inspection process will lead to collection of better information regarding the condition of
transmission and distribution system assets. Having clearer knowledge on where the system is in
good condition while knowing where system issues need addressing will lead to a more resilient
water distribution network; protected against future failures leading to a reduction in related health
concerns and minimizing costs associated with pipe breaks.
3.7 Conclusion
In this research, a general optimization framework is presented for identifying inspection paths
within drinking water networks. The formulation aims to select the most critical segments for
assessment, while also accounting for the operations limits of the technology at hand. While the
given examples relate to water distribution systems specifically, the same formulation can be used
to plan for inspections of all types of infrastructure networks.
Examples of applying the optimization formulation are shown using synthetic and real net-
works. It is shown that as the scale of the network grows beyond the computational limits of exact
methods, and complexity of its layout increases, more advanced heuristics are required to identify
good paths.
Future research should aim to explore other optimization algorithms to compare effectiveness
and efficiency, to extend the current formulation to include both targeted and continuous inspection
tools, and to model tool-specific considerations when evaluating identified paths.
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Optimizing Inspection Routes in Pipeline Networks
Maintaining an aging network is a challenge for many water utilities due to limited budgets and un-
certainty surrounding the physical condition of buried pipeline assets. The deployment of robotic
inspections provides high quality data, but these platforms have limited use due to cost and op-
erational constraints. To facilitate cost-efficient inspections, operators need to identify high-risk
assets while accounting for the effectiveness of the tools at hand. This chapter addresses inspec-
tion planning with the goal of finding an optimal route considering tool limitations. An exact
integer programming formulation is presented where only three factors are used to characterize
tool constraints. Two classes of solution methods are explored: 1) tree based searches, and 2)
integer programming. This chapter demonstrates how each method can be used to identify optimal
inspection paths within a real water distribution system. Empirical trials suggest that tree-based
search methods are the most efficient when the path limit is short, but do not scale well when
the path length increases. In contrast, integer-programming methods are more effective for longer
path lengths but have scalability issues for large network sizes. Data preprocessing, where the
input network size is reduced, can provide large computational time reductions while returning
near-optimal solutions.
Keywords: Decision Support Systems, Risk Analysis, Routing, Drinking Water Distribution
Systems, Asset Management.
Note: The research presented in this chapter has been published at the Journal of Reliabil-
ity Engineering and System Safety. Citation: Thomas Y.J. Chen, Connor T. Riley, Pascal Van




There are over 150,000 public water systems in the USA, approximately 51,000 of these are com-
munity water systems that serve an estimated 90% of the total population [76]. These large net-
works (the average utility owns over 1600 miles of pipe [194]) are recognized as one of the most
critical infrastructures [70], but many operating utilities are challenged with maintaining them with
insufficient budgets and limited information [19]. Leaky distribution pipes account for approxi-
mately 14% of treated drinking water loss. These breaks, which occur as a result of aging, can also
impact water quality for the consumer (inadequate disinfectant residual, low pressure, etc.) [131]
with potential health impacts [184]. Experts estimate over $500 billion in capital investments are
required to address the replacement needs of these decaying assets over the next 40 years [39].
For utilities, having an effective asset management plan can lead to higher returns on capital
spending by targeting the highest risk assets for renewal [147]. This can be a difficult task when
dealing with buried infrastructure because there is limited and uncertain information surrounding
their current physical condition [19]. Robotic inspections are often deployed as a means for col-
lecting real-time information on pipe health and condition. Other benefits of using these platforms
include: 1) removing humans from hazardous work situations, 2) allowing for inspection of inac-
cessible areas and, depending on the tool, 3) providing online inspection without stoppage of pipe
operation [173]. Tur and Gathwaite [194] summarize some current inspection technologies and
Daly et al. [65] provide an overview of the data collection techniques associated with these tools.
Despite the continuous high quality data available with the use of robotic inspections, economic
and regulatory constraints have limited their widespread use [160] .
In order to facilitate higher returns on spending for inspections and asset renewal, identifying
regions of high failure risk is critical. Prioritizing inspections based solely on a risk-based ranking
of assets is popular in both practice and previous research (see [87, 157, 145]), but can lead to
suboptimal results. The sensors used by the tool as well as the physical properties of the pipeline
can affect the quality of data obtained and must be accounted for when designing inspection routes.
This research tackles the inspection routing problem such that tool limitations are also consid-
ered. We specifically target the potential for signal losses as a result of sensor calibration between
varying pipe material and size [159]. It is possible to extend the formulation to model other limita-
tions within an inspection routing framework. We present an optimization model for identifying a
continuous route for inspection and explore the effectiveness of five different solution algorithms.
The aim is to examine and discuss both the scalability and practicality of these methods for real-
world systems. To broaden the related research on inspection planning, the model formulation
will include two important considerations: 1) the inclusion of high-risk pipe segments along the
selected path, and 2) a penalty to reflect the limits of the technology platform to effectively collect
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high quality data along the identified path.
The same problem is first discussed in Chen et al. (2018) [58], where a general routing frame-
work is presented and solved using heuristics. The authors focused on the importance of con-
sidering tool limits rather than obtaining paths which are provably global optimums. The main
contributions of this work can be summarized as follows.
1. We propose an exact optimization formulation for finding optimal pipeline inspection routes
while also considering platform limitations. These are critical considerations that must be
taken into account when planning robotic inspections [58]. From our review of the literature
regarding risk based inspections, we find no previous work that presents an exact formulation
of this problem.
2. We present several complementary methods to obtain such optimal paths that are applicable
to real networks. The comparison of different solution methods is informative for evaluating
how different features of the problem (e.g. available budget, network size) impact the most
appropriate method for finding optimal paths efficiently.
The methods presented here can certainly be improved, but they highlight the power of opti-
mization to address practical problems in inspection planning. Together these two contributions
advance the modeling approach for inspection planning as better paths can now be found. This
research also highlights the strengths and weaknesses of different optimization techniques when
applied for this task.
The rest of this chapter will be organized as follows: a review of inspection technologies and
planning is in section 4.2. Section 4.3 specifies the routing problem and presents the optimization
formulation. Section 4.4 covers the solution methods, as well as their implementations on a real
network. Empirical results are presented and discussed in section 4.5 and we conclude our findings
in section 4.6.
4.2 Literature Review and Background
The condition assessment of pipelines is an useful aid for decision making regarding repair, reha-
bilitation, and replacement. It is typically used to mitigate costs of failure by determining potential
failure locations in advance [137]. A popular method for assessment is through the use of inspec-
tion robotics, where inferential indicators of stresses and defects can be identified [147].
Continuous inspections are a means for collecting information along an entire length of pipe.
This is in contrast to spot or discrete inspections where only select locations are targeted (e.g.
every 10 meters along the pipeline) [65]. A 2013 EPA report summarizes a number of continuous
56
inspection platforms which are currently on the market and includes a field demonstration of their
capabilities [160]. The most commonly attached device is a CCTV camera which would allow
video to be captured inside the pipe. On top of that, many other sensors can also be outfitted
to the inspection robot, mostly classified as electromagnetic or acoustic [137]. Acoustic sensors
are geared towards leak detection while electromagnetic sensors are used to identify defects on
the pipe surface. Other less commonly used platforms include sonar and lasers, typically used to
locate debris and sediment build-up.
As mentioned in Section 4.1, both the academic and industry literature which deals with in-
spection planning aims to prioritize assets by risk (see [145] and [159] for examples). This ensures
that costly data collection techniques are targeted to the most vulnerable assets, and many previ-
ous studies have presented mathematical models for this task (see [111, 190, 185]). The academic
literature presents various applications of risk based inspection planning on engineered systems
such as offshore structures [155], oil rigs [45], ships [72, 139], and aircrafts [208]. These models
take in a user-defined estimate of asset risk and determines which assets to inspect and how often.
Typically, either a budget is specified or the objective function minimizes the cost associated with
carrying out these inspections.
For example, Li et al. (2012) [135] formulates an hierarchal integer program to determine the
minimum number of locations needed such that there can be complete coverage of the pipeline
environment using CCTV cameras. Lu et al. (1999) [141] solves for specific routes by likening the
task as a traveling salesman problem (TSP), except each location may be visited more than once
for complete inspection. A TSP formulation can lend itself useful to a host of solution methods,
some of which are explored and discussed in Laporte (1992) [126]. However routing problems are
NP complete [141] which means an efficient (non exponential) solution method is not currently
known.
Works by Straub et al. (2005 [190], 2006 [189]) and Luque et al. (2019) [143] aim to find opti-
mal replacement and inspection policies for multi-component systems (e.g. roadways or pipelines)
using bayesian methods. Each of these studies report that the large number of assets consisting a
infrastructure network make identifying optimal inspection policies with exact methods compu-
tationally infeasible. A method to integrate risk based inspections into a wider decision making
framework is presented in Khan et al. (2004) [112]. Here expert knowledge is combined with risk
assessment outputs using multi-attribute decision-making tools. To address uncertainties related to
the structural deterioration rates, works by Kallen and Noortwijk (2005) [104] and Memarzadeh
and Pozzi (2016) [149] propose stochastic models to identify inspection policies under uncertainty.
A case study that tackles optimal inspection scheduling is found in Dandy and Engelhardt
(2001) [67]. The authors demonstrate the use of genetic algorithms to formulate a cost-minimizing
five year rehabilitation and inspection plan for an Australian municipality. This work is extended
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in Dandy and Engelhardt (2006) [66] where multiple shareholder interests are captured in the
optimization (e.g. least cost, maximum system reliability). Besides only considering asset risk in
the planning stage, these studies also formulate the problem to provide complete coverage of the
pipeline network. The practical implication of the findings become limited because most utilities
do not have the budget to inspect their entire system over a limited time horizon. On top of
economic constraints, regulatory and operational considerations limit inspection, replacement, and
repair capabilities to approximately 2% of the system length for most municipalities [58].
In a best-practice guideline published by the National Association of Corrosion Engineers
(NACE) [159] for robotic inline inspections, a number of operational issues are listed which must
be accounted in the planning stage. These concerns are associated with physical properties inside
the pipe which may affect the quality of the data collected. Mazumder et al. (2018) [147] identifies
some state of the art inspection technologies and highlights their limitations. For example: the ef-
fectiveness of laser scanners depend of the pipe surface roughness and color, signals from impact
echos can be affected by the presence of embedded items inside the pipe, and acoustic methods
may not provide accurate readings for plastic pipes.
It is important that limitations must be acknowledged in the planning of robotic inspections.
The goal of the routing optimization is to identify the optimal path which maximizes the risk of
inspected assets, while being penalized for pipe properties which can lead to signal loss. To the
authors knowledge, no past research has presented an exact mathematical model which tackles
inspection path planning in this fashion.
4.3 Problem Definition and Optimization Formulation
In this section we will define the inspection routing problem and present it’s mathematical formu-
lation. Only three factors pertaining to the limitations of an inspection platform are addressed in
the optimization, however it is possible to extend the general approach presented below to model
a variety of technology-specific considerations.
4.3.1 Model Specification
The routing optimization presented here is similar to the prize collecting traveling salesman prob-
lem [42]. The goal is to find the maximum value path where only a subset of the pipes can be
traversed. Due to physical constraints on the water flow, the solution must be an elementary path,
i.e., a path that visits a junction at most once. Indeed, traversing a cycle would often require the
real-time operation of valves, which most utilities are not capable of. Furthermore, passing the
same junction twice with tethered platforms increases the risk of having the tool being stuck.
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A limited inspection budget is specified as a limit on the total length of the path. The rewards
for the designated route are associated with the pipe risk (edges), and the penalties are assigned
based on properties which negatively impact inspection readings. We focus on adjacent pipes of
different material and diameter. Many robotic sensors need a certain liftoff from the wall surface
[137] for accurate readings and require different calibrations based on material type (cast iron,
steel, etc.) and pipe diameter. When tools move between adjacent pipe with different properties,
sensors need to be recalibrated and no inspection readings are taken during this process. This is a
particular concern for free floating devices which collect inspection data while moving along the
flow of water [137]. Condition data is lost along the length of pipe that is traversed while the tool
is adjusting to different pipe properties [58].
While our model only addresses material and diameter changes, it can be extended to include
other technology specific penalties. For example: avoiding sharp bends for tethered tools, avoiding
non-metallic pipe for electromagnetic tools, etc. To the authors knowledge, no past research has
presented an exact mathematical model which tackles inspection path planning in this fashion. We
only consider the section of a single inspection route in our optimization. Due to the large set up
costs for performing a single inspection (e.g. crew dispatch, road closures, excavation equipment
to insert and retrieve tool), most utilities in practice only plan for single deployments at a time. It is
possible to optimize for the planning of multiple routes constrained under one budget, e.g. identify
multiple paths where the sum of length is less than 1 miles rather than just a single path less than
1 mile. Instead we focus the formulation and the exploration of techniques to finding one path,
variants of this problem is left for future research.
4.3.2 Mathematical Formulation
We start by first defining an algebraic representation of a water distribution system. Let G = (V , E)
be an undirected graph, where V represents the set of pipe junctions and E represents the set of all
pipe segments. Let each vertex in the network be indexed by i ∈ V , and each edge be represented
by the pair of vertices (i, j) ∈ E . This is a popular abstraction of a water system which has been
applied in various research ([209, 8]). Each vertex can represent a water source, a connecting
valve, a storage/treatment facility, or a pipe junction. Each edge represents a pipeline segment, and
for simplicity, we assume that these are undirected edges.
Let Rij and Lij represent the risk score and length (in miles) of each pipe segment. Note that
each edge (i, j) ∈ E also has a corresponding pipe material and diameter. Additionally, let s and t
be the indexing of pseudo source and sink vertices, any feasible path will start and end at these 2
vertices. The goal of the mathematical program is to select a series of edges (i, j) which forms the
highest-value elementary path, bound by the total distance (DL, DU).
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We define Di as the set of indexes j for all vertices adjacent to vertex i ∈ V . Let all pairs
of adjacent edges be indexed by the triplet (i, j, k), where j is the connecting vertex. The set T
represents all pairs of adjacent edges in G. From the network data, the following information
can be extracted: Mijk equals 1 if a material change occurs between the pair of adjacent pipes
(i, j, k) ∈ T , 0 otherwise. Dijk equals 1 if a diameter change occurs between the pair of adjacent
pipes (i, j, k) ∈ T , 0 otherwise. Finally, let PM and PD be the path penalty factors associated with
a material and diameter change along a selected pair of adjacent pipes (i, j, k) ∈ T .
The decision variables for this problem are as follows:
• Xij equals 1 if the edge (i, j) is selected for inspection, 0 otherwise. ∀(i, j) ∈ E .
• Yijk equals 1 if adjacent edges Xij and Xjk, are both selected for inspection, 0 otherwise.
∀(i, j, k) ∈ T
• Ui is the vertex labelling variable used for subtour elimination ∀i ∈ N . We use the Miller-
Tucker-Zemlin (MTZ) formulation [153] of subtour elimination constraint set.
























Xit = 1 (4.1c)∑
j∈Di
Xji +Xsi ≤ 1,∀i ∈ V (4.1d)





Xik +Xit, ∀i ∈ V (4.1f)
Yijk ≤ Xij, ∀(i, j, k) ∈ T (4.1g)
Yijk ≤ Xjk,∀(i, j, k) ∈ T (4.1h)
Yijk ≥ Xij +Xjk − 1,∀(i, j, k) ∈ T (4.1i)
Ui − Uj + 1 ≤ (| V | −1)(1−Xij),∀(i, j) ∈ E (4.1j)
Us = 1 (4.1k)
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Ut =| V | +2 (4.1l)
Xij ∈ {0, 1},∀(i, j) ∈ E (4.1m)
Yijk ∈ {0, 1},∀(i, j, k) ∈ T (4.1n)
Ui ∈ {2, ..., | N | +1}, ∀i ∈ V (4.1o)
The objective function (4.1a) is the sum of risk scores along the selected edges, minus the
total pipe junction transfer costs that are incurred due to material and diameter changes. We will
assume that the rewards and penalties grow in a linear fashion. These penalties are defined as the
total number of pipe feature changes that occur along the path, multiplied by the corresponding
penalty factor.
Constraints (4.1b) impose that the selected path be bound by the distance limit (DL, DU).
Constraints (4.1c) - (4.1f) are flow balance constraints which impose that the selected solution
must be an elementary path (no repeated vertices): (4.1c) enforces a unit flow at the source and
sink vertices, (4.1d) and (4.1e) prevent branching or looping by restricting the flow entering each
vertex, and (4.1f) is the set of flow balance constraints. Constraints (4.1g) - (4.1i) imposes the
relationship between the edge selection variable Xij and the edge pair selection indicator Yijk: Yijk
is 1 if and only if both Xij and Xjk are 1.
Since feasible solutions can only include elementary paths, by definition no sub-tours are al-
lowed. Constraints (4.1j) - (4.1l) handle sub-tour elimination following the MTZ vertex labelling
formulation [153] by imposing a strict ordering on the vertex labels. Any feasible solution will
first consist of an edge out the source Xsi, followed by a series of connected edges (Xij , Xjk, etc.),
then an edge into the sink Xkt. For any feasible path, constraint (4.1j) imposes that the labels Ui
for all intermediate vertices must be strictly increasing when ordered from source to sink. This
prevents subtours since (4.1j) will be violated if a path loops back on itself. Constraints (4.1k) and
(4.1l) gives the source the smallest label and the sink the largest label. Finally, constraints (4.1m)
- (4.1o) define the domain of each decision variable.
One other practical application of this research is to identify inspection paths under uncer-
tain conditions. No model is perfect, and the risk science literature argues single metrics paint
an incomplete characterization of risk [79] because uncertainties and assumptions behind these
estimates are not communicated. One way to elicit uncertainties is to quantify risk as a set of
possible values rather than a single number. To integrate the optimization of inspections into this
broader risk definition, model (4.1) can be solved across different reward values (Rij) and penalty
coefficients (Mijk, Dijk) and the different paths are recorded. Finding optimal paths under varying
inputs represent uncertainties in the risk analysis and tool performance. Instead of identifying a
single solution, the decision maker can now find a group routes, each optimal under different as-
sumptions. This allows for the comparison of different inspection investments against each other,
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and ultimately enhances the utility of the optimization model as a decision support tool.
4.4 Methodology
This section describes the methodology used for this research. This includes the extraction of
network information from a real water distribution system and the application of a risk model to
characterize asset condition. It also includes a description of the five solution methods used to
solve the formulation presented in Model (4.1).
4.4.1 Network Test Case
We partnered with the local utility in Ann Arbor, MI, to obtain a spatial file of the city’s water
distribution system. Figure 4.1 below depicts the full system layout.
Figure 4.1: City of Ann Arbor Water Pipe Network.
The Ann Arbor network contains pipe of 9 different material classes (predominantly Cast Iron
and Ductile Iron) and 12 different diameter sizes ranging from 2 - 24 inches. There are a total
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of 12,538 unique pipe junctions (the set V), and 13,058 unique pipe segments (the set E) in the
network, accounting for a total of 242.26 miles of total pipe.
From the spatial file we can extract the following information: the length of each pipe segment
Lij (i, j) ∈ E , the set of all adjacent pipes (i, j, k) ∈ T , and the presence of material and diameter
changes between each pair of adjacent pipe Mijk & Dijk, (i, j, k) ∈ T . Note that in the optimiza-
tion formulation the specific material or diameter does not matter (e.g. 12 in. steel or 4 in. PVC),
we only care about the change in these properties between adjacent pipes.
4.4.2 Network Test Case with Data Preprocessing
Each method we investigate is guaranteed to find the optimal inspection path, the more interesting
discussion is on the efficiency and scalability of these methods. The size of the optimization
problem can be characterized by the size of the input network and the length of the allowable path.
In the link-node network representation, size does not pertain to the total mileage of pipe but rather
the total number of edges |E| and vertices |V|.
Beyond directly working with the original spatial data itself, we also implement a network
preprocessing step which can reduce the cardinality of the edge and vertex set. The preprocessing
involves two steps: 1) merging adjacent edges which are the same pipe type, and 2) removal of
short edges. The first involves identifying all adjacent pipes which have the same material and
diameter and merging them into a single pipe. Note we merge pipes when there are strictly two
which meet at a junction. If there are three or more pipes meeting at an intersection we cannot
merge. Rewards for the set of new psuedo-edges is the sum of the constituent edge rewards Rij .
Only material and diameter is considered for when checking ”identical pipes” since they are the
ones used in the optimization model. The second step simply removes pipes which are three feet
or less in length, this corresponds to less than 0.1% of the total network length. The reduction in
the input network after preprocessing the data is summarized in table 4.1 below.
Table 4.1: Change in Optimization Model Input after Data Preprocessing.
Original Network Network with Edge Aggregation and Removal Reduction
|E| 13058 4565 65.04%
|V| 12538 4584 63.44%
Note that it is possible that the optimal solution is changed when joining and removing pipes
because feasible solutions are removed. Part of the research goal is to also explore the tradeoff be-
tween reducing the computational burden by preprocessing the network and the resulting solution
quality. Besides exploring the change in solution time as a function of the size of the input network,
we also adjust the length of the allowable inspection path. For each of the two graphs we also use
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the following path distance limits: DL = 0.00 mi.,DU = {0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 1.00, 1.25, 1.50, 1.75, 2.00}
mi. The two mile limit is used to reflect the limited inspection budgets, single inspection routes in
practice typically do not extend beyond this limit [160].
4.4.3 Probability of Failure Risk Model
In order to characterize the physical condition of the pipe segments in the full Ann Arbor sys-
tem as well as the preprocessed network, an age-based pipe-break likelihood of failure model is
implemented. The risk score assigns the rewards (the Rij coefficients) for inspecting each asset.
The reward for inspecting each asset is set to the probability of failure. Implementing a more
complicated risk function would lead to better inspection paths but is beyond the scope of this
research. We focus the work on the model formulation, and the subsequent analysis on the perfor-
mance of the optimization algorithms.
We use a model published in the literature. Similar to the methods presented in Chen et al.
(2018) [58], we use a case study by Genevieve et al. (2013) [168] where a Weibull distribution is
fit against historical failure data from a Canadian utility. A Weibull distribution is characterized
by two parameters, κ and ρ. It models the time to first failure from initial installation [174]. The
authors [168] found a better statistical fit of the failure data is achieved by discretizing the pipe
system into two classes based on installation year, before and after 1960, and fitting two separate
distributions.
A hazard function, λ(θ), which corresponds to the annual probability of failure can be derived
from a Weibull distribution.
λ(θ) = Rij = κρ(κθ)
ρ−1 (4.2)
A Weibull distribution is characterized by two parameters, κ and ρ. Where θ is the age of the
pipe segment in years, κ (units year−1) is the scale parameter of the distribution, and ρ (unitless)
is the shape parameter. ρ values greater than 1 signify that failure rates of a pipeline will increase
over time Table 4.2 below represents the κ and ρ parameters used for the test networks. We apply
equation 4.2 to all edges (i, j) ∈ E in the network to compute the inspection rewards Rij .
Table 4.2: Hazard Function Parameters of Pipe Break Likelihood Risk Model, taken from
Genevieve et al. (2013) [168].





We implement five algorithms to solve the optimization formulation presented in Model 4.1: in-
teger programming branch and bound (IP), constraint generation (CG), depth first search (DFS),
breadth first search (BFS), and a pruned depth first search (DFSpruned). These algorithms are cate-
gorized as either: 1) tree traversals or 2) integer programs.
We ran our experiments on a machine with 32 cores running at 2.6GHz. For the integer-
programming methods, the optimization model is written in Python3 using the ”gurobipy” pack-
age and then solved using Gurobi (written in C++). The tree-based methods are implemented
and solved entirely in Python3. Once again, the goal of this research is not to compare different
methods, but to show their practicability, strengths, and weaknesses of different. Finding the best
optimization model is beyond the scope of this research.
4.4.4.1 Tree Search
We first examine two exhaustive search techniques: breadth first search (BFS) and depth first
search (DFS). Both enumerate all feasible paths starting from each vertex v ∈ V in parallel. See
references by Ahuja et al. (1993) [2] for a full description of both graph traversal algorithms.
For our implementation, the starting vertices v are sorted based on their geographical location and
processed in order of increasing latitude and longitude.
The DFS was also tested with pruning, we call this the DFSpruned method. The algorithm relies
on a depth-first traversal over the network, but computes a heuristic at every step to evaluate an
upper-bound objective for the current path. The traversal along a branch of the DFS is terminated
if this upper bound is less that the best solution currently found. This allows us to find the optimal
solution without fathoming every feasible path, effectively pruning the size of the search space.
The method also processes each vertex v ∈ V in order based on latitude and longitude. To
prune paths for a particular start vertex vs, we record all edges contained within a radius of length
DU from vs and sort these edges based on unit reward L. L is defined as the ratio between reward
Rij and length Lij . We sort based on unit reward since the pipe segments lengths Lij are non-
homogenous in the given data. The DFS traversal algorithm is again executed in parallel. At each
node of the DFS, the subpath contains a series of edges E and has certain distance from the limit
(DU − dE). The length of the current path is dE , the current value is Rc, and a heuristic h(n) for
the best additional value that can be achieved in (DU − dE). To calculate h(n), the rewards of the
edges from the set L \ E are summed starting from the edge with the best unit reward, until the
distance of these edges is equal to (DU − dE). At every node n, if Rc + h(n) is less than the value
of the best path currently found in the search, then n is not expanded further.
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4.4.4.2 Integer Programming
Model (4.1) was solved using Gurobi [98] both using the full formulation (IP) and using a con-
straint generation (CG) approach. The Gurobi solver uses a branch and bound method [129] to
identify the optimal solution.
In constraint generation, constraints (4.1j) - (4.1l) (the subtour elimination constraints) are
removed from the model and the relaxed problem in solved. We remove these constraints because
they give the master problem a weak linear relaxation, making it more computationally inefficient.
For all subtours s ∈ S found by the relaxation, add the constraint
∑
(i,j)∈S Xij ≤ |S| − 1 and
resolve the integer program with these added constraints. Here we are specifically targeting the
identified subtours and removing them from feasibility. By repeating this process until no subtours
are present in the solution of the relaxation, we are guaranteed a solution that is also optimal to the
master problem in Model (4.1).
4.5 Results and Discussion
We solved for the optimal path within the Ann Arbor system with and without data preprocessing,
each with 8 different limits on the allowable length DU . The reward coefficients Rij for each pipe
segment is defined using equation (4.2), and the penalty coefficient due to material and diameter
changes (PM and PD) is set to 1. Since all rewards are bound between 0 and 1, we select a penalty
of 1 to sufficiently negate the value of any selected pipe if a penalty is incurred when traversing it.
In practice the value of these penalties should be defined by experts with experience using these
inspection platforms [58] to better reflect the losses incurred due to signal disruptions. The figure
below identifies the solution path in the unprocessed system over each DU increment. We set a
limit of 20,000 seconds (5.5 hours) in each trial. For the runs which completed within the allotted
time, each method returned the identical solution.
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Figure 4.2: Optimal Inspection Paths for Unprocessed Ann Arbor Water Pipe Network.
Five experiments were run for each algorithm/DU /network combination. In table 4.3 below
we present the value of the optimal path and the average computation time required to obtain the
solution. The fastest average time over each DU is in bold, the results displayed are only for
the network before any preprocessing is applied. Since the exact solution time can vary across
machines and trials due to a number of factors (e.g. background processes, CPU and memory
capacity etc.), we focus our analyses on the solution times relative to each other rather than the raw
number.
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Table 4.3: Network without PreProcessing - DU vs Path Value and Solution Time (sec.).
DU Objective Value IP CG DFS BFS DFSpruned
0.25 308.78 81.24 68.33 12.13 12.46 41.19
0.50 521.90 2008.72 3854.97 30.50 31.20 357.35
0.75 757.57 1090.10 5737.12 221.18 210.89 1513.82
1.00 994.72 1230.94 5781.23 1629.61 1677.13 1981.49
1.25 1227.48 1371.22 6690.16 >20000 >20000 2166.43
1.50 1448.59 1540.87 9886.01 >20000 >20000 >20000
1.75 1694.01 1113.81 5993.20 >20000 >20000 >20000
2.00 1934.82 1744.07 4441.38 >20000 >20000 >20000
The results show that, when 0.25 ≤ DU ≤ 0.75, the DFS is the most efficient and, when
1.00 ≤ DU ≤ 2.00, the IP branch and bound is best. The IP and CG branch and bound are
only methods able to find the optimal solution within 5.5 hours over all of the DU increments,
suggesting they are relatively insensitive to DU . The CG is slower than the IP in every instance
except when DU = 0.25 mi. A potential cause for the generally slower processing time is due to
the increased number of subproblems it is required to solve: over theDU increments the CG solves
an average of 7 relaxations before obtaining the optimal solution.
We find that the number of subproblems solved before reaching the optimal solution is pos-
itively correlated to the overall solution time. The solution times for the integer programming
methods are not strictly increasing with DU , unlike the graph traversals. It is known that the
branch and bound algorithm scales exponentially with the number of decision variables and con-
straints [163]. This implies that the efficiency of the integer programming approach is dependent
on the size of the input network. In order to formulate Model (4.1), having more edges (pipes)
increases the number of decision variables and more nodes (pipe junctions) increases the number
of constraints.
When the allowable path lengths are small (0.25 - 0.75 miles) the DFS and BFS exhaustive
searches are by far the fastest, the solution time being orders of magnitude less than the others. The
DFS and BFS are identical algorithms with respect to the number of steps taken (search tree size)
[2], any difference in solution times are due to implementation details. However the exhaustive
search does not scale well. With DU ≤ 1 mi., a solution can be found within 1 hour, but with DU
> 1 mi. the methods take longer than 5.5 hours.
The DFSpruned is slower than both of the exhaustive search methods when DU ≤ 1 mi. How-
ever it manages to return a solution when DU = 1.25 mi. whereas the exhaustive searches cannot.
The reason for the slower computation time at the start is due to the extra computation from having
to solve a heuristic (see section 4.4.1) at every step. The results imply that when DU is small, a
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full enumeration of all feasible paths is preferable over using a heuristic to reduce the number of
fathomed solutions. However when DU exceeds a certain threshold, the reduction in the search
space is enough such that pruning becomes more effective.
We next examine the effects that data preprocessing has on solution quality and computation
time. Table 4.4 below presents the results after preprocessing steps are applied (joining edges with
same properties and deleting edges shorter than 3 ft.). The new solution times are reported, along
with the percentage reduction in the new objective value. Again, we will focus our discussion on
the relative solution times of each method.
Table 4.4: Network with Preprocessing - Solution Time (sec.) and % Reduction in Solution Value.
DU Objective Value Change IP CG DFS BFS DFSpruned
0.25 -12.22% 41.26 14.26 4.62 4.14 7.91
0.50 -1.07% 72.41 410.90 4.70 4.67 15.46
0.75 -0.00% 31.93 53.44 5.07 5.32 41.69
1.00 -2.29% 22.51 76.95 18.43 17.66 78.66
1.25 -0.42% 61.20 159.32 83.67 80.40 103.47
1.50 -0.11% 20.36 54.86 333.06 330.86 201.01
1.75 -0.07% 63.70 132.41 1226.43 1210.02 225.64
2.00 -0.06% 62.53 49.08 4234.59 4306.73 259.33
Unlike the results without network preprocessing, all the tree search instances were able to find
the optimal path within 5.5 hours. In most cases the decrease in solution quality (objective function
value) was also minimal. The objective value reduced by less than 2.5% in all cases except at DU
= 0.25 mi., where the objective value reduced by 12%. The reduction in solutions times for the
DFS/BFS ranged between 62-99% and increased with DU . We again note that the DFS and BFS
solution times are near identical, and any differences are due to implementation details.
The average reduction in solution times for the DFSPruned was about 83%. For the IP, the
average solution time reduced by 50% in the smallest case (DU = 0.25 mi.) but had at least a
94% reduction in all other instances. Reductions in solution times were also similar for the CG,
averaging at about 95% across all instances. These results indicate that preprocessing the data can
boost computational efficiency while returning near-optimal solutions.
When examining which methods are the fastest in relation to DU , a similar pattern from the
unprocessed network case is observed. For shorter paths (DU ≤ 1.00), the exhaustive DFS/BFS
searches are the fastest. Meanwhile, for longer paths (DU ≥ 1.25), an integer programming branch
and bound approach becomes preferable. An interesting observation is that the CG is the fastest in
the largest instance (DU = 2 mi.).
Similar trends are also revealed when comparing the exhaustive DFS/BFS against the DFSPruned.
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At shorter path lengths, the full enumeration approach is faster. In contrast, at longer path lengths
(DU ≥ 1.50) we see that the pruned search becomes preferable. This indicates that even for the
processed network, involving additional computational costs to reduce the search space becomes
favorable after a certain length threshold.
To further compare the BFS/DFS against the DFSPruned, we graph the size of the search tree
for each method. The size of the search tree is the total number of steps taken by the algorithm to
find the optimal path. Figure 4.3 shows the growth in the complexity of the search as DU is scaled,
in both the unprocessed and preprocessed network.
Figure 4.3: Exponential Growth in Tree Search Complexity as DU Increases.
All the lines in figure 4.3 are roughly linear in the log scale. This shows that the size of the
search space grows exponentially with DU , both with and without network preprocessing. While
the DFS and BFS complexities are polynomial (order 2) [2] in the which they search a network, the
exponential growth in complexity with input size indicates that these methods scale poorly with
path length.
Table 4.4 shows that DFSpruned is slower than an exhaustive search until a certain threshold
in path length is reached. Figure 4.3 shows the corresponding reduction in the search space the
algorithm produced. For the DFSpruned with and without network preprocessing, there is a >88%
reduction in the search tree across all instances. However the exponential growth in the input, as
evidenced by the grey lines in figure 4.3, show that even the pruned searches scale poorly withDU .
Comparing solution times reported in tables 4.3 and 4.4, the data shows that preprocessing can
provide a large boost in the computational efficiency. Furthermore the resulting paths are near-
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optimal, the average reduction in the solution value is 2%. However, branch and bound and tree
searches still may not scale well for larger networks and longer paths. This may be a problem for
utilities with a larger pipeline network and a larger inspection budget.
The efficiency of DFSPruned is in part dependent on the quality on the best solution found at
any time. Currently the first solution is the first DFS path found and is updated throughout the
traversal. If a high quality solution is instead used as the first path, a larger reduction of the search
tree can be achieved. To provide a upper bound for the optimal efficiency of DFSPruned, we rerun
the analysis where the known optimal path is used as the starting solution. This guarantees us a
maximal pruning of the search tree in both the processed and unprocessed network. The size of
the search trees is again plotted below for the original and unprocessed network.
Figure 4.4: Tree Search Complexity Comparison, Original Network.
The average reduction in the search tree size when using the optimal solution is 70% from the
original DFSpruned, and 97% from the exhaustive searches. Below is the search tree size plots for
the instance with data preprocessing.
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Figure 4.5: Tree Search Complexity Comparison, Network with Data Preprocessing.
The average reduction in the search tree size when using the optimal solution is 75% from
the original DFSpruned, and 93% from the exhaustive searches. The results show that in both the
cases with and without network preprocessing, the reduction in the search space is similar when
using the pruned search. However there is still room for additional pruning, and in turn improved
computational efficiency. This is suggested in figures 4.4 and 4.5 by the gap between the solid grey
and dashed lines.
The current implementation of DFSPruned processes each network vertex v in order based on
longitude and latitude. The pruning capability of relies on the best solution found at each stage of
the algorithm. Therefore, if good paths are found earlier during the traversal, the efficiency can
be increased. Chen et al. [58] explores some heuristic algorithms for this task and can provide a
good starting point. In this setting, instead of using the first DFS path out of the first vertex as the
initial best solution, scan over the entire network and use a high quality heuristic solution instead.
Exploring the possibility of combining heuristics with the current methods, as well as other classes
of solution algorithms is left for future research.
4.6 Conclusion
In this research, we tackled the problem of optimal routing for in-pipe robotic inspections. The
work extended the previous literature where the optimization will take into account both: 1) the
limited capabilities to use these tools, and 2) the physical pipe properties down a given route which
may limit the effectiveness of the tools. While the focus is on water main inspections, the methods
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presented here can be extended for inspection planning in other types of networked infrastructure
(e.g. power networks, gas networks, road networks).
An exact integer programming formulation was presented, along with five solution algorithms.
The methods fall under 2 categories: integer programming and graph search. Other classes of
methods may also work (for example, dynamic programming) but is beyond scope and is left for
future work. We demonstrate the application of these algorithms using the water pipe network
in Ann Arbor, Michigan. Empirical trials suggest that tree based searches scale poorly with the
allowable path length, while integer programming methods are less sensitive. On the other hand,
integer-programming-based methods do not scale well with the number of unique pipes and pipe
junctions. We also show that graph preprocessing by 1) reducing the number of unique edges, and
2) ignoring edges below a length threshold, can provide a large boost in computation time while
returning near-optimal solution paths. Using a heuristic to identify a good path first can further
boost the efficiency of the pruned graph search.
Extensions to this research can tackle the planning of multiple paths at once, as well as model-
ing tool-specific considerations beyond just pipe property (material and size) changes. Using more
advanced pipe failure risk models can identify better paths and enhance the usefulness of the opti-
mization as a decision support tool. Examining the use of other risk frameworks in the inspection
planning context, in particular how to best address uncertainties, is left for future work.
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CHAPTER 5
Statistical Modeling in the Absence of System
Specific Data: Exploratory Empirical Analysis for
Prediction of Water Main Breaks
The replacement of deteriorating distribution pipes is an important process for water utilities. It
helps reduce capital spending on water main breaks and improves customer satisfaction. To assist
with the development of an effective renewal plan, statistical models which forecast future break-
age rates have been used to guide planning for asset management. However, this process is difficult
for older utilities which lack readily available pipe network data. We examine whether accurate
and useful predictive models can be built in the absence of pipe-feature data. Using the histor-
ical break record from a Mid-Atlantic utility, two datasets at different spatial scales are created
using publicly available demographic and environmental information. Empirical results suggest
that while accuracy suffers from the lack of pipe-level details, it is still possible to create a model
which provides useful information for prioritization of high-risk regions for management.
Keywords: Drinking Water Distribution System, Replacement and Rehabilitation Planning,
Asset Management, Statistical Modeling, Risk Prioritization
Note: The research presented in this chapter has been published in the Journal of Infrastructure
Systems. Citation: Thomas Y.J. Chen, Jared A. Beekman, Seth D. Guikema, Sara Shashaani.
Statistical Modeling in the Absence of System Specific Data: Exploratory Empirical Analysis for
Prediction of Water Main Breaks. Journal of Infrastructure Systems, 25(2):04019009, 2019.
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5.1 Introduction
The management of an aging water distribution system is important to water utilities due to the
vital societal and economic impacts that are incurred when service is not provided [77]. How-
ever, management of these systems can be challenging due to limited availability of information
and uncertainty regarding the physical condition of the pipes [19]. Aging, corrosion, and other
environmental factors play a role in the deterioration of water mains [119] which can lead to leaks
and breaks. Pipe breaks can pose public health dangers [184] by contaminating the distribution
systems, and often lead to costly repair operations [196] (Walski and Pelliccia 1982). A survey by
the Water Research Foundation estimates the average main break costs $42000 [205].
Being able to forecast which regions of the distribution network are at highest likelihood of
failure can help utilities with efficient inspection and repair decisions [116]. However, this can be
challenging for some utilities due to uncertain and limited information of system-specific features
[19]. Utilities such as these do not have a digitized map of the system, nor do they have records of
basic pipe characteristics such as material, size, and age. This lack of geospatial data is surprisingly
common in the US, especially among small to mid-size utilities. As a result, these utilities often
plan their asset management in an ad-hoc fashion such as relying on expert judgment or prioritizing
assets based on past failure trends.
To address this problem, this research aims to develop statistical models which forecast fu-
ture breakage probability using public demographic and environmental information as proxies for
pipe-level data. Using models such as these would potentially allow utilities to identify where
vulnerabilities lie in the system.
Traditional modeling approaches may fail to predict accurately when there is a significant im-
balance in the response variable (one class largely outnumbers the other class). This is common
in segment-level pipe break data because pipe breaks occur infrequently at the level of individual
segments. The proposed method in this study uses sampling methods outlined in He and Garcia
(2009) [92] to achieve better balance in the training dataset.
Because managing pipe failures is a binary problem in practice that identifies whether or not
the onset of a single failure of a distribution asset would require full repair operations, the modeling
of pipe breaks is often framed as a binary classification. In this setting, the outcome is either no
failure (a negative response) or at least one failure (a positive response) [168, 201, 207]. Thus,
this research will explore the use of binary classification models to accurately predict the onset of
pipe failures. The contribution here is exploring the use of only publicly available data in building
predictive models, and determining whether these methods can be useful for utilities challenged
by the lack of system level information.
Building models while lacking important explanatory variables raises the possibility of omit-
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ted variable bias. Omitted variable bias [132] is a model misspecification issue that arises when
variables (e.g. pipe-level data) highly correlated to the response (pipe break likelihood) are not
available. There are statistical methods to account for the model bias that arises in this situation,
such as multi-level modeling [148]. However, as discussed in Gelman et al. (2014) [84] and Allison
(1999) [11], these control methods are developed for obtaining causal inference (i.e. controlling
the error in the model training), rather than attaining optimal predictive accuracy.
Since the focus of this research is on the utility of statistical models in practice, predictive accu-
racy will be the primary measure of model performance. For completeness, multi-level models will
be included for comparison but will be evaluated solely on predictive performance. Additionally,
variable statistical significance and partial dependency analysis will not be specifically presented
when comparing different predictive models because they evaluate in-sample fit rather than out of
sample predictive accuracy. We will, however, estimate the statistical significance of our variables
and their effects on the response within a logistic regression setting. Having knowledge on which
variables the models found most useful can guide a utility’s future efforts when collecting pipe
level data.
We will assess model performance within 2 datasets at varying spatial resolutions (road level
and census tract level) by carrying out using 2 types of holdouts tests: 1) a random cross-validation
where the dataset is split randomly into training and validation sets, and 2) a temporal holdout
where data from 51 of the 52 total months are used for model training and the resulting model is
validated against the remaining month. In the random holdouts, we assess predictive performance
using common classification metrics, while in the temporal holdouts we determine whether statis-
tical models can prioritize high-risk assets and regions better than a method commonly adopted in
practice [172].
5.2 Literature Review
Numerous previous studies are available concerning drinking water distribution pipe break model-
ing and these works can be summarized under two categories: physical-based and statistical-based
models. Rajani and Kleiner (2001) [169] provide an overview of the physical/ mechanical mod-
els developed to understand the structural performance of water mains. These methods address
the components of the physical processes that lead to pipe breakage, such as corrosion [170] and
stress/strain within the pipe itself [144]. For example, one study [113] focuses on the relationship
between corrosion pits and the structural resistance of steel pipes. The analysis uses empirical data
where steel pipes of varying size and depths of corrosion were tested until failure. From this, an
analytical model was developed to quantify the pressure at which a pipe with a given corrosion pit
depth would fail.
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In a companion paper, Kleiner and Rajani (2001) [117] provide an overview of statistical-
based models by summarizing a large bodywork aimed at quantifying structural deterioration of
water mains through the analysis of historical performance data. For example, one study [110]
used condition and age data on pipes in Winnipeg, Manitoba over a 10 year period to fit a linear
regression model to analyze the failure rates across different materials over time.
Statistical models can be more flexible than physical models since they can be applied with
various types of input data, while physical-based models often require information that is not
readily available or difficult to obtain. Statistical-based models for drinking water distribution pipe
breaks are either inferential or predictive [90]. Inferential models aim to evaluate data as it is
presented, formulating trends based on statistical measures such correlation and covariance. The
goal of inferential models is to improve understanding, not to make accurate predictions. Examples
are Kettler and Goulter (1986) [110] and Shi et al. (2013) [181], both using spatial and temporal
clustering. However, Pelletier et al. (2003) [168] note that this type of statistical approach requires
an explicit set of pipe characteristics that are often not available, making them difficult to apply.
On the other hand, many predictive statistical-based models for analyzing pipe breaks have
been developed in previous works with varying degrees of model complexity. Two popular mod-
eling tools proposed in literature includes 1) survival analysis [193] which estimates the time until
next failure at the asset level, and 2) regression modeling which estimates the likelihood or number
of failures at the next time frame [81, 110]. Since many water utilities only recently started record-
ing pipe breaks, survival analysis models are less useful since they rely on having large amounts of
historical information. Linear regression models were studied in Kettler and Goulter (1986) [110],
and as a follow up Andreou (1986) [14] uses proportional hazards models and Generalized Linear
models to achieve better predictive accuracy. Yamijala et al. (2009) [207] compared a range of re-
gression models (time linear models, time exponential models, and logistic regression) and found
that although the logistic regression model performed the best, none of them achieved particularly
high predictive accuracy when used to rank assets according to risk.
To assess models with non-linear structures, Francis et al. (2014) [81] used Bayesian Belief
Networks to construct a knowledge model for pipe breaks. To explore other non-additive methods,
this research uses tree-based models explored in Chen et al. (2017) [56] to predict pipe break
probabilities. These models include Classification Trees [133], Random Forests [48] and Boosted
Trees [82], each of which will be discussed more in the “Data and Methods” section.
In recent statistical modeling studies, the topic of imbalanced learning [191] has drawn much
attention. It focuses on the observed phenomenon, as seen in pipe failure history, where standard
classification models do not provide high predictive accuracy when the instances of one response
significantly outnumber those of the other. He and Garcia (2009) [92] offer a number of approaches
to tackle the class imbalance problem, from working at the data level by changing the class dis-
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tribution using sampling techniques, to the algorithmic level where the modeling approaches are
adjusted. In modeling water main failures, Wang et al. (2013) [197] have shown that while sam-
pling techniques did not lead to better accuracy, they did offer efficiency improvements since the
training data can be reduced in size. For this study, a hybrid under-sampling and oversampling
technique was used on the training data to increase balance between records of pipe breaks and no
breaks.
5.3 Data and Methods
This section outlines the data collection and modeling methodology used in this chapter, including
how the break data was spatially aggregated and processed, as well as an overview of all the
statistical models used and the binary classification metrics used to evaluate them.
5.3.1 Pipe Break and Environmental Data
We partnered with a utility based in the mid-Atlantic region to obtain information on pipe break
dates and locations between 2010 and 2014 (52 months). We aggregated this information to a
monthly temporal scale and combined it with public demographic and environmental data to gen-
erate 2 datasets at different spatial resolutions: one at the road segment level and the other at the
census tract level. We use the streets in the study area to proxy the location of individual pipe
segments and the census tracts to proxy different geographic zones in a distribution system.
The partnering utility does not have a spatial dataset of their system, meaning no information
(including location) on the distribution pipes is available. As a result, a publicly available (U.S.
Census Bureau) spatial file of the area’s roads was used as a network proxy, while census tracts
were used to divide the service area into small regions (average 0.9 square miles). Failure history,
climate data, and demographic data were collected and used as predictors. Table 5.1 describes each
of the 24 predictors, their label in the model, and respected sources.
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Table 5.1: Summary of dataset used for classification modeling.
Variable Name Variable Description
BREAK Binary Classification Response.
BREAK HISTORY Number of Breaks on road segment/census tract over past 6 months.
AA TOTAL Number of African American households in census tract.
AA PERCENT Percentage of African American households in census tract.
ASIAN TOTAL Number of Asian households in census tract.
ASIAN PERCENT Percentage of Asian households in census tract.
AGE 2005 Number of households built later than 2005 in census tract.
AGE 2000 Number of households built between 2000 and 2005 in census tract.
AGE 1990 Number of households built between 1990 and 2000 in census tract.
AGE 1980 Number of households built between 1980 and 1990 in census tract.
AGE 1970 Number of households built between 1970 and 1980 in census tract.
AGE 1960 Number of households built between 1960 and 1970 in census tract.
AGE 1950 Number of households built between 1950 and 1960 in census tract.
AGE 1940 Number of households built between 1940 and 1950 in census tract.
AGE LESS 1940 Number of households built earlier than 1940 in census tract.
MEDIAN INCOME Median Income of households in census tract.
LAND USE Major land use identifier of road segment or census tract.
SOIL CLASS The highest level in soil taxonomy.
BOTTOM DEPTH Depth to bedrock below a given road segment or census tract.
CLAY PERCENT Percentage of soil that is clay.
COR CONCRETE Concrete corrosivity rating of soil: high, moderate, low, none.
COR STEEL Steel corrosivity rating of soil: high, moderate, low, none.
RUNOFF Runoff potential rating of soil: high, moderate, low, none.
FROST ACTION Susceptibility rating of soil for frost heaving: high, moderate, low, none.
FREEZE Number of days in month that go below freezing (32F).
TEMP MIN Minimum monthly temperature (F).
PRECIP Average monthly precipitation (in.).
TEMP STDEV Standard deviation of daily TMIN over a month.
Using ArcGIS (ESRI), the environmental and demographic variables presented in Table 5.1 are
expressed both spatially and temporally.
Information at both the road segment and census tract level was generated using a spatial over-
lay between database layers and the network file. The location of each pipe break record was
geocoded and spatially referenced to a corresponding road and census tract. Monthly climate data
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in the study period was obtained from a nearby NOAA weather station and assumed homogenous
over the entire region. Figure 5.1 shows a geographic overlay between pipe break locations and
both the road and census tract layers. The approximate distribution of the breakage data is as fol-
lows: 99.8% negative responses (no breaks) 0.2% positive responses (at least 1 break) at the road
level, and 85.4% negative responses and 14.6% positive responses at the census tract level.
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Figure 5.1: Location of pipe break records overlaid with road and census tract layers.
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5.3.2 Binary Classification Models
We choose 7 different types of classification models to determine the likelihood of breaks, which
is expressed both at the road segment and at the census tract resolution. Below is a summary of
them. A full reference for all methods can be found in Hastie et al. (2009) [90].
1. Generalized Linear Model: A linear combination of the explanatory variables, fitted to model
the log odds ratio, which is the log ratio between the probability of experiencing at least one
break and the probability of no breaks.
Log Odds Ratio = ln(
Pr(BREAK = 1)
1 - Pr(BREAK = 1)
) (5.1)
This ratio is a measure of association between a particular set of variables and the likelihood
of the positive response ’at least one break’ occurring. A larger log odds ratio is associated
with a greater likelihood of the response.
2. The Generalized Additive Model: A linear combination of smoothed functions for each
explanatory variable, fitted to model the log odds ratio.
3. The Classification Tree: A recursive partitioning technique that iteratively partitions data.
Each split is selected to minimize impurity in the resulting subsamples, which is a measure
of the inhomogeneity of data points from different classes within a region.
4. The Random Forest: An ensemble of Classification Trees trained with bootstrapped repli-
cations of the original data with a randomized subset of explanatory variables used for each
splitting node. The Classification Trees grouped together are approximately uncorrelated
conditioned on the original data and can reduce variance.
5. The Boosted Trees: An ensemble of Classification Trees trained sequentially, with each tree
capturing the error of the set trained before it, thus reducing bias.
6. The Mixed Effects Model: Similar to a Generalized Linear Model in structure, but includes
random Gaussian variables to control for missing variables [85], trained using maximum
likelihood estimation. Two structures of Mixed Effects Models are used: one that assumes
a uniquely parameterized normal variable for every observation (random intercept), and an-
other that groups observations based on time and location by assuming the normal variable
for rows from the same month and same road segment/census tract have the same mean and
variance (random slopes).
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Since we are trying to estimate pipe failures without any pipe information, the motivation for
implementing a mixed effects model is to account for model biases which may arise [198]. Mixed
effects models introduce hierarchy in the data where a given variable will have a different affect
on the outcome based on different possible groupings. If the effects between groups are drastically
different it may indicate that there are important features missing. We note that the most intuitive
grouping would involve pipe level features (material, age, size) which are not available, but we
still explore how random effects modeling techniques can be applied in this setting. It can benefit a
utility to invest in the collection of pipe feature data since it allows for the use of multilevel models
to explore group-level effects.
For both of the Mixed Effects Models structures, we train a model using all variables listed in
Table 5.1 and another with a feature selection step to remove highly correlated variables. We esti-
mate the variable inflation factor (VIF) for each feature to check for multicollinearity and remove
those with VIF’s greater than 10, we refer to this as before feature selection.
For all other model structures besides the Mixed Effects, 4 distinct models are built. One using
all the explanatory variables listed in Table 5.1 and another which includes after feature selection,
then another pair with and without after feature selection; only first we perform before feature
selection and remove features with high multicollinearity (VIF ≥ 10) beforehand. The multi-
collinearity check is done to estimate model performance when only linearly independent features
are included. After feature selection is implemented because not all variables may have a statis-
tically significant dependence to the response, and including them can lead to model overfitting.
These insignificant variables can differ depending on the structural form of the model (e.g. linear
or non-linear), and identifying these variables and removing them can result in models with better
out-of-sample predictive accuracy.
For linear models (Generalized Linear model, Generalized Additive model), the stepwise fea-
ture selection method [105] is used to iteratively remove and add variables based on Akaike In-
formation Criterion until all the remaining ones have statistically significant relationship to the
response at the 0.05 level. Finally, for the Random Forest and Boosted Trees method, the im-
portance of each variable is evaluated by training the model with and without it. The change in
in-sample accuracy with the variable excluded is calculated and variables are ranked according to
the magnitude of that change. The top 10 most important variables (ones that lead to the largest
decrease in accuracy when omitted) are kept and the second model is built off of them.
5.3.3 Predictive Performance Metrics
One common criterion to evaluate binary classification models is overall accuracy, calculated as the
fraction of total observations that are correctly classified. However, since the negative responses
83
(no failures) in both datasets outnumber the positive ones, using overall accuracy would skew the
measure heavily towards the negative responses. Thus overall accuracy is not used as an evaluation
metric as it would provide misleading information about the model performance. Furthermore,
utility managers would gain more insight from the analysis if the accuracy of the positive and
negative responses are evaluated separately. Thus, the following measures are used.
1. Brier Score (BS): A proper score function (minimized for a perfect model) for binary classi-







Where N is the total number of observations, Oi is the i’th event outcome (0 or 1 in a binary
setting), and Pi is the probability that the i’th observation is positive (’at least one break’ in
this study).
2. True Positive Rate (TPR): The fraction of observations that fall in the positive class (at least
one break) which are correctly classified by the model.
TPR =
Correctly classified observations with BREAK = 1
Total number of observations with BREAK = 1
(5.3)
3. False Positive Rate (FPR): The fraction of observations that fall in the negative class (no
breaks) which are incorrectly classified by the model.
FPR =
Incorrectly classified observations with BREAK = 0
Total number of observations with BREAK = 0
(5.4)
4. Positive Predicted Value (PPV): The fraction of observations that are predicted positive class
by the model which are correctly identified.
PPV =
Correctly classified observations with BREAK = 1
Total number of observations predicted with BREAK = 1
(5.5)
5. Negative Predicted Value (NPV): The fraction of observations that are predicted negative
class by the model that are correctly identified.
NPV =
Correctly classified observations with BREAK = 0
Total number of observations predicted with BREAK = 0
(5.6)
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5.4 Random Holdout Results and Discussion
For both the datasets at the road segment level and at the census tract level, the predictive accu-
racy of each model was tested using holdout cross-validation repeated 100 times. To ensure there
are enough positive instances to build the models, in each trial we divide the full dataset into 2
according to the response and combine a randomly selected 75% of the positive class and nega-
tive class observations to form the training data, the remaining instances are left as the validation
data. These models are built using the training data and tested on the unbalanced validation set
by taking this unseen data and making predictions on their outcome with each of the respective
methods. Predictive accuracy can be measured by comparing the predictions against the actual
response: BREAK = 0 or BREAK = 1. Each of the performance measures listed in the “Predictive
Performance Measures” section is recorded over the 100 trails.
Since the focus of the research is on the predictive accuracy of the methods, information related
to goodness of in-sample fit is not presented (e.g. variable statistical significance, R2). While
feature selection involves in-sample fit by using variable significance, it is mainly done to avoid
overfitting against the training data in order to improve the out-of-sample accuracy.
To balance the training data, random over- and under-sampling was performed in each holdout
to boost the occurrence of positive responses to 50% (from 0.2% in the original road level dataset,
and from 14.6% in the census tract level dataset). This was done by splitting the dataset into the
two corresponding classes, applying random sampling without replacement to the majority classes
to reduce their prevalence, and applying random sampling with replacement to the minority class
to increase its prevalence. In the remainder of this section, the results obtained from the random
cross-validation trials between the two datasets are presented and discussed.
Table 5.2 and 5.3 show the mean and standard deviation for each classification metric over
the 100 holdouts in the road level and census tract level datasets respectively. They summarize
the results from all the model forms, including 1) models trained using all available features,
2) models with features selected through feature selection, 3) models trained with all linearly
independent features, and 4) models trained with features selected through feature selection starting
from linearly independent features.
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Table 5.2: Performance summary of binary classification models in the road level, sample mean
and standard deviation reported over 100 trails. aModels where feature selection was used.
Model BS TPR FPR PPV NPV
GLM 1.76x10−1 (1x10−3) 7.35x10−1 (7x10−3) 4.22x10−1 (3x10−3) 6.76x10−3 (3x10−4) 9.99x10−1 (3x10−5)
1.90x10−1 (1x10−3) 7.07x10−1 (9x10−3) 4.67x10−1 (4x10−3) 6.40x10−3 (3x10−4) 9.99x10−1 (4x10−5)
GLMa 1.76x10−1 (1x10−3) 7.3x10−1 (1x10−2) 4.2x10−1 (1x10−2) 6.87x10−3 (4x10−4) 9.99x10−1 (4x10−5)
1.90x10−1 (1x10−3) 7.0x10−1 (1x10−2) 4.6x10−1 (1x10−2) 6.53x10−3 (4x10−4) 9.99x10−1 (4x10−5)
GAM 1.70x10−1 (1x10−3) 7.45x10−1 (7x10−3) 4.18x10−1 (3x10−3) 6.94x10−3 (3x10−4) 9.99x10−1 (4x10−5)
1.81x10−1 (1x10−3) 7.20x10−1 (8x10−3) 4.51x10−1 (3x10−3) 6.74x10−3 (3x10−4) 9.99x10−1 (4x10−5)
GAMa 1.83x10−1 (1x10−3) 7.08x10−1 (7x10−3) 4.35x10−1 (2x10−3) 7.00x10−3 (3x10−4) 9.99x10−1 (4x10−5)
1.82x10−1 (1x10−3) 7.08x10−1 (8x10−3) 4.36x10−1 (2x10−3) 6.93x10−3 (3x10−4) 9.99x10−1 (4x10−5)
CART 1.86x10−1 (2x10−3) 6.0x10−1 (2x10−2) 3.8x10−1 (2x10−2) 8.50x10−3 (5x10−4) 9.99x10−1 (4x10−5)
1.94x10−1 (3x10−3) 5.3x10−1 (5x10−2) 3.5x10−1 (6x10−2) 9.42x10−3 (2x10−3) 9.99x10−1 (1x10−5)
RF 6.09x10−2 (8x10−3) 4.4x10−1 (1x10−2) 1.37x10−1 (1x10−3) 9.35x10−3 (4x10−4) 9.99x10−1 (4x10−5)
7.44x10−2 (1x10−3) 4.3x10−1 (1x10−2) 1.59x10−1 (2x10−3) 7.49x10−3 (3x10−4) 9.99x10−1 (4x10−5)
RFa 1.4x10−1 (3x10−2) 6.3x10−1 (6x10−2) 2.4x10−1 (2x10−2) 7.11x10−3 (1x10−3) 9.99x10−1 (1x10−5)
1.3x10−1 (2x10−2) 4.8x10−1 (4x10−2) 2.1x10−1 (2x10−2) 5.20x10−3 (3x10−4) 9.99x10−1 (7x10−5)
GBM 1.63x10−1 (1x10−3) 7.3x10−1 (1x10−2) 3.8x10−1 (1x10−2) 8.00x10−3 (4x10−4) 9.99x10−1 (3x10−5)
1.72x101 (1x10−3) 7.1x10−1 (1x10−2) 3.9x10−1 (2x10−2) 7.77x10−3 (3x10−4) 9.99x10−1 (4x10−5)
GBMa 1.67x10−1 (1x10−3) 6.8x10−1 (1x10−2) 3.4x10−1 (1x10−2) 9.56x10−3 (6x10−4) 9.99x10−1 (4x10−5)
1.74x10−1 (1x10−3) 6.4x10−1 (2x10−2) 3.3x10−1 (2x10−2) 9.75x10−3 (7x10−4) 9.99x10−1 (4x10−5)
GLMM1 1.76x10−1 (1x10−3) 7.35x10−1 (7x10−3) 4.22x10−1 (3x10−3) 6.76x10−3 (3x10−4) 9.99x10−1 (3x10−5)
1.90x101 (1x10−3) 7.07x10−1 (9x10−3) 4.67x10−1 (4x10−3) 6.40x10−3 (3x10−4) 9.99x10−1 (4x10−5)
GLMM2 4.16x10−2 (8x10−4) 8.31x10−1 (8x10−3) 4.93x10−1 (9x10−4) 6.47x10−3 (3x10−4) 9.99x10−1 (3x10−5)
3.98x10−2 (6x10−3) 8.13x10−1 (8x10−3) 5.17x10−1 (2x10−3) 6.22x10−3 (2x10−4) 9.99x10−1 (3x10−5)
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Table 5.3: Performance summary of binary classification models in the census tract level, sample
mean and standard deviation reported over 100 trails. aModels where feature selection was used.
Model BS TPR FPR PPV NPV
GLM 0.237 (0.002) 0.600 (0.008) 0.483 (0.002) 0.203 (0.007) 0.892 (0.005)
0.237 (0.001) 0.600 (0.009) 0.482 (0.002) 0.203 (0.007) 0.892 (0.006)
GLMa 0.237 (0.002) 0.600 (0.009) 0.483 (0.002) 0.203 (0.007) 0.892 (0.005)
0.237 (0.001) 0.600 (0.009) 0.482 (0.002) 0.202 (0.007) 0.892 (0.006)
GAM 0.227 (0.002) 0.637 (0.009) 0.477 (0.002) 0.223 (0.008) 0.910 (0.004)
0.227 (0.002) 0.637 (0.008) 0.477 (0.002) 0.223 (0.008) 0.910 (0.004)
GAMa 0.228 (0.002) 0.637 (0.008) 0.477 (0.002) 0.221 (0.008) 0.910 (0.004)
0.228 (0.002) 0.634 (0.009) 0.477 (0.002) 0.221 (0.008) 0.910 (0.004)
CART 0.239 (0.002) 0.63 (0.4) 0.57 (0.3) 0.176 (0.007) 0.914 (0.004)
0.239 (0.002) 0.63 (0.4) 0.57 (0.3) 0.175 (0.007) 0.914 (0.004)
RF 0.157 (0.003) 0.428 (0.009) 0.306 (0.005) 0.25 (0.01) 0.889 (0.004)
0.156 (0.003) 0.427 (0.009) 0.306 (0.005) 0.26 (0.02) 0.890 (0.004)
RFa 0.145 (0.002) 0.42 (0.01) 0.300 (0.005) 0.27 (0.02) 0.892 (0.004)
0.145 (0.002) 0.425 (0.009) 0.301 (0.005) 0.27 (0.02) 0.892 (0.004)
GBM 0.218 (0.002) 0.658 (0.008) 0.471 (0.002) 0.236 (0.008) 0.920 (0.004)
0.218 (0.002) 0.657 (0.009) 0.472 (0.002) 0.236 (0.008) 0.920 (0.004)
GBMa 0.219 (0.002) 0.654 (0.008) 0.472 (0.002) 0.234 (0.008) 0.919 (0.004)
0.219 (0.002) 0.654 (0.009) 0.472 (0.002) 0.234 (0.008) 0.919 (0.004)
GLMM1 0.237 (0.002) 0.600 (0.009) 0.483 (0.002) 0.203 (0.007) 0.892 (0.004)
0.237 (0.001) 0.600 (0.009) 0.483 (0.002) 0.202 (0.007) 0.892 (0.006)
GLMM2 0.216 (0.003) 0.663 (0.008) 0.472 (0.002) 0.239 (0.009) 0.922 (0.004)
0.216 (0.003) 0.664 (0.008) 0.472 (0.002) 0.239 (0.008) 0.922 (0.004)
For each model, first 2 values are results without Multi-collinear Feature Removal: Mean over
100 trials (standard deviation); second 2 values are results with Multi-collinear Feature Removal:
Mean over 100 trials (standard deviation). Model abbreviations: GLM: Generalized Linear Mod-
els. GAM: Generalized Additive Models. CART: Classification Tree. RF: Random Forest. GBM:
Boosted Trees. GLMM1: Mixed Effects Models with Random Intercepts. GLMM2: Mixed Ef-
fects Models with Random Slopes.
We observe that in Table 5.3, the use of only linearly independent features had nearly no effect
on predictive performance. This is evidenced by the fact that the average accuracy metrics (and the
standard deviation) were identical whether the feature removal step was used or not. In contrast,
removing multi-collinear features in the road level data appears to worsen performance in the road
level results in Table 5.3. With the variable removal step applied the following trend is seen across
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most model structures: True Positive Rates are lower, False Positive Rates are higher, and Positive
Predicted Values are lower. The rest of this section will only target the results when all available
features (including those linearly dependent) are used.
In the road level results, every model has near perfect negative predictive values, meaning that
when the models assign a negative prediction to an observation, it is right 99.9% of the time.
Whereas in the census tract level, while all models still perform well according to this measure
(between 89% and 92%), there is a drop off in accuracy as spatial resolution increases and there
is a better balance between the 2 classes. The reason why all methods perform well in this regard
is intuitive: since the testing dataset is heavily skewed with negative outcomes (99.8% in the road
data, 85.4% in the tract data), these observations are easy to predict correctly. This suggests that
a more meaningful comparison between the models involves metrics related to the accuracy of the
positive responses (BREAK = 1), and comparing multiple metrics in a holistic fashion.
From the road level results in Table 5.2 all model structures except the Random Forest without
feature selection have an average False Positive Rate above 20%, while in the tract level results
in Table 5.3 all model structures have an average above 30% False Positive Rates. Since the
positive responses occur infrequently (0.2% and 14.6% respectively), this indicates that almost
all the models are substantially over-predicting failures. As a result of over-prediction, the rate
at which a positive prediction is correct, namely the positive predictive value, is expected to be
very low. While all the models have a Positive Predicted Value less than 1% in the road level
results, the Boosted Trees and Random Forest performed best in this aspect (0.956% and 0.935%
respectively). These measures are much higher in the census tract level results; all models have
Positive Predicted Values between 17.6% and 27%. The Random Forest with feature selection was
the best in this aspect.
As the spatial resolution between the datasets is increased, there is a better balance between
the two classes. These results point to an interesting finding: while a better balance can lead
to some loss of accuracy in predicting the “no failure” responses, there is a large improvement
for predicting the “failure” cases, as evidenced by the significant difference in Positive Predicted
Values between the two tables.
The Brier Score, measuring the mean square error of the predicted likelihoods of failure, indi-
cates that there are 3 highly accurate models in the road level results: The Random Forest using
all covariates, and the two Mixed Effects Models. The average Brier Scores from these methods
are smaller than the others by at least an order of 10. We note that the Random Forest model also
had the lowest average False Positive Rate, while the Mixed Effects Models had the lowest aver-
age Positive Predicted Values. This shows there is agreement between the different metrics when
identifying accurate models.
In contrast, the Brier Score values from the census tract results do not show a single model
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outperforming the others by such a large margin. The two Random Forest models are the best,
achieving an average Brier Score approximately 35% lower than the others. Again, there is agree-
ment across different measures as the Random Forests also had the best False Positive Rate and
Positive Predicted Value results.
The True Positive Rates equal the proportion of observations that are positive responses which
are correctly identified. When observing the road level results from the linear models, Boosted
Trees, and Mixed Effects Models, they all seem to perform well (all above 70%). However, this
statistic is misleading due to over-prediction of positive responses. For example, the Mixed Effects
Model with random slopes has the highest True Positive Rate at 83.1%, however the False Positive
Rate of 49.3% indicates that this model is assigning roughly half of the observations as positive
predictions. Similarly, the Mixed Effects Model with random slopes in the census tract results
had the highest True Positive Rates (66.3%), but its False Positive Rate is also comparably high
(47.2%). Given the low occurrence rate of the positive class, it is likely a large portion of them will
be identified by simply assigning positive predictions to a large number of observations. As a result,
while the True Positive Rate provides some information on a models ability to identify correctly
the positive instances, it must be considered alongside other metrics for correct interpretation.
As evidenced by the similar performance measures with and without feature selection, it is
found that the predictive performance of the Generalized Linear model, Generalized Additive
model, and the Classification Tree is not very sensitive to feature selection. The results from
the road level dataset suggest that using feature selection on the Random Forest leads to a model
that is more likely to over-predict. The increase in the Brier Score by almost 4 times indicates
that there is more bias. Over-prediction is evidenced by the increased False Positive Rate, lower
positive predictive value, and increased True Positive Rate. On the other hand, when applied to the
census tract level dataset, feature selection for the Random Forest appears to marginally improve
performance on average but leads to higher variance especially for the road level data.
The performance of the Boosted Trees in the census tract level data did not change significantly
with feature selection but did lead to improved performance in the road level results. While the
Brier Score stays roughly the same, the False Positive Rate decreases and the Positive Predicted
Value increases, suggesting that the new model is less likely to over-predict and positive predictions
are more likely to be correct. However, the tradeoff for lowering the rate of over-prediction is that
fewer true positive outcomes are identified, as evidenced by the lower True Positive Rate.
In the road level results, the Mixed Effects Models appear to over-predict the most amongst all
the models. The highest False Positive Rates, True Positive Rates, and the lowest Positive Predicted
Values all belong to the two models. Random slopes and intercepts were used as controlling
parameters to account for omitted variable bias, but the training process of these models is meant
for improving causal inference of the in-sample data. While the Brier Scores of the models are
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the lowest by more than a magnitude of 10, this can be a misleading indication of good predictive
performance when considering the other metrics. On the other hand, the Mixed Effects Models
performed much better in the census tract level results. In particular, the random slopes model
performed relatively well based on these metrics: average True Positive Rate, Positive Predicted
Value, and Negative Predicted Value. However, both random slope and intercept models do have
high False Positive Rates as well, indicating over-prediction.
As highlighted in the introduction section, while we do not discuss variable statistical signif-
icance as it pertains to out-of-sample accuracy; we can use it to provide insight on variables that
provide the greatest explanatory power. As part of an extended analysis we use both the road level
and census tract level dataset to train a Generalized Linear model. Note that we first balanced the
response distribution through resampling and perform before feature selection to remove multi-
collinear features. The summary of variable statistical significance is summarized in Table 5.4 and
Table 5.5, which shows both the coefficient value as well as its p-value from the logistic regression,
lower p-values indicate that a variable is statistically significant.
90
Table 5.4: Generalized Linear Model Feature Statistical Significance for Road Level Data.
Covariate Regression coefficient p-value
BREAK HISTORY 2.707273 0.000000
LAND USE(WATER) 1.182370 0.000000
AA PERCENT 0.581550 0.000000
LAND USE(Developed) 0.207457 0.001545
SOIL CLASS(Inceptisols) 0.203086 0.000015
FREEZE 0.047318 0.000000
T STDEV 0.013281 0.017823
TMIN 0.008200 0.000000
CLAY PERCENT 0.007532 0.000000
AGE LESS 1940 0.001044 0.000000
AGE 1960 0.000732 0.000000
AGE 1970 0.000266 0.000007
AGE 1980 0.000084 0.081396
MEDIAN INCOME 0.000001 0.087193
AGE 2005 -0.000139 0.299151
AGE 1950 -0.000141 0.000060
ASIAN TOTAL -0.000185 0.263724
AGE 1940 -0.000368 0.000000
AA TOTAL -0.000395 0.000000
AGE 1990 -0.000752 0.000000
AGE 2000 -0.001281 0.000000
BOTTOM DEPTH -0.001440 0.000000
SOIL CLASS(Entisols) -0.069317 0.008203
SOIL CLASS(Alfisols) -0.127571 0.000002
SOIL CLASS(Ultisols) -0.177209 0.000000
PRCP -0.472325 0.000001
(Intercept) -1.377525 0.000000
ASIAN PERCENT -2.152039 0.000000
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Table 5.5: Generalized Linear Model Feature Statistical Significance for Census Tract Level Data.
Covariate Regression coefficient p-value
ASIAN PERCENT 1.439946 0.082844
LAND USE(INDUSTIAL) 0.874150 0.000000
PRCP 0.749920 0.000000
LAND USE(ResourceConservation) 0.565614 0.000006
LAND USE(MixedUse) 0.564866 0.000016
LAND USE(Residential) 0.415841 0.000155
AA PERCENT 0.331253 0.001341
BREAK HISTORY 0.188556 0.000000
T STDEV 0.047920 0.000000
CLAY TOTAL 0.001112 0.749617
AGE 2005 0.000895 0.000089
AGE 1960 0.000751 0.000000
AGE LESS 1940 0.000471 0.000000
AGE 1980 0.000340 0.000035
AGE 1970 0.000308 0.001955
AGE 1940 0.000261 0.002288
AGE 1950 0.000252 0.000033
MEDIAN INCOME 0.000189 0.089160
AGE 1990 0.000185 0.028243
AGE 2000 0.000039 0.764792
AA TOTAL -0.000331 0.000000
ASIAN TOTAL -0.001780 0.000105
TMIN -0.003170 0.078820
FREEZE -0.009900 0.144116
BOTTOM DEPTH -0.009900 0.000026
(Intercept) -1.545253 0.000000
For both logistic regressions, before feature selection was implemented to remove highly cor-
related variables. Any feature with a variable inflation factor of larger than 10 was removed.
Between the logistic regressions using both datasets, the historical failure count and the number
of old households (AGE LESS 1940) are identified as one of the most important features. This
indicates that historical failure activity and pipe age (older houses typically are connected to older
pipes) are potential drivers of failure.
After that there is variability as to which variables are significant. For the road level data,
demographic information such as the percentage of Asian American or African American house-
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holds are highly significant, while in the census tract level data land use is much more important.
Environmental conditions pertaining to soil conditions are also more significant in the road level
data. It is possible that operating at a finer spatial scale allows the relationships between the soil
data and the road data to be more important in the model.
Beyond using the statistical models only to forecast regions with high breakage likelihood,
identifying which features are significant can further help utilities by pointing out the effects of
each individual variable on breakage likelihood. In both Table 5.4 and 5.5, the coefficients for per-
centage of break history is positive, indicating that a high number of historical breaks are associated
with higher breakage likelihoods. Similarly, the coefficient for the number of older households is
also positive but much smaller in magnitude, suggesting while there is a positive correlation be-
tween the variables the effect of this variable on the response is weaker.
We acknowledge that our analyses of feature importance are confined strictly to the linear
logistic regression realm, it is possible there are significant nonlinear relationships in the data
which are not detected and can be left for exploration in future work.
In summary, we show through the random holdout results that predictive accuracy suffers when
faced with the lack of system specific data. There is also a tradeoff between spatial precision and
model accuracy. When analyzing the pipe break records at the road level, the imbalance between
the positive and negative classes causes all the models to over-predict. While better accuracy can
be achieved by aggregating to larger geographic regions such as census tracts (average 0.9 square
mile in area), these classifiers become less useful for guiding asset management because they
cannot point to where specifically in a census tract a pipe break will occur. This indicates that in
order for utilities to achieve correct forecasts on the future condition of their system, they must
collect accurate and precise data on the current system at a fine spatial scale.
5.5 Temporal Holdout Results and Discussion
In the previous section, we acknowledge that predictive accuracy is limited in the absence of system
specific data. Here we aim to test whether statistical models built without system data, despite
their limited accuracy, can still provide useful insight to guide asset management. Utilities without
system level data often rely solely on historical break records to plan their maintenance activities.
Regions or pipe segments are sorted based on how often they previously experienced failures, and
the ones with the most failures are inspected first. Our goal here is to determine if a sorting based
on the predictions of a statistical model can achieve better accuracy than one based on historical
failure rates. Temporal holdouts are used to compare the models against the history-based sorting.
This section will present the evaluation criteria, show the results of this analysis, and discuss them.
As discussed briefly in the introduction, in each trial the data is divided into two sets: the
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training set which consists of 51 of the 52 months worth of data, and the remainder month being
the validation set. We repeat this holdout process iteratively for all 52 months. Over- and under-
sampling is again used to boost the occurrence of the positive class (breaks) to 50% in both the
road and census tract level training data. Each model is built using this balanced training set
and predictions are made on the unbalanced validation data. Similar to the previous section, we
implement 4 different models for each unique structure: 1) using all features, 2) using after feature
selection, 3) using only linearly independent features (before feature selection), 4) using variable
selection on linearly independent features (both before and after feature selection).
Each model is a binary classifier that provides the predicted likelihood of failure, which we can
use to sort our observations (highest to lowest) in the validation set. Since each model produces a
different set of predictions, each resulting ranking will also be different. For example, the Boosted
Trees ranking will sort the validation set highest to lowest based on its predictions for probability of
break, while the Random Forest ranking will do the same based on its different set of predictions.
We also use the break history, which is included in the analysis as an explanatory variable, to
sort the observations in the validation data. Here the roads or census tracts with the most histor-
ical failures are ranked higher. This is what the utilities typically do to decide where to perform
inspection and maintenance.
Since the true response is known, we can compare in a pairwise fashion the accuracy of a
statistical models ranking against the historically based rank at different cutoff points. For example,
if we set the cutoff to 50 observations and wish to analyze the Classification Tree, we will compare
the top 50 observations from 1) the ranking based off the Classification Tree predictions and 2)
the ranking based off the historical failure rates. Out of these two sets of 50 observations, if the
Classification Tree rank has more or equal to the number of breaks as found in the historical rank,
we can conclude that it has achieved a non-dominated sorting. This indicates that the Classification
Tree is at least as good, if not better, as the history driven ranking.
We perform this pairwise comparison between every model and the history-based rank for each
of the 52 temporal holdout trials at the following defined cutoffs: 10, 20, 30, 40, 50. While there
are many more roads and census tracts than 50 in the datasets, we choose these cutoffs because
they reflect a realistic application of these models. Utilities have limited resources to spend on
maintenance, so in a given time frame they can only focus on the top-ranked regions or roads for
management. In Tables 5.6 and 5.7, we report the fraction of trials in which the model achieved a
non-dominated ranking of observations and the best performing models at each cutoff. There does
not seem to be a noticeable effect of feature selection on the prioritization accuracy of the models.
In some cases models incorporating feature selection leads to better a sorting of the observations
while in others it does not.
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Table 5.6: Temporal holdout results for the road level data. aModels in which feature selection is
used.
Model Top 10 Top 20 Top 30 Top 40 Top 50
GLM 0.827, 0.855 0.673, 0.808 0.692, 0.808 0.788, 0.788 0.788, 0.827
GLMa 0.827, 0.855 0.673, 0.808 0.692, 0.808 0.788, 0.827 0.788, 0.827
GAM 0.827, 0.577 0.673, 0.615 0.673, 0.538 0.788, 0.558 0.788, 0.577
GAMa 0.827, 0.538 0.712, 0.596 0.673, 0.538 0.750, 0.538 0.808, 0.538
CART 0.442, 0.442 0.346, 0.346 0.308, 0.308 0.269, 0.269 0.308, 0.308
RF 0.538, 0.500 0.423, 0.346 0.423, 0.327 0.346, 0.231 0.346, 0.192
RFa 0.346, 0.423 0.288, 0.250 0.231, 0.192 0.154, 0.154 0.115, 0.192
GBM 0.462, 0.442 0.327, 0.327 0.250, 0.327 0.346, 0.288 0.346, 0.346
GBMa 0.462, 0.481 0.308, 0.385 0.308, 0.308 0.269, 0.327 0.211, 0.404
GLMM1 0.769, 0.865 0.673, 0.788 0.673, 0.808 0.731, 0.769 0.750, 0.846
GLMM2 0.596, 0.538 0.577, 0.558 0.519, 0.500 0.462, 0.442 0.442, 0.442
Best Model GLM GLM GLM/GLMM1 GLM/GAM GLM
Table 5.7: Temporal holdout results for the census tract level data. aModels in which feature
selection is used.
Model Top 10 Top 20 Top 30 Top 40 Top 50
GLM 0.634, 0.577 0.808, 0.769 0.731, 0.692 0.558, 0.596 0.635, 0.634
GLMa 0.654, 0.615 0.769, 0.750 0.692, 0.731 0.577, 0.596 0.635, 0.635
GAM 0.538, 0.654 0.788, 0.673 0.712, 0.673 0.712, 0.750 0.692, 0.712
GAMa 0.615, 0.462 0.788, 0.692 0.654, 0.673 0.712, 0.673 0.712, 0.635
CART 0.385, 0.385 0.327, 0.308 0.288, 0.269 0.250, 0.250 0.308, 0.288
RF 0.481, 0.519 0.558, 0.442 0.462, 0.327 0.442, 0.327 0.519, 0.404
RFa 0.500, 0.500 0.385, 0.442 0.403, 0.385 0.346, 0.288 0.403, 0.385
GBM 0.558, 0.634 0.750, 0.769 0.731, 0.750 0.731, 0.712 0.808, 0.692
GBMa 0.653, 0.673 0.692, 0.635 0.692, 0.654 0.692, 0.692 0.693, 0.731
GLMM1 0.615, 0.654 0.731, 0.750 0.731, 0.654 0.538, 0.519 0.635, 0.596
GLMM2 0.673, 0.538 0.712, 0.692 0.731, 0.673 0.692, 0.596 0.712, 0.635
Best Model GBMa GLM GBM GBM GBM
For each model, first value is without Multicollinear Feature Removal, second value is with
Multicollinear Feature Removal. Model abbreviations: GLM: Generalized Linear Models. GAM:
Generalized Additive Models. CART: Classification Tree. RF: Random Forest. GBM: Boosted
Trees. GLMM1: Mixed Effects Models with Random Intercepts. GLMM2: Mixed Effects Models
with Random Slopes.
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Table 5.6 reports the relative performance of the statistical learning based model sorting against
the history-based sorting when analyzed at the road segment level. The Generalized Linear model
using only linearly independent features and the Generalized Additive models using all available
features are consistently two of the best performing models across all cutoff points. The Mixed
Effects model with random intercepts also performed comparably well. At the cutoff of 10 obser-
vations, the 2 models produced a non-dominated ranking relative to the history-based method in
88.5% of the trials. Similarly, in cutoffs of 20, 40 and 50, the model was non-dominated in more
than 78% of the trials. At the cutoff 30, the Mixed Intercepts Models (random slopes) performed
equally well as the linear and additive models. These high percentages indicate that the statistical
models are more likely to prioritize high probability of failure roads effectively.
Table 5.7 reports the relative performance of the statistical learning based models against the
history-based sorting when analyzed at the census tract spatial resolution. Unlike the results in
the road level case, the Boosted Trees was the best performing model in this instance. Between
the cutoffs of 10, the Boosted Trees had above 65% of trials where it produced a non-dominated
ranking compared to the historical-based rank. Between cutoff points 30 to 50, the Boosted Trees
was also the best model, with at least 73% of the trails performing at least as good as the history
rank. This suggests that when using statistical models for prioritization at the census tract level, it
could be beneficial to use multiple methods together for better accuracy.
Outside of the cutoff point 10, the best models perform at least as well as the history-based
rank in a high fraction of the holdout trials, all above 71%. Indicating that while a history-based
rank can sort a small number of very high-risk regions well, it becomes less accurate as it has
to handle more observations and that using statistical learning based models can guide decision
making better.
We demonstrate through our results in Table 5.6 and Table 5.7 that despite the limited clas-
sification accuracy of the statistical methods, an accurate prioritization of high-risk assets can be
achieved based off the predicted probabilities of failure. This is the case in both the road and cen-
sus tract level analysis when compared against the common practice of sorting by historical failure
rates. In the road level results, we find that the Generalized Linear and Generalized Additive mod-
els achieve the most accurate sorting. While in the census tract level results we find that while
a history based rank can initially be more useful, the Generalized Additive models and Boosted
Trees combined will eventually outperform it. This indicates that these statistical models can be
useful for utilities which lack readily available data, and can serve as a viable alternative to their
current methods.
Our conclusions are based off empirical findings that are specific to the datasets we use, but
the goal of this chapter was to demonstrate the utility of statistical models when faced with the
data challenge commonly faced by water utilities. While our results show that there is benefit in
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adopting statistical models for prediction, we do acknowledge that the effectiveness of the models
can be improved with data specific to the distribution system and utilities should invest in the
collection of them.
5.6 Conclusion
In this research, the challenge for water utilities in having to manage their distribution network
without any readily available pipe level information is addressed. We examine whether accurate
and useful predictive models can be built in the complete absence of pipe-feature data. It is found
that when evaluating the models in a binary classification context, the predictive accuracy is low,
and the model suffer from the lack of asset level information. Future directions for this study are
to incorporate more advanced modeling techniques to handle class imbalance, which can improve
accuracy.
Despite the limited accuracy of the models, models without detailed pipe-level data are able
to better prioritize the high-risk assets when compared to a historical failure rate based ranking,
which is a prioritization method commonly adopted in practice. Hence, these models can be useful
to aid inspection and maintenance planning.
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Prediction of Water Main Failures with the Spatial
Clustering of Breaks
Due to limited budgets and an aging system, infrastructure managers have increasingly sought
cost-effective means to evaluate asset condition. Better information on the physical health of the
infrastructure can help achieve higher returns on investments in replacement and repair spending.
This is a particular challenge for water distribution systems due to the vast amount of buried and
unseen pipelines. While robotic inspections can provide high quality data, they can often be cost
prohibitive. An alternative method is to perform a desktop analysis by using past performance
information to estimate current pipeline conditions. A spatial clustering of pipe breaks fits well
into a wider asset management framework with the aim of identifying regions with abnormally
high failure rates. The information about spatial clusters identified using historical breaks, if and
where they exist, can potentially improve predictions on the location of future breaks. In this
research, we present three algorithms (poisson based, density based, and locally weighted density
based) for scanning and clustering pipe break data and demonstrate their application on a real
pipeline network. We also explore whether the use of spatial clusters as an explanatory variable
can improve the accuracy of pipe break machine learning models. Empirical findings show that the
locally weighted density scan provides the greatest precision for finding high breakage zones. The
application of these clusters generally improves the performance of predictive models by helping
them prioritize high risk pipes with greater accuracy.
Keywords: Infrastructure Resilience, Water Distribution Systems, Spatial Clustering, Statisti-
cal Modeling, Pipe Break Prediction.
Note: The research presented in this chapter is under first round review at the Journal of Relia-




In many parts of the United States, drinking water infrastructure is nearing the end of its useful
life and upgrades are needed to ensure the consistent delivery of safe water to end users [10]. A
2017 report published by the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) estimates that over one
trillion US dollars of capital investments are required for necessary upgrades to the nation’s water
infrastructure [19]. Despite being recognized as one of the most critical infrastructures [70], leaks
and breaks in the distribution system are occurring more frequently as the pipelines degrade [54].
An estimate from ASCE reports that over 240,000 water main breaks occur across the country per
year [19]. This accounts for about 14% of treated water lost throughout the distribution system,
often termed as non-revenue water [154]. On top of the economic burden caused by the aging
infrastructure (each break costs about $42,000 [205]), researchers have also linked pipe breaks to
compromised water quality and health risks [76, 184].
Spending on infrastructure repair and replacement is needed to ensure drinking water infras-
tructures can continue to function well [41, 178]. Because many utilities operate on a limited
budget [58], having an effective asset management framework is critical. This ensures that capi-
tal investments are targeted to the most vulnerable regions and risks can appropriately mitigated.
However, a common challenge that prohibits many US utilities from formulating asset manage-
ments plans is the lack of readily available system data [57, 101, 146]. This means that basic
pipeline information (material, age, size) can be missing from digitized databases. As a result,
many utility managers rely on their expert judgement instead to estimate pipeline condition and to
plan maintenance works [154].
Spatial models can be useful for helping managers identify high risk zones in the network.
They are a cheaper alternative to robotic inspections since they only require information regarding
the failure locations. Spatial models also have less data requirements; utilities do not need to
invest in collecting missing pipeline information [147]. The key idea is to monitor the location of
failures over an extended period of time and aim to identify spatial clusters of breaks. A cluster
here is defined as a contiguous collection of pipes with an anomalously high failure rate compared
to regions not in clusters [69]. Having knowledge on whether clusters exist, and if so where they
are located, is useful information for utility operators. It can act as a potential indicator of system
distress. For utilities which lack comprehensive pipeline data these clusters can be directly used to
inform capital spending directed at these high risk zones. On the other hand, utilities which have
pipeline information can use this information to improve the accuracy of pipe break forecasting
models [68, 69].
The first goal of this research is to explore the effectiveness of three different spatial cluster-
ing algorithms in finding high breakage zones. The second goal is to determine whether the use
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of spatial clusters derived from breaks in the past can assist in predicting the location of future
breaks. To the authors knowledge, no past research has jointly compared clustering approaches
for grouping regions within a network and consequently explored their application in pipe break
prediction models.
We partnered with a utility in the Midwest to implement our approach in a real water distribu-
tion system. We will first compare the following clustering approaches: a poisson based model, a
density based approached, and a locally weighted density approach. As an extension from earlier
work, we will focus on clustering the pipes on which the breaks occur rather than grouping the
breaks themselves. Then we will take the best performing algorithm and test whether the inclusion
of clusters as an explanatory variable can improve machine learning pipe break prediction models.
The aim is to demonstrate that high precision clusters (as many breaks captured in as little of the
network as possible) can provide useful information to better predict future pipeline failures.
6.2 Related Research
The related works for this research deal with: 1) spatial scan statistics and their application for
analyzing critical infrastructure, and 2) the statistical modeling of water main breaks. In this section
we will review the methods which were explored as well as their relevance to this chapter.
6.2.1 Pipe Break Clustering
Spatial scan and cluster methods were developed and frequently used in the analysis of epidemi-
ological data [124, 96]. Researchers have used the statistical tools to identify regions (zip codes,
counties) which are likely to be experiencing a disease outbreak. There are two major components
to this process. The first involves identifying candidate regions using a search window, defined
by a particular size and shape (e.g. circular window with 500m radius). The second is the choice
of probability model to evaluate the number of events observed within a given space. The ob-
served events are assumed to follow a parametric distribution (e.g. Poisson, Bernoulli) [123] and a
hypothesis test is carried out to determine the statistical significance of the observations.
Past works have compared the effectiveness of various non-compact shapes (oval, rectangular,
etc.) [125]. Other researchers have explored non-parametric methods to better capture the inci-
dence of clusters [175], these methods only compare relative intensity of events and could be more
flexible [121]. Case studies in the water infrastructure domain are found in Goulter and Kazemi
(1998) [86] and Shi et al. (2013) [181]. The researchers used clustering methods to identify regions
prone to main breaks and to analyze spatial factors unique to these areas.
These works discussed above have relied on the use of euclidean search spaces for the iden-
100
tification of clusters. This may not apply well when analyzing water networks since the search
space is now constrained to a 2-dimension planar graph [211]. As a result, the methods above need
to be adapted to scan over planar graphs when applied to networked infrastructure (power, water,
gas). Shi and Janeja (2009) [180] presents an algorithm that relies on connectivity measures for
efficiently scanning a linear graph for potential clusters. Yiu and Mamoulis (2004) [211] present
network based formulations of partition based and hierarchical based clustering methods for road
networks. A domain specific case study for water systems in presented in De Oliveira et al. (2011)
[69], where a Poisson model based scan and clustering algorithm is presented. The methodology
also controls for pipeline features such as age and material which may affect breakage rates. The
same authors present a network implementation of the density based clustering algorithm OPTICS
[16] in a related paper [68].
6.2.2 Pipe Break Prediction
Previous work on the statistical prediction of pipe breaks can be described as one of two cate-
gories: physical based and statistical based models [169]. Physical based methods aim to char-
acterize the structural performance of the water mains subject to environmental loadings. Some
examples include: modeling the thinning of steel pipe walls due to corrosion [171], and describ-
ing the mechanics of in-pipe stress due to external frost loading [118] and temperature changes
[88]. A common challenge for this approach is the requirement of empirical data that is not readily
available or difficult to obtain [57].
Statistical based methods can be more flexible since they can be applied with different types of
input data. The main goal is to quantify structural deterioration by analyzing past performance data
[117]. Two popular tools used in the literature are survival analysis and regression modeling. Sur-
vival analysis estimates the time until the next pipe break [193], and regression modeling estimates
the likelihood or number of breaks in a time window (e.g. month, year) [56]. Survival analysis
requires utilities have well documented records on the time and location of pipe breaks, and are
less useful since many utility operators only recently started recording breaks [144]. Yamijala et al.
(2009) [81] compared a range of regression models (time linear, time exponential, logistic regres-
sion) and found that none of them achieved particularly high accuracy due to the low occurrence
rate of breaks. Chen et al. (2019) [57] explored the effectiveness of using only environmental data
(soil conditions, weather data) to model breaks, and showed that these models can still be useful
in prioritizing high risk regions.
A case study presented by Wood and Lence (2009) [203] demonstrated that predictive models
built on basic pipeline attributes (age, diameter, material) can be useful for guiding pipe replace-
ment and identifying key factors affecting breaks. Previous work has shown that categorizing
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observations based on common pipeline features could lead to better model accuracy [103, 212].
Researchers have further suggested the inclusion spatial clusters as an explanatory variable could
potentially improve regression models [69, 68]. To the authors knowledge, no previous work has
provided a framework for comparing the precision of clustering algorithms for networked infras-
tructure and determined their usefulness in forecasting future breaks.
6.3 Data and Methods
As stated in the introduction, the first goal of this project is to compare three different cluster-
ing methods in their ability to capture pipe break zones in a pipe network with high precision.
High precision here is defined as capturing many breaks while only classifying a small portion of
network as spatial clusters. The second goal is to take the best performing cluster approach and
determine whether machine learning pipe break models can be enhanced with spatial clusters as a
variable. This section will outline the distribution network data from the partnering utility, as well
as the clustering and machine learning approaches we explored.
6.3.1 Pipeline Network and Break History
We need two types of data to carry out the proposed research. The first are the water distribution
network data, preferably in a digitized map format that includes physical attributes of each indi-
vidual pipeline. The second are the pipe failure records themselves, these can be recorded either
in text format (reporting the location and time of each break) or also in a digitized map.
We partnered with a mid-sized utility in the midwest which serves a population of approx-
imately 100,000. The distribution system contains 423 miles of total pipe, with 11430 unique
junctions and 12092 unique segments. The utility has had 755 pipe breaks (as recorded from re-
pair work orders) spanning from 2008 to 2017, Figure 6.1 maps the distribution system with all
break records overlaid. The digitized map contains pipe segment attributes and operating informa-
tion such as age, material, diameter, average flow, and average pressure. We will use this dataset to
implement and evaluate the quality of both the clustering algorithms and the subsequent predictive
models.
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Figure 6.1: Network Layout with Breaks from May 2008 - Apr 2017.
6.3.2 Clustering Methods
Three algorithms are implemented and compared: a poisson based approach and two density based
methods. We will outline each of them respectively.
We first start by defining an algebraic representation of a water distribution system. Let G =
(V , E) represent an undirected graph, where V represents the set of pipe junctions and E represents
the set of all pipe segments. Each recorded main break is referenced to its nearest pipe junction,
let these points be denoted by F ( F ∈ V). The aim of the clustering algorithm is to identify a set
of discrete subgraphs C where the edges contained in C have a higher breakage rate than the ones
not ( E \ C).
6.3.2.1 DBSCAN
The algorithm recursively checks for each failure node in F whether a minimum count of breaks B
exist within a threshold network distanceD. Two failure nodes are considered in close proximity to
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each other if the minimum network distance between them is less than D. If such condition is met,
all edges contained within D from the root node are marked as a cluster, otherwise the algorithm
moves onto the next failure node. Length constrained graph traversals such as the depth-first search
[2] can be used to identify both the cluster condition and the set of contained edges.
The following parameter combinations are implemented for comparison: B: {5, 8, 10, 12, 15}
and D: {0.125, 0.250, 0.375, 0.500} mi.
6.3.2.2 Locally Weighted DBSCAN
A potential flaw in the DBSCAN method is the reliance on global density parameters: B and D.
This assumes that every cluster in the search region can be characterized by the same properties: a
minimum number of points contained within some radius. As a result, clusters with lower density
may be missed and high density clusters may be overestimated. To more effectively reveal clusters
across different regions of the data, different local densities may by needed [16].
OPTICS gets around this issue by detecting clusters of varying densities [16]. A networked
implementation of this method is presented in De Oliveria et al. (2011) [69]. However since
the output of the OPTICS method is a node grouping rather than a desired edge grouping, we
instead adapt the existing DBSCAN method. A length constrained breadth-first graph traversal is
performed out of each failure node in F . To ensure that the search radius is strictly increasing, the
closest unmarked point is traversed in each step. If the minimum break count B is met before the
threshold distance D, terminate the search early and return the traversed edges as a cluster.
The following parameter combinations are implemented for comparison: B: {5, 8, 10, 12, 15}
and D: {0.125, 0.25, 0.375 ,0.500} mi.
6.3.2.3 Poisson Based Model
This approach is adapted from the existing literature, and reimplemented for our dataset. De
Oliveira et al. [69] presents a framework for scanning a planar network and identifying hot zones
with high events rates. This method assumes that the underlying break process (X) follows a pois-
son distribution. To account for potentially varying break distributions due to different pipeline
features, we define the material-specific and diameter-specific breakage processes by the poisson
random variables Xm and Xd.
Xm ∼ Poisson(λm) (6.1)
Xd ∼ Poisson(λd) (6.2)
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Where λm and λd are the total number of breaks divided by the total length of pipe (in feet)
considering only specific material and diameter classes. We perform a length constrained depth-
first traversal out of each breakage node F to identify all edges contained within the distance D.
Any connected set of edges which contain at least B number of failures are considered as a can-
didate cluster. In each candidate, we use the parametric distributions Xm, and Xd to compute the
expected number of breaks in the subgraph and compare it with the observed break count. Hypoth-
esis testing is then used to calculate the statistical significance of the observation relative to the
assumed distributions. Let O be the observed number of breaks in a given candidate cluster. The
statistical significance of the O when evaluated against both poisson distributions (Xm andXd) can
be evaluated using the following p-values.
pm = P (O ≥ Xm) (6.3)
pd = P (O ≥ Xd) (6.4)
The regions are considered statistically significant if pm and pd are both less than 5%. This
implies that under the poisson assumption there is a less than 5% chance the O breaks occur in
the region randomly, thus we label all edges in the region as clusters. The following parameter
combinations are implemented for comparison: B: {5, 8, 10, 12, 15} and D: {0.125, 0.250, 0.375
,0.500} mi.
6.3.3 Pipe Break Machine Learning Models
After comparing the performance between the three clustering algorithms, we take the best ap-
proach and subsequently explore whether including clusters in a pipe break machine learning
model can improve accuracy. Below we will outline the dataset and evaluation framework we
implemented, as well as the pipe break prediction models explored.
6.3.3.1 Dataset and Holdout Framework
The digitized dataset of the distribution network also comes with basic pipe attributes and infor-
mation on operating conditions. We can also use the known location of each pipeline to infer key
environmental variables. Using the mapping software ArcGIS, we performed a spatial analysis
between the pipe locations and environmental information. We also gathered annual summaries of
climatological data over the study area to infer if weather patterns after pipe break. Below we list
the additional attributes collected and their respective sources. We associate this data with each
individual pipe segment E .
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• Proximity to Major Roads: modeled as a binary variable, 1 if the pipe segment lies within
100 ft. of a highway, 0 otherwise. Obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau [195].
• Land Use: modeled as binary variable, 1 if pipe segment is underneath residential land, 0
otherwise. Obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau [195].
• Soil Conditions: corrosivity ratings for steel and concrete, runoff potential, frost heaving
potential. Obtained from the U.S. Department of Agriculture [162].
• Annual Climate Information: total precipitation, days with temperature below freezing, days
with temperature below 0F, days with more than 1 in. of precipitation, days with more than
1 in. of snowfall. Obtained from the National Oceanic Atmospheric Association [1].
We model pipe breaks at the annual scale: the number of breaks per pipe segment per year.
As mentioned in previous sections the break records span between 2008 - 2017. The accuracy
of each prediction model is evaluated in a holdout setting where a portion of the data is used for
model training and predictions are made against previously unseen records. The predictions are
then compared against known break responses and accuracy is summarized. To do this, the break
records are divided into annual windows spanning from May to April. We select these windows
such that each winter season is fully contained in an annual timeframe. Table 6.1 summarizes the
full dataset used.
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Table 6.1: Summary of dataset used for Regression Modeling.
Variable Name Variable Description
Breaks (Response) Number of Breaks on Pipe Segment in a given annual window.
Cluster Indicator Variable. 1 if segment is in high breakage cluster, 1 otherwise.
Material Pipe Material. Classified as Cast Iron or Other.
Diameter Pipe Diameter (inches).
Length Pipe Length in feet.
Age Pipe Age (years).
PSI Average operating pressure in pipe (pounds per square inch).
GPM Average flow in pipe (gallons per minute).
HEAD Average hydraulic head inside pipe (meters).
RoadProx Indicator Variable. 1 if segment is within 200 ft. of major highway, 0 otherwise.
CorConrete Soil susceptibility of corrosion to concrete. Classified as Low, High.
CorSteel Soil susceptibility of corrosion to steel. Classified as Low, High.
Runoff Runoff potential class for soil. Classified as Low, Medium, High.
FrostAct Soil susceptibility to frost heaving. Classified as Low, Medium, High.
PRCP Annual cumulative rainfall in annual window (inches.)
Days00 Days in annual window below 0 Fahrenheit.
Days32 Days in annual window below 0 Freezing (32 Fahrenheit).
PRCP01 Days in annual window with more than 1 inch of rainfall.
SNOW01 Days in annual window with more than 1 inch of snowfall.
Our final dataset includes break responses from 4 of the 10 available years: 2013 - 2014, 2014 -
2015, 2015 - 2016, and 2016 - 2017. For each time frame, we use break records from the preceding
five years to classify high breakage clusters. As a result, breaks from 2008 - 2012 cannot be used
as a response. A total of four holdout trials are performed where each individual year is left out for
validation and the models are built with the remaining three. This allows us to determine whether
clusters built from the past are indicative of future breaks. Table 6.2 summarizes the response
and cluster information, this includes the response time frames as well as the time frames used to
obtain historical clusters.
Table 6.2: Summary of Time Frames in the Pipe Break Dataset.
Year Response Window Years Used for Cluster Training
1 May 2013 - Apr 2014 May 2008 - Apr 2013
2 May 2014 - Apr 2015 May 2009 - Apr 2014
3 May 2015 - Apr 2016 May 2010 - Apr 2015
4 May 2016 - Apr 2017 May 2011 - Apr 2016
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6.3.3.2 Regression Models
We chose five different regression models to estimate the number of breaks at each individual pipe
segment. A summary of the approaches is presented below, we refer the reader to Hastie at al.
(2009) [90] for a full description.
1. Generalized Linear Models (GLM): Because pipe breaks are discrete (zero, one, two breaks),
we assume the response distribution is poisson. This model is a linear combination of the
explanatory variables, fitted to the log of the response (number of breaks per segment).
2. Generalized Additive Models (GAM): We also assume the response distribution is poisson.
This approach is also a linear combination of each explanatory variable, except here each
continuous feature is modeled with smoothed splines to potentially capture non-linear rela-
tionships.
3. Regression Tree (RT): An iterative partitioning technique. Each split is selected to minimize
the in-sample error of the resulting subspaces.
4. Random Forest (RF): An ensemble of regression trees, each built with bootstrap replicates
of the original dataset. This allows for model variance to be reduced. Only a random subset
of the explanatory variables are used at each partitioning in a tree. The average over all trees
is taken as the final prediction.
5. Gradient Boosted Trees (GBT): An ensemble of regression trees, each trained sequentially.
The training samples and the output trees are reweighed after each iteration based on in-
sample error, this technique is shown to reduce bias. The final prediction is a weighted
average over each regressor.
These five models are selected because they span a wide range in terms of model complexity
and parametric assumptions. We also recognize that this is not an exhaustive list. The aim of the
research is not to find the best predictive model, but rather to explore the effect of spatial clusters
on model accuracy. It is possible other regression techniques can achieve higher accuracy, and
finding these models is left for future research.
6.4 Clustering Results
The three clustering algorithms (DBSCAN, Locally Weighted DBSCAN, Poisson Based) were
implemented in Python 3. There are many proposed metrics to quantify the effectiveness of iden-
tified clusters [96]. Some rely on statistical measures such as Moran’s I or Tango’s statistics, while
others use likelihood based hypothesis tests. These measures were developed for euclidean search
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spaces so they do not apply to this research. We will instead use the following domain-specific
measures for evaluating failures on infrastructure: 1) proportion of breaks included in cluster, 2)
proportional length of system in cluster. High precision clusters are desirable and these regions
will have a high proportion of breaks included within a limited portion of the system length.
Table 6.3 reports the tuning results from DBSCAN.
Table 6.3: DBSCAN Clustering Results: Cluster Break Capture %, Cluster Length Capture %B is
the break threshold and D is the search radius.
D B = 5 B = 8 B = 10 B = 12 B = 15
0.125 mi. 37.2%, 6.3% 16.2%, 1.9% 8.5%, 0.9% 4.4%, 0.4% 2.1%, 0.1%
0.250 mi. 72.6%, 29.6% 50.1%, 16.7% 38.1%, 12.1% 31.4%, 9.1% 18.4%, 4.7%
0.375 mi. 85.7%, 52.6% 80.8%, 44.5% 68.1%, 35.4% 62.8%, 31.1% 57.1%, 25.6%
0.500 mi. 89.5%, 62.3% 86.9%, 59.1% 81.9%, 55.3% 78.2%, 50.0% 73.4%, 45.2%
In each cell the within-cluster break and length proportion capture are reported. The resulting
outputs differ based on the input parameter combinations B and D. Some patterns can be seen in
the table. When B is held constant, both the proportion of break and network length contained
within the cluster increases with D. This is an intuitive result, for the same break threshold we
expect to have more breaks identified and more pipe segments included with a larger search radius.
Conversely, when D is held constant, both the proportion of break and network length contained
within the cluster decreases with B. This is also an intuitive result, we expect to have fewer breaks
and pipe segments identified when we increase the break threshold for cluster consideration.
Table 6.4 reports the tuning results from the locally weighted DBSCAN.
Table 6.4: Locally Weighted DBSCAN Clustering Results: Cluster Break Capture %, Cluster
Length Capture %. B is the break threshold and D is the search radius.
D B = 5 B = 8 B = 10 B = 12 B = 15
0.125 mi. 36.0%, 5.3% 16.0%, 1.7% 8.5%, 0.7% 4.4%, 0.4% 2.1%, 0.1%
0.250 mi. 67.8%, 22.0% 46.6%, 12.8% 35.9%, 9.4% 29.8%, 7.3% 17.1%, 4.1%
0.375 mi. 81.1%, 41.5% 77.6%, 38.0% 63.6%, 29.5% 59.6%, 26.7% 52.3%, 22.9%
0.500 mi. 85.6%, 48.7% 85.0%, 52.6% 79.5%, 49.4% 74.0%, 45.3% 69.9%, 40.6%
Again, in each cell both the within-cluster break and length capture are reported as a result
of parameter inputs B and D. It is noted when comparing instances of the same input parameters
against the DBSCAN, the break and length capture in the locally weighted case is always less. This
is because the local weighted version terminates the graph search early once the break threshold is
met, while the full DBSCAN will continue until the distance limit is met.
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The empirical results in Tables 6.3 and 6.4 suggest that the locally weighted DBSCAN results
in higher precision clusters. For example: in the instance where B = 0.5 mi. and D = 5, the
locally weighted DBSCAN captures only 4% fewer breaks in more than 10% less of the total
system length. This suggests that while the extended search means the DBSCAN can capture
more breaks, the tradeoff is the lowering of the resulting cluster precision.
Clustering results for the Poisson model are reported in Table 6.5, the 5% significance level is
selected for any candidate region to be considered a cluster.
Table 6.5: Poisson Model Clustering Results, for Significant Clusters at the 5% Level: Cluster
Break Capture %, Cluster Length Capture %. B is the break threshold and D is the search radius.
D B = 5 B = 8 B = 10 B = 12 B = 15
0.125 mi. 26.8%, 3.8% 15.0%, 1.8% 8.0%, 0.8% 4.4%, 0.4% 2.1%, 0.1%
0.250 mi. 37.4%, 10.1% 36.7%, 10.2% 33.5%, 9.5% 30.6%, 8.4% 18.4%, 4.6%
0.375 mi. 49.3%, 17.6% 51.1%, 18.7% 50.6%, 19.1% 49.5%, 18.6% 48.1%, 18.3%
0.500 mi. 47.2%, 20.8% 51.0%, 22.5% 45.3%, 20.8% 45.2%, 20.5% 52.6%, 23.5%
This approach is the much more conservative compared to the DBSCAN methods in terms
of classifying pipes as clusters. For the same input parameters ( D, B) the break capture and
length capture for the Poisson approach is always the lowest. There is also no discernible pattern
related to the parameters, possibly due to the significance tests required for any candidate space
to be included as cluster. Empirical results from the last two rows ( D ≥ 0.375 mi.) suggests the
algorithm becomes insensitive to the B parameter after a certain threshold. This is evidenced by
the fact that all entries in the same row are very similar.
When selecting the best cluster, we ignore instances where the resulting clusters cover more
than 50% of the network length. This is because these results are not high precision. Of the
remaining trials where fewer than half of the network is identified, we select the case where the
highest proportion of breaks are captured. The locally weighted DBSCAN is selected as the best
clustering approach out of the three, specifically the instance where the input search radius (D) is
0.5 miles and the break threshold (B) is 5 breaks. 85.6% of all the training breaks are contained
within 48.7% of the system length, Figure 6.2 shows the identified clusters overlaid with the break
points. In the subsequent machine learning trials, this algorithm is used to train the clustering
indicator variables.
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Figure 6.2: Cluster output from Locally Weighted DBSCAN with Parameters D = 0.5 mi. and B
= 5.
6.5 Pipe Break Machine Learning Evaluation and Results
As shown in Table 6.2, the pipe break dataset was divided into 4 annual time frames between May
and April: 2013 - 2014, 2014 - 2015, 2015 - 2016, and 2016 - 2017. Cluster indicators for each
window were generated with the locally weighted DBSCAN method using break data from the
preceding five years. This is a binary vector where 1 indicates that a pipe segment belongs in a
high breakage cluster and 0 otherwise.
Four holdout trials were performed where data from three years were used for model building,
and remaining year was used for model validation. In the methods section above, we noted that
five regression models were explored (GLM, GAM, RT, RF, and GBT). For each model structure,
one with-cluster version is trained where the cluster indicator is included in the training data and
another without-cluster version where the indicator is removed. The goal of this section is to
compare the accuracy between the with-cluster and without-cluster models.
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6.5.1 Evaluation Criteria
One common criteria to evaluate regression models is mean squared error. However, since the
number of instances with zero breaks so heavily outnumber non-zero breaks in this dataset (99.4%
of all observations), using mean squared error would heavily skew the accuracy evaluation towards
the zero break instances [57]. In practice, utilities are more interested in the higher risk pipes that
are predicted to have the most breaks. This is in part due to limited budgets available where only
the highest priority assets can be addressed in a given year. As a result, a more useful evaluation
criteria should reward models that better separate high breakage pipes.
A natural approach is to form a ranking based on the predictions of each regression model
and evaluate whether observations with breaks are ranked higher than those without. For any
holdout year and regression model, let Ŷi be the predicted number of breaks for the i’th pipe
segment (∀ i ∈ E). Sort each of the observations in E high to low based on Ŷi. Let Y * be the real
break observation vector when sorted based on the Ŷi predictions. A break capture vector can be
generated by computing the cumulative sum at each index along the sorted Y * vector. Divide the
cumulative sum vector by the total number of breaks, now the vector is scaled between 0 - 1 and
reflects the fraction of breaks captured instead than the raw number. A length capture vector can
similarly be calculated by the cumulative sum of each pipe length along the same sorted vector.
Divide the length capture by the total length of the entire system to normalize between 0 - 1. Let
B and L be the rank ordered break and length capture vectors. Note that both start at 0 and end at
1, L is strictly increasing and B is strictly non-decreasing.
The B and L vectors characterize how well a set of predictions prioritize high risk breaks. For
example, suppose the 100th index along the break capture vector B is 0.4 and is 0.3 along the
length capture vector L. This means that at the top 100 ranked pipe segments, 40% of all breaks in
the validation data are captured within 30% of the system length. Plotting B against L and taking
the area under the curve will give us a single metric that captures prioritization accuracy. This
metric is similarly scaled between 0 - 1 and models that produce more accurate rankings will have
higher area under the curve.
6.5.2 Holdout Trials
In all four trials the resulting regression tree only had one level, meaning the final prediction only
took one of two possible values. This shows that the model is under-fitting the data, and is typically
associated with high bias (error) [90]. Since the predictions only take two unique values, they are
also not useful in doing any prioritization and are discarded from further analysis. Only results
from the remaining four models are presented and discussed below.
Figure 6.3 below shows the rank ordered plots of B against L for the holdout year May 16 -
112
Apr 17.
































































































Figure 6.3: Holdout Results for May 16 - Apr 17. Rank Ordered Plot, Break Proportion Capture
vs. Length Proportion Capture.
Each subplot indicates results for a single model structure, the black line shows the performance
of the with-cluster model and the gray line shows the performance of the without-cluster model.
Results for the other three holdout years are included in the appendix. In each of the four models
the black lines are higher than the gray lines. This indicates a better prioritization of high breakage
pipes is achieved when cluster indicators are included. The gap between the two lines is smallest
in the random forest, suggesting that while the with-cluster model still improves the accuracy, the
improvement is smaller than in the other models.
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The area under the curve metrics across all validation trials are reported in Table 6.6.
Table 6.6: Area Under the Ranked Ordered Curve: With Cluster Indicator, Without Cluster Indi-
cator.
Holdout Year GLM GAM RF GBT
May 13 - Apr 14 0.653, 0.640 0.669, 0.668 0.647, 0.677 0.606, 0.627
May 14 - Apr 15 0.735, 0.676 0.776, 0.740 0.755, 0.706 0.732, 0.717
May 15 - Apr 16 0.765, 0.727 0.794, 0.767 0.887, 0.881 0.803, 0.756
May 16 - Apr 17 0.790, 0.727 0.810, 0.779 0.863, 0.845 0.804, 0.763
In each cell, results from the with-cluster and without-cluster models are shown and the higher
value is indicated in bold. Empirical results show that the with-cluster model produced a better
ranking in all trials except two: the RF and GBT in the first holdout year. In three out of the four
years the random forest model had the highest ranking metric, and across all four years a with-
cluster model was the overall best. The average improvement in the area under curve metric from
including the cluster indicator is 6.2% in the GLM and 3.1% in the GAM. Omitting the 2 trials
where the cluster led to a worse model, the average improvement in the area under curve metric
was 3.3% and 4.6% in the RF and GBT respectively.
Because utilities only have the resources to address to highest priority needs, an evaluation
metric that reflects accuracy at the only the top ranked assets is a more useful. We focus on the
accuracy of the top ranked 20% of system length. The area under the ranked-ordered curve can
be adapted such that only the first portion of the curve L ≤ 0.2 is considered. Table 6.7 shows
the adjusted results, with-cluster and without-cluster area under curve metrics are reported side by
side in each cell.
Table 6.7: Area Under the Ranked Ordered Curve at the top 20%: With Cluster Indicator, Without
Cluster Indicator.
Holdout Year GLM GAM RF GBT
May 13 - Apr 14 0.0336, 0.0299 0.0414, 0.0393 0.0510, 0.0595 0.0428, 0.0353
May 14 - Apr 15 0.0432, 0.0330 0.0567, 0.0484 0.0493, 0.0496 0.0524, 0.0469
May 15 - Apr 16 0.0558, 0.0473 0.0684, 0.0641 0.1319, 0.1296 0.0655, 0.0664
May 16 - Apr 17 0.0605, 0.0405 0.0703, 0.0567 0.1173, 0.1109 0.0808, 0.0609
The with-cluster models always outperform the without-cluster models in the GLM and GAM
instances. The average improvement from adding the cluster indicator is 27.7% and 13.3% re-
spectively between the two models. The results between the RF and GBT are more similar, the
with-cluster models produced a better ranking in just 5 of the 8 trials. In three out of the four
holdout years, a with-cluster model produced the best overall ranking.
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The empirical results suggest that inclusion of the cluster indicator variable generally improves
the ranking accuracy of a predictive model. Similar findings are derived when comparing all
instances and only the top ranked 20% of pipe segments. For simpler models like the GLM and
GAM, both with strong parametric assumptions, having the cluster indicator always improved the
model. In contrast the cluster indicator usually improved the RT and GBT, but there are a number
of cases (5 out of 16) where it did not. It is possible with more complex models like the RT and
GBT that are able to capture a variety of non-linear relationships, the cluster indicator does not
provide as great discriminatory power between high and low breakage pipes.
These findings show that including high breakage clusters in a machine learning model can
help better prioritize high risk pipes. Specifically, the ranked ordered sorting of observations based
on the predicted number of breaks are generally more accurate. Spatial clusters always improve
simpler models, whereas for more complex models they still generally help. Our results suggest
that spatial clusters trained from historical break events are indeed useful for predicting future
breaks. We acknowledge that our findings here are based only on empirical results and pertain
specifically to our dataset. It is possible that the utility of using spatial clusters will change in a
different test case, this is left for future exploration.
6.6 Conclusion
In this research we explored the effectiveness of three different spatial clustering algorithms to
identify high breakage zones within a pipeline network. We adapted existing methods presented in
the literature for applications in planar graphs, and these methods can be adapted for use in other
infrastructure domains. Empirical results from a real water network shows that a locally weighted
DBSCAN algorithm produces the highest precision clusters. This is where the most breaks are
captured within a limited total mileage of pipe.
We also examined whether the inclusion of spatial clusters as an explanatory variable can im-
prove pipe break predictions. Since in practice utilities can only afford to target the highest priority
assets for replacement/rehabilitation, overall accuracy measures are not particularly useful. Instead
we adapt our evaluation of criteria based on the ability of predictive models to achieve an accu-
rate sorting of observations, where the best models will capture more breaks the highest ranked
instances.
We performed holdout trials where clusters were trained from the preceding five years and used
in conjunction with spatial pipeline data for predict future breaks. Another set of models were
trained without the clustering information for comparison. Our experiments show that including
spatial clusters generally leads to improved accuracy, and the best overall model always had clus-
tering information. This shows that combining two different statistical techniques: clustering and
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predictive modeling, can potentially lead to better identification of high risk critical infrastructure.
Giving decision makers better information to make the right capital investment decision.
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The research presented in this thesis forms a body of work that critically analyzes the current
state of risk analysis and management for drinking water infrastructures. I aim to demonstrate how
risk assessments in this domain can be improved such that better decision support can be provided
for the protection of these critical systems. This dissertation sits at the intersection of the fields of
risk analysis, civil and environmental engineering, statistics, optimization, and decision support.
The works presented borrows from each of these respective domains to provide new insight to the
complex problem of managing the aging water infrastructure in the US. The intellectual contribu-
tions of each individual chapter are summarized in section 7.1, and possible directions for future
work are discussed in section 7.2.
7.1 Summary of Contributions
Chapter 2 provides context for why risk assessment practices in the water infrastructure domain
need advancing. More specifically, it demonstrates why there is a need for the research in this
thesis. I aim to establish the existing knowledge gap between risk analysis practice and theory
by critically analyzing a popular J100-10 standard [23] published by the American Water Works
Association (AWWA). Through a holistic comparison between the recommended practices within
the standard and the foundational concepts of the risk analysis field, conceptual and theoretical
limitations can be identified. We find that key concepts of risk and resilience are inadequately
conceptualized, and methods for quantifying these metrics can lead to misrepresentations which
could ultimately misguide the decision maker.
The insights gained in this chapter pertain only to the J100-10 application of risk analysis
for the water infrastructure domain. I acknowledge there are numerous other risk assessment
frameworks presented in both the academic and professional literature. The point is to begin a
conversation on how this popular standard can be improved moving forward, and to highlight the
gap between theory and practice. Advancements in future editions of the J100-10 that fall closer in
line with the state of the art can lead to better practice of risk assessments in the water infrastructure
domain.
The rest of the dissertation examines two specific steps in the asset management of water in-
frastructure: pipe rehabilitation planning and robotic inspection planning, and demonstrates the
application of quantitative tools to improve the decision making process. These topics were se-
lected because they are two critical steps in any risk assessment process for water systems.
Chapters 3 and 4 explores the mathematical optimization of inspection path planning. Utility
operators need to manage a vast network of underground pipelines, but only have limited budgets
for their inspection. For higher returns on investment, identifying an inspection path that maxi-
mizes the traversal of high risk pipelines can assist better decision making for risk mitigation (e.g.
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replacement versus repair). There are a variety of previous research that have examined this op-
timization problem, and have presented a multitude of formulations and algorithms for this task.
A key omission from previous works is the limitations of the robotic inspection tools themselves
are not included in the modeling framework. For different robotic sensors, specific properties of
the inspection path can impact the quality of the inspection reading and lower its effectiveness for
decision making.
The contribution of chapter 3 is twofold, the first is to highlight how omitting platform limita-
tions can lead to lower quality inspections. The second, a general framework for incorporating tool
limitations into a mathematical optimization framework is presented and applied for both real and
synthetic networks. The main contribution here is that we highlight the importance of tool limita-
tions when planning for inspections, something that is omitting in the risk and reliability literature
prior to publishing this chapter in 2018. Three heuristic optimization algorithms are applied and
their effectiveness is explored.
Chapter 4 extends this work and presents an exact integer program formulation for the routing
problem. The model is a variant on the prize collecting traveling salesman problem, where the goal
is to find a maximum value subpath within a large network. Material and diameter changes between
adjacent pipes, which impact sensor readings, are included as penalties to the objective. Five
different solution algorithms (variants on integer programming branch and bound, and variants on
tree search) are demonstrated for a mid-sized utility in the US, and their scalabilities are explored.
The contribution here is the mathematical model itself, as well as the assessment of algorithm
scalability for this routing problem. Together these two chapters help improve the state of risk
analysis practice in the water domain where utilities can better allocate inspection investments to
better manage their critical infrastructures.
Chapters 5 and 6 examines the statistical modeling of pipe breaks and its application for re-
placement planning. Typical water systems in the US have been installed over 50 years ago and
have limited availability of real time condition data. To better allocate replacement and repair
spending, utilities need to know which assets are in poorest condition. Statistical models of pipe
break predictions are a useful decision support tool because they help utilities identify potential ar-
eas of greatest risk for infrastructure failure. This information can help utility operators proactively
manage their assets by targeting high risk areas before failures occur.
Many small to mid-sized utilities have no records of any pipeline information at all, and this
challenge is addressed in chapter 5. The contribution is to demonstrate whether accurate and useful
models can be built in the absence of any pipe-specific features. We partnered with a utility in the
Mid-Atlantic and obtained the date and time of pipe repair work orders as the break response. Pub-
licly available environmental and demographic information are used as regressors, and a variety
of machine learning models are trained. We find that accuracy suffers when key pipeline infor-
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mation such as diameter, material, and age are omitted. However when compared to prioritizing
assets solely based on failure history, a common practice amongst utilities, a better sorting of high
risk assets can be achieved when using the statistical models. The results show that utilities with
no digitized network information can still leverage public data to create statistical models that are
useful for replacement planning. This work also demonstrates that useful decision support can be
obtained despite limited accuracy with these methods, and can drive data collection efforts in the
future.
Chapter 6 aims to extend the methodology in the pipe break modeling literature. The con-
tribution is to explore if information about the spatial clustering of high breakage density zones,
if and where they exist, can improve machine learning models when used as a regressor. From
my review, no previous work has combined an unsupervised learning technique with supervised
methods to improve predictive accuracy in this domain. We partnered with a mid-sized utility in
the Mid-West and aplied three clustering algorithms for the identification of pipe break clusters.
Machine learning models for the estimation of pipe break count are then trained with and with-
out clustering information. The goal is to determine if the models having the clustering data will
outperform those without, and if so, by how much. Findings from this research show that mod-
els with clustering information included tend to outperform those without. This indicates that the
two-tiered framework which combines unsupervised and supervised techniques can produce better
performing models. The magnitude of this improvement depends on the complexity of the model,
simpler models will experience larger improvements over more complex models. Practical uses of
this research aim to guide the modeling approach used by utilities to obtain more accurate break
forecasts.
7.2 Future Research Directions
One extension from the critical review of J100-10 is to establish an alternate assessment procedure
that addresses all of the identified flaws. Another direction for future research is developing a
framework for an implementation-driven comparison between various risk assessment methods.
The methods for a critical review of a risk analysis standard, such as that presented in Chapter 2
and be applied to domains beyond water infrastructure. The presented approach focuses on the
foundational issues of the risk analysis field. An alternate approach is to implement a variety of
risk analysis standards and compare the assessment results. A framework for doing so is currently
unknown due to challenges of differing scope and focus across standards.
The inspection routing optimization work in Chapters 3 and 4 incorporates a constant penalty
factor for the number of pipe feature changes occurring along an identified route. Future work
could expand on the modeling framework to incorporate a variety of technology-specific consid-
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erations. Extensions can also explore how to optimize the planning for multiple tools, whether it
involve different inspection robots or multiple allowable runs of the same tool. The added com-
plexity of optimizing for an ensemble of paths, rather than just a single path can lead to useful and
interesting research.
Chapter 6 identifies a clustering algorithm for finding high breakage spatial clusters, and demon-
strates how to incorporate this information as a regressor in a statistical model. However the focus
is purely on the improvement of statistical accuracy for future break prediction, and does not ex-
plore the patterns between pipes within and outside these identified clusters. Perhaps there is
a certain class of pipe material that is predominantly included in these clusters, or a certain in-
stallation age that of those pipes. This type of analysis can provide better understanding on the
underlying mechanisms that are driving high breakage zones. The information can in turn be used
in conjunction with failure forecasts to better inform pipe rehabilitation and replacement decisions.
The statistical modeling methods presented in Chapters 5 and 6 can be extended by incorporat-
ing representations of uncertainty in the output. Beyond just likelihood of an event (pipe break),
uncertainty is a big part of an adequate risk representation [28]. Current model outputs only pro-
vide point predictions on either the probability of failure or the expected number of failures per
asset. How to illicit uncertainty in these predictions, and how to incorporate them into a wider




Chapter 3 Appendix - Example Optimal Paths
Figure A.1: Example Solution Paths in Random Grid Network.
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Figure A.2: Example Solution Paths in Micropolis Network.
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Figure A.3: Example Solution Paths in Ann Arbor Network.
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APPENDIX B
Chapter 6 Appendix - Rank Ordered Plots
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Figure B.1: Holdout Results for May 13 - Apr 14. Rank Ordered Plot, Break Proportion Capture
vs. Length Proportion Capture.
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Figure B.2: Holdout Results for May 14 - Apr 15. Rank Ordered Plot, Break Proportion Capture
vs. Length Proportion Capture.
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Figure B.3: Holdout Results for May 15 - Apr 16. Rank Ordered Plot, Break Proportion Capture
vs. Length Proportion Capture.
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[46] Marie Claude Besner, Michèle Prévost, and Stig Regli. Assessing the public health risk of
microbial intrusion events in distribution systems: Conceptual model, available data, and
challenges. Water Research, 45(3):961–979, 2011.
[47] Nur Afiqah Binti Haji Yahya, Negin Ashrafi, and Ali Hussein Humod. Development and
Adaptability of In-Pipe Inspection Robots. IOSR Journal of Mechanical and Civil Engi-
neering, 11(4):01–08, 2014.
[48] Leo Breiman. Random forests. Machine Learning, 45(1):5–32, 2001.
[49] E Downey Brill, Shoou-Yuh Chang, and Lewis D Hopkins. Modeling to Generate Alter-
natives: The HSJ Approach and an Illustration Using a Problem in Land Use Planning.
Management Science, 28(3):221–235, 1982.
[50] E.D. Brill, S.Y. Chang, and L.D. Hopkins. Use of Mathematical Models to Generate Al-
ternative Solutions to Water Resources Planning Problems. Water Resources, 18(1):58–64,
1982.
[51] A. J. Brito and A. T. de Almeida. Multi-attribute risk assessment for risk ranking of natural
gas pipelines. Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 94(2):187–198, 2009.
[52] Gerald G. Brown and Louis Anthony Tony Cox. How Probabilistic Risk Assessment Can
Mislead Terrorism Risk Analysts. Risk Analysis, 31(2):196–204, 2011.
[53] Kelly Brumbelow, Jacob Torres, Seth Guikema, Elizabeth Bristow, and Lufthansa Kanta.
Virtual Cities for Water Distribution and Infrastructure System Research. World Environ-
mental and Water Resources Congress 2007, pages 1–7, 2007.
[54] Patricia Buckley, Lester Gunnion, and Will Sarni. The Aging Water Infrastructure: Out of
sight, out of mind? Technical Report March, Deloitte University Press, 2016.
[55] Aaron Burkhart. Lifeline Infrastructure Risk Analysis Application. PhD thesis, University
of Colorado at Colorado Springs, 2015.
[56] Thomas Y.J. Chen, Jared A. Beekman, and Seth D. Guikema. Drinking Water Distribution
Systems Asset Management: Statistical Modelling of Pipe Breaks. In Condition Assess-
ment, Surveying, and Geomatics - Proceedings of Sessions of the Pipelines 2017 Confer-
ence, pages 173–186, 2017.
132
[57] Thomas Y.J. Chen, Jared A. Beekman, Seth D. Guikema, and Sara Shashaani. Statistical
Modeling in Absence of System Specific Data: Exploratory Empirical Analysis for Predic-
tion of Water Main Breaks. Journal of Infrastructure Systems, 25(2):04019009, 2019.
[58] Thomas Y.J. Chen, Seth D. Guikema, and Craig M. Daly. Optimal Pipe Inspection
Paths Considering Inspection Tool Limitations. Reliability Engineering & System Safety,
181:156–166, 2019.
[59] United State Congress. Homeland Secuirty Act of 2002, 2002.
[60] Louis Anthony Cox. Some Limitations of Risk = Threat Vulnerability Consequence for
Risk Analysis of Terrorist Attacks. Risk Analysis, 28(6):1749–1761, 2008.
[61] Louis Anthony Cox. What’s Wrong with Risk Matrices? Risk Analysis, 28(2):497–512,
2008.
[62] Louis Anthony Cox. Improving Risk-Based Decision Making for Terrorism Applications.
Risk Analysis, 29(3):336–341, 2009.
[63] Susan L. Cutter. Resilience to What? Resilience for Whom? Geographical Journal,
182(2):110–113, 2016.
[64] Susan L. Cutter, Lindsey Barnes, Melissa Berry, Christopher Burton, Elijah Evans, Eric
Tate, and Jennifer Webb. A place-based model for understanding community resilience to
natural disasters. Global Environmental Change, 18(4):598–606, 2008.
[65] Craig Daly, Chongyang Kate Zhao, Minh Smith, and Gert Van Der Walt. Not All Data Is
Created Equal: Impact on Decision Making. In Pipelines 2016, pages 490–505, 2016.
[66] G. C. Dandy and M. O. Engelhardt. Multi-Objective Trade-Offs between Cost and Re-
liability in the Replacement of Water Mains. Journal of Water Resources Planning and
Management, 132(2):79–88, 2006.
[67] G.C. Dandy and M. Engelhardt. Optimal Scheduling of Water Pipe Replacement Using
Genetic Algorithms. Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management, 127(4):214–
223, 2001.
[68] Daniel P. De Oliveira, James H. Garrett, and Lucio Soibelman. A density-based spatial clus-
tering approach for defining local indicators of drinking water distribution pipe breakage.
Advanced Engineering Informatics, 25(2):380–389, 2011.
[69] Daniel P. De Oliveira, Daniel B. Neill, James H. Garrett, and Lucio Soibelman. Detection of
Patterns in Water Distribution Pipe Breakage Using Spatial Scan Statistics for Point Events
in a Physical Network. Journal of Computing in Civil Engineering, 25(1):21–30, 2011.
[70] (Department of Homeland Security) DHS. National Infrastructure Protection Plan. Techni-
cal report, Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC, 2009.
133
[71] Lloyd Dixon, Robert J. Lempert, T. LaTournette, and Robert T. Reville. The Federal Role
in Terrorism Insurance: Evaluating Alternatives in an Uncertain World. Technical report,
2007.
[72] You Dong and Dan M. Frangopol. Risk-informed life-cycle optimum inspection and main-
tenance of ship structures considering corrosion and fatigue. Ocean Engineering, 101:161–
171, 2015.
[73] Sarah Dunn, Gaihua Fu, Sean Wilkinson, and Richard Dawson. Network theory for infras-
tructure systems modelling. In Proceedings of the ICE - Engineering Sustainability, volume
166, pages 281–292, 2013.
[74] Jack Edmonds. Matroids and the Greedy Algorithm. Mathematical Programming,
1(1):127–136, 1971.
[75] Muzaffar M. Eusuff and Kevin E. Lansey. Optimization of Water Distribution Network
Design Using the Shuffled Frog Leaping Algorithm. Journal of Water Resources Planning
and Management, 129(3):210–225, 2003.
[76] Natalie G. Exum, Elin Betanzo, Kellogg J. Schwab, Thomas Y.J. Chen, Seth D. Guikema,
and David P.E. Harvey. Extreme Precipitation, Public Health Emergencies, and Safe Drink-
ing Water in the USA. Current Environmental Health Reports, pages 1–11, 2018.
[77] B.C. Ezell. Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessment Model (I-VAM). Risk Analysis,
27(3):571–583, 2007.
[78] Reza Faturechi, Eyal Levenberg, and Elise Miller-Hooks. Evaluating and optimizing re-
silience of airport pavement networks. Computers and Operations Research, 43:335–348,
2014.
[79] Roger Flage and Terje Aven. Expressing and Communicating Uncertainty in Relation to
Quantitative Risk Analysis. Safety and Reliability: Methodology and Applications, 2(13):9–
18, 2009.
[80] Roger Flage, Terje Aven, Enrico Zio, and Piero Baraldi. Concerns, Challenges, and Direc-
tions of Development for the Issue of Representing Uncertainty in Risk Assessment. Risk
Analysis, 34(7):1196–1207, 2014.
[81] Royce A. Francis, Seth D. Guikema, and Lucas Henneman. Bayesian Belief Networks
for predicting drinking water distribution system pipe breaks. Reliability Engineering and
System Safety, 130:1–11, 2014.
[82] Jerome H. Freidman. Greedy Function Approximation: A Gradient Boosting Machine.
Annals of Statistics, 29(5):1189–1232, 2001.
[83] T. Fwa, W. Chan, and C. Tan. Genetic-Algorithm Programming of Road Maintenance and
Rehabilitation. Journal of Transportation Engineering, 122(3):246–253, 1996.
134
[84] Andrew Gelman, John B. Carlin, Hal S. Stern, David B. Dunson, Aki Vehtari, and Donald B.
Rubin. Bayesian data analysis. Taylor & Francis, 2014.
[85] Andrew Gelman and Jennifer Hill. Data analysis using regression and multi-
level/hierarchical models. Cambridge University Press, 2007.
[86] Ian C. Goulter and Ahad Kazemi. Spatial and Temporal Groupings of Water Main Pipe
Breakage in Winnipeg. Canadian Journal of Civil Engineering, 15(1):91–97, 1988.
[87] Vincent M. Guillaumot, Pablo L. Durango-Cohen, and Samer M. Madanat. Adaptive Opti-
mization of Infrastructure Maintenance and Inspection Decisions under Performance Model
Uncertainty. Journal of Infrastructure Systems, 9(4):133–139, 2003.
[88] Ahmad Habibian. Effect of Temperature Changes on Water-Main Breaks. Journal of In-
frastructure Systems, 120(2):312–321, 1994.
[89] Yacov Y. Haimes. On the Definition of Resilience in Systems. Risk Analysis, 29(4):498–
501, 2009.
[90] Trevor Hastie, Robert Tibshirani, and Jerome Friedman. The Elements of Statistical Learn-
ing: Data Mining, Inference, and Prediction, Second Edition. Springer, 2009.
[91] Kjellrun Hiss Hauge, Anne Blanchard, Gisle Andersen, Ragnhild Boland, Bjørn Einar,
Daniel Howell, Sonnich Meier, Erik Olsen, and Frode Vikebø. Inadequate risk assess-
ments A study on worst-case scenarios related to petroleum exploitation in the Lofoten
area. Marine Policy, 44:82–89, 2014.
[92] Haibo He and Edwardo A. Garcia. Learning From Imbalanced Data. IEEE Transactions on
Knowledge and Data Engineering, 21(9):1263–1284, 2009.
[93] Elizabeth Kemp Herrera, Aimee Flannery, and Michael Krimmer. Risk and Resilience Anal-
ysis for Highway Assets. Transportation Research Record: Journal of the Transportation
Research Board, 2604(1):1–8, 2017.
[94] F. Owen Hoffman and Jana S. Hammonds. Propagation of Uncertainty in Risk Assessments:
The Need to Distinguish Between Uncertainty Due to Lack of Knowledge and Uncertainty
Due to Variability. Risk Analysis, 14(5):707–712, 1994.
[95] Seyedmohsen Hosseini, Kash Barker, and Jose E. Ramirez-Marquez. A review of definitions
and measures of system resilience. Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 145:47–61,
2016.
[96] Lan Huang, Linda W. Pickle, and Barnali Das. Evaluating Spatial Methods for Investi-
gating Global Clustering and Cluster Detection of Cancer Cases. Statistics in Medicene,
27(25):5111–5142, 2009.
[97] Marijke Huysman, Tamas Madarasz, and Alain Dassargues. Risk Assessment of Groundwa-
ter Pollution Using Sensitivity Analysis and Worst Case Scenario Analysis. Environmental
Geology, 50(2):180–193, 2006.
135
[98] Gurobi Optimization Inc. Gurobi Optimizer Reference Manual, 2014.
[99] SCIENTECH Inc. VSAT User’s Manual (Vulnerability Self-Assessment Tool). Technical
report, Association of Metropoligy Seweages Agencies, 2002.
[100] Calvin D. Jaeger, Michael M. Hightower, and Teresa Torres. Evolution of Sandia’s Risk
Assessment Methodology for Water and Wastewater Utilities (RAM-W). In World Environ-
mental and Water Resources Congress 2010, pages 3804–3010, 2010.
[101] Lindsay Jenkins, Sanjiv Gokhale, and Mark McDonald. Comparison of Pipeline Failure Pre-
diction Models for Water Distribution Networks with Uncertain and Limited Data. Journal
of Pipeline Systems Engineering and Practice, 6(2):04014012, 2015.
[102] Golam Kabir, Ngandu B. S. Balek, and Solomon Tesfamariam. Consequence-based frame-
work for buried infrastructure systems: A Bayesian belief network model. Reliability Engi-
neering and System Safety, 180:290–301, 2018.
[103] Konstantinos Kakoudakis, Kourosh Behzadian, Raziyeh Farmani, and David Butler.
Pipeline failure prediction in water distribution networks using evolutionary polynomial re-
gression combined with K -means clustering. Urban Water Journal, 14(7):737–742, 2017.
[104] Maarten J. Kallen and Jan M. Van Noortwijk. Optimal maintenance decisions under imper-
fect inspection. Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 90(2-3):177–185, 2005.
[105] Yutaka Kano and Akira Harada. Stepwise variable selection in factor analysis. Psychome-
trika, 65(1):7–22, 2000.
[106] Stanley Kaplan and B John Garrick. On The Quantitative Definition of Risk. Risk Analysis,
1(1):11–27, 1981.
[107] Matthias Karl, Richard F Wright, Tore F Berglen, and Bruce Denby. Worst Case Scenario
Study to Assess the Environmental Impact of Amine Emissions from a CO2 Capture Plant.
International Journal of Greenhouse Gas Control, 5(3):439–447, 2011.
[108] Y. Kawaguchi, Yun-Hui Liu Yun-Hui Liu, T. Tsubouchi, and S. Arimoto. An Efficient
Algorithm Of Path Planning For An Internal Gas Pipe Inspection Robot. Proceedings of the
IEEE/RSJ International Conference on Intelligent Robots and Systems, 2:1155–1160, 1992.
[109] David J. Kerr, Amanvir Singh, and Imran Motala. Understanding Risk and Resilience to
Better Manage Water Transmission Systems. In Pipelines 2015, number 20, pages 1772–
1785, 2015.
[110] A.J. Kettler and C. Goulter. An Analysis of Pipe Breakage in Urban Water Distribution
Networks. Canadian Journal of Civil Engineering, 12(1):286–293, 1986.
[111] Faisal I. Khan and Mahmoud M. Haddara. Risk-based maintenance (RBM): A quantitative
approach for maintenance/inspection scheduling and planning. Journal of Loss Prevention
in the Process Industries, 16(6):561–573, 2003.
136
[112] Faisal I. Khan, Rahed Sadiq, and Mohamed M. Haddara. Risk-based inspection and main-
tenance (RBIM) Multi-attribute Decision-making with Aggregative Risk Analysis. Process
Safety and Environmental Protection, 82(6):398–411, 2004.
[113] J.F. Kiefner and P.H. Vieth. A Modified Criterion for Evaluating the Remaining Strength of
Corroded Pipe. Technical report, Battelle Columbus Div., OH (USA), 1989.
[114] J Kim, C. Baek, D. Jo, E. Kim, and M. Park. Optimal planning model for rehabilitation of
water networks. Water Science and Technology, 4(3):133–148, 2004.
[115] S. Kirkpatric, C.D. Gelatt, and M.P. Vecchi. Optimization by Simulated Annealing. Science,
220(4598):671–680, 1983.
[116] Y. Kleiner and Balvant Rajani. Forecasting Variations and Trends in Water-Main Breaks.
Journal of Infrastructure Systems, 8(4):122–131, 2002.
[117] Yehuda Kleiner and Balvant Rajani. Comprehensive Review of Structure Deterioration of
Water Mains: Statistical Models. Urban Water, 3(3):151–164, 2001.
[118] Yehuda Kleiner and Balvant Rajani. Forecasting Variations and Trends in Water-Main
Breaks. Journal of Infrastructure Systems, 8(4):122–131, 2002.
[119] Yehuda Kleiner and Balvant Rajani. Comparison of four models to rank failure likelihood
of individual pipes. Journal of Hydroinformatics, 14(3):659, 2012.
[120] Maria Koliou, John W. van de Lindt, Therese P. McAllister, Bruce R. Ellingwood, Maria
Dillard, and Harvey Cutler. State of the research in community resilience: progress and
challenges. Sustainable and Resilient Infrastructure, pages 1–21, 2017.
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